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CIVILIZATION

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VISCOUNT SAMUEL, G.C.B., G.B.E., M.A., HON.D.C.L.

IN what, after all, does civilization consist? If Japanese aggression in China were successful, would it bring to the Chinese a higher civilization or subject them to a lower? Sidney and Beatrice Webb entitled their spacious survey of present-day Russia *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?* with a query at the end. In a postscript to that book they give reasons why they think that query might be omitted. But Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco assert that Communism is not a civilization at all, but an embodiment of the forces of destruction, to be resisted at all costs and to the death. History has accorded the title of "the Great" only as a rule to the mighty conquerors—Alexander, Charles, Frederick, Napoleon. "And we avow ourselves," said Odysseus, "to be the men of Agamemnon, son of Atreus, whose fame is even now the mightiest under heaven, so great a city did he sack, and destroyed many people." But is that the true standard of greatness?

In our ordinary lives we have to decide every day which values are best. Take for example the problems of the educationist. How far should the education of children be literary and humanistic, or scientific and utilitarian, theological, artistic, athletic, military? Different schools of thought, here and elsewhere, put different values upon these elements. Which is right? Or are all of them right? Or none of them?

Consider the problem which underlies the economic situation in this country—and in all countries. The advance in science, invention, and technical organization and skill has vastly and rapidly increased the productivity of industry and agriculture. The benefits of that

progress may be distributed in various ways. They may go to the employing class in larger profits. Or they may go to the workers: in better wages, or else in more leisure; or perhaps in less labour for married women, young persons, or children. They may go to the consumers: in lower prices, or in the better quality of goods, or in more convenient methods of distribution. They may be diffused in a growing expenditure upon forms of trade competition. Or they may be taken by governments in taxation; and spent either upon social services and the like, or upon armaments and war. The political and economic controversies of our time spring very largely from differences of opinion as to the comparative worth and necessity of these various purposes.

The market values of commodities themselves are not determined, as Marx taught, by the amount and quality of the labour needed for their production, but in the first place by the ideas that govern the demand for them. A country house, which cost perhaps a hundred thousand pounds fifty years ago, may not be worth one thousand to-day; the bigger it is and the more it cost, the less it is worth. As much labour would be needed to produce a crinoline now as in the eighteen-sixties; it would have fetched a price then, it is worthless to-day. A fat pig has considerable value in Chicago; it has none in Mecca or Tel-Aviv.

To take a different class of cases: young men and women have to choose occupations of some kind; and the choice is not solely a question of opportunity, but in varying degree also of predilection. Unless we are to be like thistledown, blown haphazard upon the wind, taking root or failing to take root wherever the floating seed may rest, there must be some judgement as to the kind of life, within the limits that are open, that is most worth while.

The answers given to all such questions determine the kind of civilization we shall have. In turn, the kind of civilization that we have helps to determine the answers that we give. We are in a circle; our choice of values determines our civilization, and our civilization determines our choice of values. Unless we can find some standpoint outside the circle where we can frame an independent criterion, we may go on for ever round and round.

For thousands of years religion set the standards. The character of a civilization was determined by its creed. It was a Christian civilization or Islamic, Buddhist or Hindu, Confucian or Shinto. God had spoken, or the prophets and the sages; the peoples had only to accept. Beliefs crystallized into customs. In Europe all through the Middle Ages civilization was based on Christian theology —the theology especially of St. Thomas Aquinas, which had drawn into alliance Aristotle's philosophy and found its interpreters in the

Church and the Schoolmen. Throughout the Middle East and among Moslems elsewhere the Suras of the Koran gave the answer to every problem. The Crusades were the typical manifestation, on the one side and on the other, of the civilizations of the age. Judaism had become largely a matter of Rabbinics, the meticulous application of verbally inspired texts. In India the caste system grew up as a religious ordinance. In China popular Confucianism and Taoism developed their own codes of morals.

There came the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the beginnings in Europe of modern science. Astronomy, and physics in general, anatomy, and all branches of physiology began rapidly to develop, and there arose straightway the great conflict between the established theology and the new science. Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stake; Galileo was indicted and persecuted; Spinoza excommunicated by the synagogue; Descartes intimidated by the attacks of theologians.

When the cause of intellectual liberty had won the victory the scope of the human mind speedily expanded. It no longer felt itself, to quote a sentence of Mr. H. G. Wells, "boxed in imaginatively by the Creation and the Day of Judgement." It saw its background in a history immensely prolonged and visualized an almost boundless future.

The eighteenth century brought the *philosophes* of France and their Encyclopaedia; the "Philosopher Kings" of Prussia, Austria, Russia, Sweden, and Spain; in England appeared the precursors of the Philosophic Radicals, who were to influence so greatly the century that followed. Philosophy was no longer conditioned by theology, but began itself to mould religious thought.

With Kant the idealist school arose, acquired a predominant position, but brought no conclusions generally agreed. Authority, whether religious or philosophic, was found to be insufficient. To fill the need, various currents of thought flowed in. Science was inclined to materialism, and set a trend that way. Marxism followed the trend; the aggrieved elements in an economic system disorganized by the Industrial Revolution found in it a creed and a purpose. Then came Nietzsche and the intuitionists starting an anti-intellectual movement; and that movement gave room for Sorel, Spengler, and the philosophy of violence. Out of these ideas have now arisen the Fascism of Italy and the National-Socialism of Germany. A lack of accepted standards in morals and politics have led thought into chaos, action into confusion, and have given us the world that we see around us to-day.

"Turn back, O Man, forswear thy foolish ways," says a poet of our time. His words would find an echo in many minds. Widespread

among us is the feeling that there must be a fresh start. It is often said that in these days civilization itself is in peril. But in what civilization consists, or should consist, we do not quite know; and not everyone is sure that the civilization we now have deserves to be saved from whatever perils may threaten it.

Who is to answer these questions? Who is to give us the independent criterion of values that we need? Where shall we find again the authority that has been lost?

"The philosophy which a nation receives," wrote Emerson, "rules its religion, poetry, politics, arts, trades, and whole history." But the nations of to-day do not receive—or at all events do not accept —any coherent philosophy of any kind. The reason is not far to seek. It obviously comes from the disagreements among philosophers. The ordinary man might be willing to accept their guidance if they spoke with one voice, but wisely recognizes that he is not competent to decide between them when they differ. "Moreover," as Dr. Joad says, "many of the disputes of philosophers are disputes about what exactly it is that they are disputing about."

Bishop Gore wrote in his Gifford Lectures: "It must of course be admitted that if a student to-day reads in succession the works of a number of contemporary or almost contemporary philosophers—surrendering himself to each in turn before he seeks to estimate the ultimate value of his speculations—he will be impelled towards a final scepticism, because he will find the conclusions, confidently presented to him for acceptance, so different and irreconcilable. But to acquiesce in the sceptical attitude which is content to find all views interesting, while abandoning the attempt to reach a conclusion or conviction of one's own, is to abandon the very aim of reason, which is the conviction of truth." Yet to this surrender many thinkers feel themselves obliged to consent, in despair of reaching definite conclusions.

Some among them find an excuse by asserting that, after all, it is the search that matters and not the finding. They accept the defeatism which says—I have heard Lord Baldwin use the quotation more than once—"it is better to travel hopefully than to arrive."

Or else they take refuge in a theory that at bottom a man's philosophy can never be anything more than the expression of his temperament. Professor Schiller, whose death a few months ago all the members of this Institute deeply deplore, published a book not long before with the title, *Must Philosophers Disagree?* He came to the conclusion that they must; because, he wrote, "every philosophy was the offspring, the legitimate offspring, of an idiosyncrasy, and the history and psychology of its author had far more to do with its development than *der Gang der Sache selbst.*" Elsewhere Schiller wrote, "Behind all philosophy lies human nature, and in

every philosopher there lurks a man." This is the same as Fichte's doctrine, "The kind of philosophy that a man chooses depends upon the kind of man that he is."

Such views may be amusing; they have in them a touch of good-humoured cynicism; but if they were taken seriously they would be fatal to any prospect of help from philosophy in finding an issue from our troubles. Philosophy would sink into a matter of personal taste. As Gore says, "to abandon all hope of forming a decision of our own, and to be content to find all opinions interesting . . . is ignoble." We may rather take our stand with Professor Laird, who, asking "What is the relation of contemporary philosophy to contemporary temperaments?" answers, "This question seems to me to be essentially unfair. It assumed that there should be stock philosophies for stock figures when the truth is that a good philosophy should be able to dominate every temperament."

But where is philosophy to find its title to dominate? How is it to escape from the swamp of mere speculation, of assertion and counter-assertion, of "proclamation without proof"?—to borrow a phrase of Professor Radhakrishnan. For my own part, I feel convinced that we shall find firm ground, that we shall be able to make a fresh start with any hope of success, only if philosophy, with full deliberation, accepts science as its basis. Premisses for philosophy, I firmly believe, can be found nowhere but in the conclusions of science.

The school of thought initiated by Kant and Hegel, which with its various developments was predominant in Europe for more than a century, is essentially anthropocentric. It starts, not with the universe, but with the faculties and processes of the human mind. To many a student it seems that, after an immense and pertinacious elaboration of ingenious logical thought, it produces at the end of the argument nothing different from the assumptions that were put in at the beginning—unless indeed something fresh has surreptitiously been slipped in during the process, usually under cover of some verbal ambiguity. Each dialectic appears convincing until the next dialectician shows its omissions and inconsistencies; himself to be refuted in turn by the one who comes after. Meanwhile decades, generations go by; and philosophy goes on, intangible and elusive, giving to the hungry and thirsty human soul just such food and drink as the ironic gods gave to Tantalus.

It may be said that, since there is no permanency in science, since its conclusions change as knowledge grows, philosophy on this principle will find its premisses ever shifting. To some extent this must be so. And is it wrong that it should be so? If in earlier times philosophy had had at its disposal the knowledge that has now

been brought by physics, chemistry, psychology, biology in all its branches; and the social sciences also, politics, economics, eugenics —can we doubt that it would have shaped itself differently? Plato and Aristotle must needs have written differently, and Descartes and Spinoza. As Wildon Carr has said, "If Immanuel Kant had lived in our day, he could not have written *The Critique of Pure Reason* without such fundamental modifications as would have made it not only another book but a new philosophy, even though his old philosophy should have been contained in it." And there is no reason to doubt—or to regret—that in so far as the basic conclusions of the science of the next century will differ from those of the science of to-day the philosophy of the next century will be modified correspondingly. There must be what Ernst Mach called "the gradual accommodation of thoughts to facts."

We may see, looking back, that it was the dualism of Descartes that set us on the wrong track. His principles, says Whitehead, "lead straight to the theory of a materialistic, mechanistic nature, surveyed by cogitating minds. After the close of the seventeenth century science took charge of the materialistic nature, and philosophy took charge of the cogitating minds. Some schools of philosophy admitted an ultimate dualism; and the various idealistic schools claimed that nature was merely the chief example of the cogitations of minds. But all schools admitted the Cartesian analysis of the ultimate elements of nature." Whitehead adds that philosophy, emphasizing Mind, was out of touch with science during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; but, he says, "it is creeping back into its old importance owing to the rise of psychology and its alliance with physiology." And he speaks elsewhere of "the groundwork of common experience which is the final test of all science and philosophy."

The human mind has ever sought a window through which it might look upon the universe; idealistic philosophy gave it only a mirror, so that it was merely itself that it saw.

From this the conclusion does not follow that philosophy is to be regarded as nothing more than a branch of science without specific functions of her own. She may draw her materials from science, but she must choose her tasks and reach her results for herself. As Professor Laird puts it, "Philosophy has never flourished except in alliance with the sciences, and also has never flourished when it was prepared to plod humbly after them."

We may regard, then, the frontier where science and philosophy meet, where the conclusions of the one are handed across to become the premisses of the other, as the vital centre in the wide realm of thought.

If this general conception were accepted, it would lead straightway to an immense simplification of metaphysics.

Take for example the principle of causality, which has given rise to such vast and subtle dissertations. For science there is nothing transcendental about it. Causation is merely a statement of fact, a name for a process; certain events in combination are followed by other events; we call the first "causes" and the others "effects." As soon as the conditions are present together the effect necessarily follows. That is the position from the scientific standpoint, and is there any reason why philosophy should spend her energies in seeking anything more recondite?

It is true that there has arisen in recent years, as we all know, a school of physicists—Heisenberg, Bohr, Schrödinger, Eddington, and others—who challenge the principle of causality itself, and assert that an opposite principle of uncertainty operates throughout nature. When I first ventured to address the Institute on this subject—on a similar occasion to this five years ago—it appeared that that theory was becoming predominant in physics and was likely to influence philosophy profoundly. Since then the movement of thought has been the other way—largely owing to the repudiation of Heisenberg's theory by the two most eminent theoretical physicists of our time, Einstein and Planck, and its non-acceptance by the most eminent experimental physicist, Lord Rutherford—a man illustrious throughout the world, whose death is universally mourned, and most of all by those who had the great privilege of his warm-hearted friendship.

The recent International Congress of Philosophy, held in Paris, assigned one of its sections to this question of indeterminism; and I was interested to find that far the greater volume of opinion, expressed in the papers submitted and in the discussions, was against the indeterminists. Until fresh reason is shown to the contrary, philosophers are under no obligation to abandon the earlier doctrine, held with unanimity by all scientists for many generations, that the processes of nature are uniform, that pure hazard does not enter, that effects follow causes with certainty, and that like causes always produce like effects.

Consider another of the great simplifications that will follow if philosophy frankly accepts the conclusions of science as its own starting-point. The scientific world is agreed as to the validity of the principle of evolution, whatever controversy there may still be with regard to natural selection as its biological method. Man, therefore, must see himself as an offspring from lower organisms, and his mind as occupying, not a quasi-creative position—not a "position of miraculous privilege," to quote Professor Laird again—but the status of the organ of intelligence of one creature among

thousands, or possibly millions. Consequently we must primarily regard man as from the universe, and no longer, as the idealists sought to do, primarily regard the universe as from man. As Professor A. D. Ritchie has written: "There are many possible ways of approach to philosophy, and there is also an impossible one, though one that has often been tried. That the philosopher can somehow spin his philosophy out of what he finds inside himself, that he has some private internal source of information in virtue of which he can decide what the universe must be, without needing to take the trouble to look at it, is a belief that dies hard."

Consider again how great will be the alleviation to philosophy when all the metaphysical discussions on such subjects as "colour" disappear; it being discovered that there is nothing there to be discussed. We know now how the different colours, as we term them, arise from the fact that a ray of ordinary light, when it falls upon an object, is split up into a number of component rays of different wave-lengths; some of these are absorbed into the atoms of which the object is made up, and others are reflected. If a group of these reflected rays enter a human eye, they cause a sensation in the brain which we call seeing a red or green or yellow object, or whatever the particular colour may be, depending upon the length of the waves of the radiation. But "colour," as such, in the abstract is non-existent. It is our name for that group of phenomena. Physics tells us about the rays, and physiology and psychology tell us about the sensations. Consequently there is nothing for philosophy to discuss; except indeed the nature and value of the emotions which colour may evoke—when we see a sunset, for example, or flowers, or a painting; and the nature and value of a universe of which such emotions form part.

I would submit another of the gains to philosophy from the simplification which will follow an acceptance of scientific conclusions; it comes from the establishment by physics of the unity of space-time. Here the consequences seem likely to be revolutionary. All the long and elaborate discussions on the nature of absolute Time and its relations with absolute Space, all the metaphysics which turn on the idea of pure Duration, fade away. They are deprived of their very subject-matter. It is futile to discuss Time in itself, or Duration in itself, if there is no such thing.

The ingenious speculations of Mr. J. W. Dunne on what he terms Serial Time have attracted much attention of late. The plays of Mr. Priestley, based upon those speculations, are a rare example of metaphysics penetrating into daily life, and even fascinating crowded audiences in the theatre. But are the metaphysics sound? Is the popular mind being enlightened or being confused? Let us pause to examine the question that is involved.

The investigation of the structure of the atom has proved that at the heart of things there is motion. Within each atom electrical units of various kinds are in incessant movement with inconceivable frequencies. We imagine that a piece of rock at the heart of a mountain remains the same continually from one million years to another. If we could see into its innermost substance, we should find that it does not remain the same from one-millionth of a second to the next.

There can be no physical existence without some kind of motion. Motion involves that something is at one *time* in one *place* and at another *time* in another *place*. It is therefore impossible that there should be motion in space alone or in time alone; there can be motion only in a combination of the two. Try to separate them, and motion would cease. Without motion nothing could exist. Hence we are brought to the inescapable conclusion that absolute time apart from space, or absolute space apart from time, are conceptions that have no counterpart in the perceived universe. They are no more than empty imaginings of the human mind. It may be said that we can divide space into miles or acres or inches; and time into years or days or seconds; and that these are quite different. But such divisions, considered in isolation, are conventional fictions only. Since absolute Space and absolute Time represent nothing actual in the universe, they can be of no value to philosophy. The only basis for metaphysical speculation, therefore, is the conception of the single indivisible Space-Time.

We are meeting in London on a Tuesday. We assume that London is in one category and Tuesday in another. London, we say, was here on Monday and will be here on Wednesday; the conceptions of place and of time are altogether separate. But on consideration we shall see that that is not so. If we wish to state the facts correctly, we should say that we are meeting in London-as-it-is-on-this-Tuesday; or we could meet in London-as-it-is-on-a-Wednesday, or on any other day; but it is not possible to meet in a London on no day, for London could not exist apart from time. Nor could we meet on a Tuesday nowhere, for that could not exist either. There can be no "duration" unless there is something that endures.

It has long been recognized that it is impossible to separate in actuality the three spatial dimensions of length, breadth, and thickness. We may write books of geometry in which points are discussed possessing none of those dimensions; or lines which have one dimension; or plane surfaces which have two; and it is useful to engage in such discussions because of the deductions that can be drawn from them by other sciences, or in practical life; or indeed because of the intellectual exercise. But we have always known quite

well that there are no such things in reality as points or lines or planes as so defined.

The conclusion is that if philosophy is to deal with the actual universe; if it is to be something more than a mere exercise in logic, a kind of intellectual game played with counters which are conventionally given an artificial value and according to rules invented by the players—then it must accept the fact that a separate Space and a separate Time are non-existent, and that it is futile to spend energy in discussing them.

Once grasp this conception of an indivisible Space-time and speculations such as those of Mr. Dunne are deprived of their first premiss. You may represent Time in general as T, and particular times as t_1, t_2, t_3, and so forth; you may make use of these symbols in ingenious equations, and apply them in "an infinite regress." Nevertheless they do not mean anything actual. Time apart from extension is merely a word. In the universe that we can perceive you cannot separate time from things. Events can no more take place twice over than a loaf of bread can be eaten twice over.

Caesar died, stabbed in the Senate-house at Rome, on the Ides of March in the year that we call 44 B.C. At a particular moment his heart ceased beating, his lungs stopped breathing, his vital processes ceased. An astronomer might have determined the precise moment by sidereal time, by the positions that were occupied by the earth, the sun, and certain stars when Caesar drew his last breath. That event and that moment were unique in the history of the universe. No question of relativity, or of "t_1, t_2, t_3," or of infinite regresses, could make Caesar die twice, or that position of the earth, sun, and stars occur twice. And so with every event that has happened or will happen, with every phenomenon and every thought.

Mr. Dunne in his books gives many interesting examples of prevision. What the explanation of those occurrences may be I do not know; but I feel convinced that it cannot be any form of "Serial Time," of dual or multiple happenings.

The conception of a unified Space-time must rule out also such ideas as that of "pull from the future." General Smuts, in his *Holism and Evolution*, writes (speaking of an organism): "The pull of the future is almost as much upon it as the push of the past, and both are essential to the character, function, and activities which it displays in the present." Professor Arnold Toynbee, in his *A Study of History*, quotes, with concurrence, another passage in the same book: "The Universe . . . has a trend; it has a list. It has an immanent Telos. It belongs to or is making for some greater whole. And the pull of this greater whole is enregistered in its inmost structures." If such expressions as "the pull of the greater whole that the universe is making for" are merely figures of speech, well

and good. It would be pedantic to quarrel with them. Or if they are merely intended to convey the fact that organisms, man among them, are animated by purpose, by a desire to attain to something which may be expected to come later, then they are obviously expressing a reality. It is not indeed a pull from the future; it is a push, due to experiences in the past showing their effects in the present and giving an impulse forward. But there is nothing actual which "pulls" the acorn to become an oak. It is pushed by the constitution and capacities it has inherited from the past. If those expressions are meant to imply that there is such a thing as "the future," which has actuality and can exercise some kind of influence, then they can only mislead and confuse us.

The last example that I would submit of the simplification that may come to philosophy if it consents to take science as its purveyor relates to the long effort that has been made to define universals: What is the nature of "the Absolute"? What is the meaning of "the Good"? and so forth. If philosophy has not been able to present any definition, for instance of "the Good," that will meet with general acceptance, may it not be because there is no such thing? If the idea is no more than an artificial abstraction drawn from the many particular goods that constitute reality, it is not surprising that it cannot be defined apart from those particulars. Life does not offer us "the Good" any more than nature offers us "the Tree." So also philosophy has failed to find "the sanction for morality" —to take another example—because there are many sanctions, and not one only, as we may see around us every day. I would venture to suggest that the most dangerous word in the whole philosophic vocabulary is the apparently humble and insignificant word "the."

Kant had one great advantage over all the philosophers who came after him: he did not have to spend years of his life studying Kant. The longer the list of the classic philosophers extends the more the mind of the student is liable to be clogged by the mass of historical knowledge he is required to absorb. It is not a question of "going back to Spinoza," to use a phrase sometimes heard nowadays. It is not a question of going back to anyone. Philosophy ought not to be a matter of choosing one of a series of pigeon-holes inscribed with the names of thinkers or of schools of thought, of creeping in and sliding to the cover. Philosophy, I would submit, should rather devote itself in these days to a new clarification of its own ideas in the light of those new and fundamental discoveries of science. Then it may seek a synthesis with science and with religion. It is that threefold synthesis which may be able to offer to the world the guidance it so urgently needs; may be able to tell us

what values are really worth while, in what a high civilization really consists.

Such a synthesis will not give us, indeed, a definite programme of practical action. That is the province of politics and economics, of the specialized sciences, and of religion separately; religion moulded no doubt by philosophy and by science, but animated by its own authentic spirit and bringing its own specific contribution. The function of philosophy, in union with the others, is rather to set the aims which practical action should seek. As Hume said, "We come to a philosopher to be instructed how we shall choose our ends, more than the means for attaining the ends."

But mark the number of practical issues besetting our minds day by day on which this synthesis of philosophy, science, and religion will have a bearing.

Is the State or nation a real entity, as Hegel taught and the Nazis and Fascists believe? Or is it only one more "fictional abstraction"? Does the individual exist ultimately for the State, or the State for the individual?

Is war between nations the outcome of a supreme natural law of a struggle for existence leading to the survival of the fittest, and therefore in the end beneficent? Or is this merely a misapplication of biological conclusions to a sphere they do not fit?

Is it true that thermodynamics proves conclusively that the earth is doomed to become lifeless, as the moon is; that the universe itself is on the way to ultimate death? If so, does this involve a fundamental pessimism in our general outlook, with a repudiation of the optimistic element in the religious creeds?

Is it possible to find a sound basis for ethics apart from theology? If it is, in what does the basis consist? If it is not possible, does it follow that theological dogmas ought to be accepted even if they are believed not to be true?

How far, if at all, should political ideologies influence scientific conclusions? Sidney and Beatrice Webb, in their book on Soviet Communism, quote the following watchwords from *The Journal for Marxist-Leninist Natural Science*: "We stand for Party in Mathematics"; "We stand for the purity of the Marxist-Leninist theory in surgery." Is this an example to be imitated?

If the principle of Causality is acknowledged to be supreme, what will be effect upon the current popular superstitions? What shall we think, for example, of the Town Council of Margate, which decided in January 1937 that no house in any new street on its housing estates was to be numbered thirteen? What shall we think of some of our newspapers with vast circulations which print week by week columns of astrological prophecies under such titles as "The Stars Foretell"? And what shall we think of their readers?

These are features—some more important, some less—in the civilization of the twentieth century to which a synthesis of philosophy, science, and religion may address itself.

I would end by venturing, perhaps rashly, to submit some of my own beliefs as to the direction in which such a synthesis may lead us.

It may come to be recognized universally that, as Bernard Shaw says, "Civilization needs a religion as a matter of life and death." That religion will no doubt take various forms to meet the needs of various races and temperaments and under the influence of various traditions. But it can hardly fail to be at bottom theistic. I would remind you how many of the eminent philosophers of to-day accept the theistic position, conspicuous among them Whitehead, Alexander, Bergson, Lloyd Morgan. Religion in the future will necessarily be purged of ideas in the sphere of physics and biology that have been inherited from the past but are now discredited. It must be such as to invite and to satisfy both the saint and the scientist.

A fire, a mist, and a planet,
  A crystal and a cell,
A jellyfish and a saurian,
  And a cave where the cavemen dwell.
Then a sense of law and beauty,
  And a face turned from the clod,
Some call it Evolution,
  Others call it God.

The civilization that may come cannot be materialist. It will not lay too much emphasis on "things." Let each nation do honour to those of its members who are engaged in material production; but I cannot imagine a really great civilization being content to take as its symbol the tools of industry and agriculture, the hammer and the sickle; or spending for long its chief enthusiasm upon factories and tractors. That is to see in man a body that makes and consumes, rather than a mind that thinks and creates, understands, aspires and enjoys. A civilization in which economic factors are not kept as servants but are raised to be rulers, or even gods, can never suffice the human soul.

When the "fictional abstractions," as Vaihinger calls them; have disappeared, the individual man will be left clear-cut against the sky, no longer enshrouded by metaphysical mists. State, nation, industrial corporations and the like will be seen for what they are, nothing more than groupings or patterns of men and women. Then may be ended the domination of political myths; peoples will no longer be willing to surrender the right to think for themselves; no longer consent to become fodder for ideologies, as well as *kanonen-futter*;

no longer submit to be intellectually enslaved, to sink to the status of Helots of the mind.

A synthesis of philosophy, science, and religion will keep intuition in its proper place, make it subject always to the guidance of the rational judgement. It will not underestimate the value of common sense; will be suspicious of philosophic paradox; will believe that an idea need not be false merely because it is obvious, and that even a truism may still be true. It will find the road to wise conclusions in the worldwide and age-long process of observation and experiment, trial and error, practical experience and free discussion.

Among the truisms, among the things that are obvious, is the infinite mischief done by the two great evils of the modern world, War and Poverty. When Oswald Spengler says that "War is the creator of all great things" he gives us the authentic utterance of barbarism. Mankind will come to see that by far the greatest danger to its own welfare is the existence of States which combine technical strength with moral weakness, the possession of great means with indifference to good ends.

Nor will the future be likely to tolerate that mingling of splendour and squalor which the twentieth century has inherited from the eighteenth and nineteenth—a brilliant garment on a body dirty and diseased. First let the body be cleansed and cured; then array it. When intelligence and goodwill get fully to work on our social system, they will bring about great changes.

We see that the movement towards such ends as these has already succeeded in setting a fresh value on simplicity. Great mansions, for example, are gradually becoming anachronisms of the countryside, like the medieval castles that preceded them. Lavish display, troops of servants, are out of fashion, not only because of the pressure of equalitarian taxation, but also because private pomp sees itself to be an insult to poverty.

Art follows, as always, the predominant trend of thought. We see it now no longer creating ornament for ornament's sake; catering less for private luxury and more for ordinary comfort and general civic needs; aiming at imparting beauty to everyday things. We cannot doubt that that tendency will develop.

There have been signs indeed that this movement may overpass itself, going beyond the simple and beautiful to the merely primitive, which may also be the ugly. Because we prefer a Doric temple to the Albert Memorial, that is no reason why we should prefer the art of Easter Island or Benin to the Doric temple; no reason why we should prefer Epstein's "Genesis" to Michelangelo's "Dawn," the style of the Futurists or Surrealists to that of Rembrandt, or negroid music to the purity of Bach or the majesty of Beethoven.

It is easy to stress the evils of the civilization that is now around

us. We may easily come to think that it offers little else than evils. Yet the men of the Middle Ages, could they reappear, would envy us our freedom from the more constant wars, the more desperate poverty, the widespread ignorance, the unchecked diseases and constant epidemics from which they suffered. The study of the conditions of the past is often the best cure for pessimism about the present.

Nor is it true that our age is wholly deafened by its own noise and degraded by its own vulgarities. We read of the "noble simplicity and quiet greatness of the age of Pericles," and we draw a contrast. Yet there are many men and many women to-day, in all countries and among all classes, whose lives are marked by just those qualities. It is they who may be the precursors of the next age, and not the others.

"All the great ages," said Emerson, "have been ages of belief. I mean, when there was any extraordinary power of performance, when great national movements began, when arts appeared, when heroes existed, when poems were made, the human soul was in earnest, and had fixed its thoughts on spiritual verities." And all the great ages have had confidence in themselves and in the future; have been forward-looking; not critical merely and parasitical upon the past. Hellenism became decadent, became Hellenistic, when, as Whitehead puts it, "learning and learned taste replaced the ardour of adventure" and "genius was stifled by repetition." If a statue were to be designed symbolizing man, it might well be modelled on the statues of Janus, with two faces; one countenance regarding the past—and it would be the face of old age; one countenance turned to the future—the face of youth.

So philosophy coming out of its phase of classicism, science coming out of its phase of materialism, and religion from its servitude to dogmas that are outworn, may join in constructing a spiritual and intellectual framework for the future. They may give to mankind clear-cut ideas, simple, easily grasped, alive in the mind and powerful to guide conduct. "Meliorism" may become a key-word—the discard, that is to say, of both optimism and pessimism, with emphasis on the need and the hopefulness of effort to make things better.

Conscious Evolution may be another root idea. Man has come to understand, however imperfectly, his place in the history of things; his environment, and how in some degree it may be modified; his own nature, and how in some degree it may be moulded. The knowledge will stimulate his efforts, help to determine their direction, immensely accelerate the pace of his progress. "Man is in the making," Lowes Dickinson wrote, "but henceforth he must make himself. To that point Nature has led him out of the primeval slime. She has given him limbs, she has given him brain, she has given

him the rudiment of a soul. Now it is for him to make or mar that splendid torso. Let him look no more to her for aid; for it is her will to create one who has the power to create himself. If he fail, she fails; back goes the metal to the pot; and the great process begins anew. If he succeeds, he succeeds alone. His fate is in his own hands. Of that fate, did he but know it, brain is the lord, to fashion a palace fit for the soul to inhabit."

Such are the ideals to which our trinity, intimately unified, of philosophy, science, and religion may point. There we may see in what a true civilization consists. Lighted by that conception the landscape through which we are passing need not seem so gloomy, but will have the sunshine slanting through it.

GREAT THINKERS

(XIII) IMMANUEL KANT

Professor G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D., F.B.A.

The close proximity of the nineteenth century to our own age is an impediment in the way of tracing with confidence the lines of its intellectual development, and more especially of estimating the significance of its philosophical speculation. Certain characteristics of the latter are, however, already sufficiently obvious. It is clear, at any rate, that the chief attempts at philosophical construction in the nineteenth century were the outcome of German reflexion; it is clear also that the great thinker who died in 1804 set the current of speculative activity upon a course markedly distinguishable from any that had been followed in preceding centuries. As a philosophical epoch, the nineteenth century was emphatically the century of Kant. It began with the elaboration of the idealistic systems which have often been regarded as constituting the advance from Kant; it ended, after the culmination of those systems, in metaphysical conceptions that seemed the apotheosis of what had been propounded in Königsberg, with the demand for a "return to Kant," as the condition of philosophical speculation understanding itself and of pushing forward to new undertakings. In more ways than one Kant was the founder of modern philosophy. It was he who gave to the fundamental questions of philosophy the form which they still retain; it was he who first applied the methods of research by which solutions of these questions are still being sought.

Immanuel Kant was born in Königsberg, a small city on the extreme north-eastern frontier of Prussia, on April 22, 1724. He spent the whole of his life in Königsberg and never visited any towns other than those in his own province of East Prussia. His father was a poor but very worthy citizen, a saddler and strapmaker by trade; his mother was a woman of intelligence and of a deeply religious nature, largely influenced by the revivalist movement then of considerable influence in Germany known as Pietism. Kant himself always spoke of his father's ancestors as being of Scotch descent, but as to this there appears to be a great deal of doubt. He was the second of a family of nine children, only five of whom, however, survived the years of infancy. His early education was probably rendered possible by the generosity of one Dr. F. A. Schulz, who was the head of the most important school of Königsberg, the Collegium

Fredericianum, so called on account of its being endowed by Frederick the Great, and who was impressed by the manifest signs of promise which he discerned in his pupil. Schulz was a man of wide learning, and was also deeply imbued with the spirit of Pietism, and he evidently exerted considerable influence upon Kant's mental development. When the school years were over, Kant began to attend lectures at the age of eighteen, in the year 1740, at the University of Königsberg. He supported himself meanwhile by teaching, apparently also receiving some little help from an uncle. At the University he gained the personal friendship of the ablest of the professors, one Martin Knutzen, a man of distinct philosophical ability and well versed likewise in the principles of natural science. Through his advice, Kant commenced to study the works of Newton, and in the first instance his interest centred upon mathematical and physical investigations rather than upon philosophy. His earliest work, written in 1747, in his twenty-third year, and published in 1749, was an Essay *On the True Estimate of Moving Forces*; and six years later appeared his *General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*, an elaborate exposition of the nebular hypothesis of the origin of planetary systems, in which he anticipated by forty years the celebrated work of the great French Astronomer, Laplace. For nine years previous to the publication of this treatise in 1755 Kant had been obliged, through stress of circumstances, to act as domestic tutor in various families in the neighbourhood of Königsberg. In 1755 he returned, however, to the University, took his Degree as Doctor of Philosophy, and wrote the Latin Dissertation *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World* (published in 1770) to habilitate, as the Germans say, at the University—that is, to qualify himself for teaching there. He then became a Privat-Docent, a private lecturer, namely, without a salary, taking classes in Logic, Metaphysics, Physics, and Mathematics. The eleven years following were years of extreme hardship and poverty; he had to eke out a living by such stray appointments as he could get. His struggle in this respect was ended in 1770, when he was forty-six years of age, by his being appointed to the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in the University, the duties of which he continued to discharge until 1797, after which year he was prevented from lecturing through the increasing infirmities of age. It was during his career as a professor that his greater works were published. He died on February 12, 1804.

Kant's chief philosophical works, written during the period of his professorship at Königsberg, are the following: *Kritik of Pure Reason*, first edition, 1781; *Prolegomena to every Future Metaphysic*, 1783; *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, 1785; *Kritik of Pure Reason*, second edition, 1787; *Kritik of Practical Reason*, 1788;

Kritik of Judgement, 1790; *Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason*, 1793; *Metaphysic of Morals*, 1797.

It was only gradually that Kant succeeded in working his way to the point of view of the Critical Philosophy. As a student he had been brought up in the traditions of the philosophy of Leibniz, in the form in which that philosophy was then represented in the German Universities. C. F. Wolff, in trying to make Leibniz's philosophy consistent, had reduced it to a mere skeleton of what it was in its author's own hands, and had converted it into a barren system of logical distinctions. Wolff's whole mode of thinking may not unfairly be described as rationalism in its crudest and most arid aspect; and, as thus developed, it fell an easy prey to the more promising method of empirical investigation which had its home in England, and was then becoming familiar to German scholars. "I honestly confess," wrote Kant in the Preface to the *Prolegomena*, "that my recollection of David Hume's teaching was the very thing which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber, and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a new direction." It is, however, impossible in a single article to trace the stages of Kant's Pre-Critical period; and I proceed at once to an account of his philosophy in its mature form.

His own investigation Kant was wont to describe as "critical." And by the term "critical" he intended to emphasize the change in the point of view taken by himself from what had been adopted in the earlier philosophies especially of Leibniz and Wolff, but also, though not so explicitly, of Locke and Hume. Trained, as I have said, in the traditions of the first, awakened from the "dogmatic slumber" which that training had engendered in him by the sceptical doubts of the second, Kant, in his subsequent thinking, made it his aim to reconcile the elements of truth he discerned in each of these systems and to transcend them. In their own way, no doubt, Locke, Leibniz, and Hume had been critics too, critics of the conventional notions and assumptions prevalent in the science and popular thinking of their day. But, as a distinguishing mark of philosophical procedure, "criticism" had for Kant a specific and carefully defined meaning, a meaning which it had not previously borne and which it was not henceforward to lose. "Criticism," in his view of it, stood opposed to what he called "dogmatism." And by "dogmatism" he invariably understood any mode of dealing with facts purporting to be known facts without a previous inquiry into the significance and legitimacy of the notions by which such facts were interpreted. In seeking to determine the nature and relations of real things, metaphysical thinkers had freely employed conceptions such as those of ground and consequent, cause and effect, identity and difference, and the like; and, although Hume had called in question the validity of the

ordinary notion of causal connectedness, yet he had availed himself, without compunction, of most of the other categories, and the problem had never been seriously faced whether so-called "things" were rightly conceived by the help of these and such-like notions at all. The *impasse* before which the philosophy of the eighteenth century had found itself at a stand was, consequently, not surprising. If, for instance, "things" were regarded after a manner sufficiently familiar, as in some way "given" to the faculty of thought or intelligence, and if, further, these "things" were conceived as things-in-themselves, things, that is to say, existing in fulness of being independently of their being known, then it appeared to Kant evident that the only relation possible between the assumed "things" and the mind would be the relation indicated by the term "affections" or "modifications" of the mind, and that what was called knowledge of the supposed things-in-themselves could at the best be only knowledge of the results, the impressions, produced by them. In that case, not only would such knowledge in no sense be, what the interpreting notions made use of led to the belief it was, universal and necessary, but since it was in the first instance, at any rate, knowledge of the subjective furniture, so to speak, of the mind itself, the doubt must ever remain whether it adequately, or even at all, represented the nature and relations of real being. Indeed, one might push Kant's reflexions beyond the point to which he himself carried them in his own introductory statements, and insist that if what we take to be knowledge of things-in-themselves be thus in truth the merely subjective having of impressions, produced by such "things," there would be no means of explaining how from these "affections of the mind" there should grow up the wholly different mental attitude expressed by the phrase "knowledge of things." An *impasse* of this kind seemed, then, to Kant to be inevitable so long as the interpreting notions which reflective thought employed, and perhaps unavoidably employed, were not first of all subjected to critical scrutiny, and the precise significance they had, other than the obvious one of being modes in which a thinking mind orders and arranges its experience, ascertained. What the nature of a "thing" is apprehended as being will largely depend upon the interpreting notions applied in the process of its apprehension, and the peculiarity of the critical method lay in the preliminary justification it required of the interpreting notions thus applied.

Kant further described his investigation as "transcendental," and by this term likewise he gave expression to a characteristic feature of his method of research, a feature also distinctive of much of the speculation which has followed the Kantian. A transcendental treatment of experience was explicitly defined by Kant as one in which there is given the ground for *a priori* determinations in respect to

objects. By *a priori* determinations he meant determinations which are universal and necessary, as contrasted with what is taken to be *a posteriori* or particular. And, since all knowledge involves universal and necessary factors, since universal and necessary factors are essential to knowledge of whatsoever kind, a transcendental inquiry was in truth an inquiry into the nature of knowledge as such, an examination of knowledge undertaken with a view to exhibiting the conditions implied in knowing, or in being aware of, anything. A transcendental inquiry thus stood opposed to a psychological investigation into the way in which knowing as an operation or a process of an individual mind happens or is brought about. Considered as a complex of mental events or occurrences, an act of knowing is a particular fact in the natural world, an infinitesimal constituent of the great totality of existence; and, in endeavouring to trace its genesis and history, the psychologist is compelled to use the notions or categories, the *a priori* principles as Kant called them, without which the said act of knowing could not be known by him at all. The psychologist assumes that this fact, the occurrence, namely, of particular mental events, can be known; he assumes also that the means by which it is known are reliable and trustworthy. But it was just the assumed reliability and trustworthiness of the notions involved in knowledge, whether in knowledge of what we call material or of what we call mental facts, that appeared to Kant to offer to philosophy the initial problem it had to solve. This problem concerned not at all the natural circumstances under which knowing takes place in an individual mind; it concerned not at all the actual contents of the knowledge which might be obtained either by one individual or by any number of individuals. It was restricted to what may be called the logical conditions of knowledge and to determining the range within which knowledge on account of its nature must be confined.

To show, then, how knowledge of objects is possible, to discover the ground on which the validity of such knowledge is based, and to fix the boundaries beyond which the validity of what claimed to be knowledge could not be sustained, such was the task which Kant set for himself in the *Kritik of Pure Reason*. The outcome of his investigation may be said briefly to be the reverse of the familiar Platonic view of the relation of cognition and existence. Plato sharply distinguished the world of ultimate reality, the world of the Ideas (ἰδέαι or εἴδη), the eternal essences in a sphere transcending the sphere of time and space, from the world of phenomena, the world of sensuous things, subject to perpetual flux and change. Knowledge, in the strict acceptation of the term, ἐπιστήμη, there could be, so he held, of the former, but of the latter we become aware only through the dubious, uncertain medium of belief or opinion, δόξα, Kant, too,

was led, as a result of more than one line of consideration, to draw a sharp distinction between the world of ultimate realities, or noumena, as he named them, and the world of phenomena, or objects of sense. But, unlike Plato, he reached the conclusion that only of phenomena could there be, in the strict sense of the term, knowledge, whilst of noumena, of things-in-themselves, we were unable through the avenue of the understanding to form any positive conception. Kant, then, believed himself in the *Kritik*, on the one hand, to have established the trustworthiness of ordinary experience, and the validity of the reasoning exemplified in mathematics and the natural sciences, and, on the other hand, to have disposed of the claims of metaphysics to rank as a *Wissenschaft*.

Let us dwell for a while on some of the salient points yielded by the analysis of experience from which the conclusion just referred to was drawn. Kant's discoveries were numerous and important, but perhaps no one of them was of greater significance than his singling out the characteristic of *objectivity* as that which presented the central problem for a theory of knowledge. Why was it that what is known *stands over against* the knowing subject as other than and distinct from the act of knowing? How comes it that a subjective activity of the mind, be it produced or not produced by the influence of external things, should carry with it the unique feature, reference to an object? Expressed quite generally Kant's solution of the problem is the following. Sense data received into the *a priori* forms of intuition, space and time, are apprehended as constituents of objects in consequence of being wrought into the texture of experience through means of the pure notions of the understanding, or categories. The object cognized is, that is to say, essentially a complex of heterogeneous factors; and, in and by the act or process of cognizing, a synthesis or conjunction of these factors is brought about. The process involved, in the first place, the multiplicity of sense-material, sense presentations, mere impressions, not *per se* so much as cognizable, and devoid of any power to group or arrange themselves. These elements are *a posteriori*, particular and given, Kant was often inclined to suppose, by the action of real things upon the faculty of sensibility. The process involved, in the second place, two forms or general modes, in which the manifold of sensations is received. As universal conditions of sense perception, these forms of space and time, although sensuous in character, do not belong to any sense, nor are they, although general, notions or concepts. They are pure *a priori* intuitions, ways in which any intelligence that is like ours sensuously affected *must* receive the data of sense. The process involved, in the third place, the rules or principles according to which the given elements of sense are combined and, in being combined, are cognized. The manifold of sensuous stuff or material is in itself

a mere ἄπειρον, a merely indefinite mass of disjointed particulars; it can become content of knowledge only through being brought into relation with the unity of consciousness, the fundamental identity in the midst of difference. The supreme unity in conscious experience is the unity of the self or ego; and, as referred to the unity of the self or ego, the data of sense have imposed upon them systematic order and connectedness. The categories—such interpreting notions as those of quantity and quality, of substance, of cause, etc.—are the ways in which the Unity of Self-consciousness expresses itself in relation to the empirical detail, the modes in which self-consciousness plants itself out, so to speak, in the given material. And the gist of Kant's contention was that it is precisely the function of this act of synthesis to give to sense-presentations *the* centre of reference, *the* unity in difference, which is what we mean by their objectivity, that it is precisely the function of this act of synthesis to be productive of the peculiar component in the object which constitutes it, apart from its special concrete clothing, an object at all.

This contention is so opposed to our ordinary conceptions, and so crucial for the Kantian philosophy as a whole, that it is worth while running the risk of being wearisome in order to throw light upon it. Let me now try to state as simply as I can what I conceive to have been Kant's meaning. Popular reflexion habitually takes for granted that the dependent, given, impressed character of sense-affection is responsible for the reference involved in an act of perception to an object. Now, while it is true that in his unguarded moments Kant did sometimes allow himself to slip into phraseology that would seem to imply this popular doctrine, yet to him at any rate the credit is due of having unmistakably demonstrated its falsity. In his own way, he pressed the consideration that sense qualities as elements in the content perceived do not tell the story of their own origin. Be they "affections," or "impressions," or what not, still, even so, their impressed, produced, dependent character constitutes no part of the account they give of themselves to the subject apprehending them, and cannot, therefore, be the determining conditions of the subject's ascribing them to an external object. Kant left, indeed, undisturbed the common psychological view of the way in which sensations come about. But he did insist that as "impressions," as "affections of the mind," sensations are purely subjective modifications, and bring with them no report whatsoever of the source from which they come. Consequently, he turned to the other factors, which analysis had revealed as present in the complex whole called an object, to find an explanation of the characteristic of objectivity. Of these other factors, all are universal and necessary, and the categories, although not in themselves fully formed notions or products of thought, emanate from the spontaneity of the Ego, the

principle that thinks. How, then, can it be the function of the categories to give objective connectedness to the particulars of sense intuition? Is there not an air of paradox in attributing to the spontaneity of the *subject* precisely *the* characteristic in the object which leads us to determine the object as other than, or as standing over against, the subject? Kant's answer may be expressed in the following manner. The assertion would be paradoxical if the term "subject" in the first as in the second of these references denoted the individual mind. The Unity of the Subject, however, which finds expression in the categories is not to be identified with the individuality of the subject that opposes itself to the object. It is possible for each one of us to make of his own mental life matter of contemplation, and the inner life will, in that case, exhibit a variously compounded unity and identity, the unity and identity, Kant would have said, of an object, an object whose components differed unquestionably from the components of that kind of object which we describe as material, but nevertheless, in Kant's view, an object all the same. On the other hand, the Unity which was the source of the categories was not this unity, not the unity of an object, but the Unity which was implied as a prior condition in making even of the inner life itself matter of contemplation. The Unity which Kant distinguished as transcendental must be understood to refer to that aspect of consciousness of which we can offer no further explanation, because any explanatory term would be found to involve it as a precondition. "Consciousness in general" (*Bewusstsein überhaupt*), "original unchangeable consciousness," "the permanent and abiding Ego," "the correlatum of all our presentations"—these are some of the metaphors used by Kant in speaking of this fundamental principle of experience, metaphors which were intended to indicate partly its non-individual, partly its purely formal character. "It is," as William Wallace put it, "consciousness in general which is Kant's theme, just as it is granite in general, and not the block in yonder field, which is the theme of the geologist." Whilst then actualized, if the expression may be permitted, in each concrete centre of consciousness, consciousness in general yet transcends the latter in the aspect of what Windelband aptly described as "a super-individual function." In every act of knowing, the individual mind *must*, therefore, conform to the conditions imposed by consciousness as such; it was precisely in virtue of their being conditions due to the nature of consciousness in general that the categories were universal and necessary. Now, as involved in an individual's act of knowing, the universality and necessity of the categories come to recognition in and through the independent position assigned to the object. The object is apprehended by the individual as something external to and distinct from himself because the categories by means of which he apprehends it

are not his private property, but the common property of every self-conscious mind. Or, in other words, the characteristic feature of the object, its standing over against the apprehending subject, means that its empirical elements are arranged in a regular, definite, determinate manner, according to a fixed order or prescribed rule, that the individual subject, in apprehending what is offered to him in experience, is *compelled, constrained,* to conform to the conditions imposed by consciousness as such. The laws of the game are not laid down by him; he is forced to observe the terms on which it is to be played. And he experiences the constraint as something other than himself. The mode of synthesis, that is to say, is not at the mercy of his caprice; it does not vary in different individuals, it does not vary in the same individual at different times. And so, in contrast with his *changing* states, the object appears as *permanent,* as the correlate of "the unchanging consciousness," upon which also his empirical individual self, as an object, is dependent. To use Kant's own words, the object is that which steadies, that which gives stability to, the wandering manifold of sensuous intuition. And, he might have added, the object is likewise that which steadies, that which gives stability to, the transient states or phases of the individual mental life. For it is only in so far as the wandering manifold of intuition is thus steadied, through being referred to an object, that the individual subject becomes aware of his concrete self as one and identical. Were the manifold of intuition not referred to an object, "we should," Kant wrote, "have a self as many coloured and as various as the impressions we receive"; or, otherwise expressed there would neither be awareness of self nor any self to be aware of. The unity and identity of the self is realized in and through the unity and identity of the object; awareness of self and awareness of an object are correlative and inseparable aspects of experience.

The view taken by Kant of the constitution of the knowable universe follows directly from the analysis he offered of the structure of an object and of the conditions which render objective knowledge possible. As just indicated, subject and object, according to his conception of them, mutually involve each other; experienced fact, that is to say, can only be interpreted in terms of Mind or Intelligence. There can be no fact of the kind we experience as objective that is not related to the transcendental Unity of Consciousness. The latter, in so far as it finds expression in the categories, Kant called specifically the understanding (*Verstand*); and, whilst he would never allow that the understanding produces nature, whilst he would never allow that the concrete content of nature is derived from the understanding, yet he explicitly asserted that the understanding makes nature, makes it in its intelligible aspect as a systematic, orderly whole of inter-related parts. Nature, in his view, is a network of

thought-relations into which material has been imported; and, as imported, the material consists of sense-presentations capable of being formed into constituents of objects. Obviously, therefore, as constructions of Mind, and as composed partly of material given to mind, the objects of knowledge can only be phenomena or appearances, appearances, possibly, of a reality or realities not thus dependent for their existence upon mind, but appearances which in that case are essentially other than and distinct from that of which they are appearances. Within this enveloping unity of phenomenal experience, resting upon the transcendental Unity of Consciousness every knowable object is to be found; and science deserts its proper territory, and strays into regions of phantasm, when it essays to extend its province beyond the realm of sense experience. A science of nature is possible, but a science of things-in-themselves would be a contradiction in terms. For things-in-themselves are not, at any rate, sensations; they cannot, therefore, be received into the sensuous forms of space and time, they cannot be reduced into objects by being connected with the Unity of Self-consciousness through means of the categories. The effort to acquire scientific knowledge of ultimate reality turns out to be, in truth, only a delusive attempt to sensualize the Supersensible.

Nevertheless, the thing-in-itself was for Kant no excrescence on the critical philosophy; and, as Robert Adamson once said, it is very far from playing the part of "that convenient receptacle for difficulties of thought, the unknown and unknowable." Kant, it is true, restricted the range of positive scientific knowledge to the sphere of phenomena. But it was assumed by him as equally certain, throughout his treatment of experience, that the phenomenal itself indicates, contains a reference to, a realm of being other than the phenomenal. For, not only does reflexion on the nature of finite things leave us with a certain characteristic set of problems unsolved, it literally forces upon us the all-important distinction between the limitedness, the incompleteness, of the phenomenal world of knowledge and the infinitude, the completeness, of the world of real existence. It is to the lines of reflexion in question that I now direct attention.

In the first place, Kant laid, as we have seen, stress on the consideration that the Understanding is not productive of the world of objective fact. Nature is intelligible, so his contention runs, because it has being only as object for a thinking mind; and it must, therefore, possess those relations through which alone it becomes intelligible for a thinking mind. This intelligibility is, however, but the *form* of nature. Not only when we view nature in general but in the more special analysis of knowledge itself there appear in constant conjunction the material and the formal factors. Understanding,

which confers upon the matter of sense intelligible form, has still to accept the sensuous matter. The form of nature, the variety of ways in which its parts are related to one another, depends upon and expresses the Unity of Consciousness. But nature is more than a system of relations; it is a system of related *facts*. And the concrete content of these facts cannot be explained as in like manner dependent upon and expressive of the Unity of Consciousness. The particular elements in the context of experience are, so far as consciousness is concerned, contingent, accidental, empirical. Nature, then, is dependent upon intelligence in that its form as a related system implies intelligence; it is not dependent upon intelligence for its material, its sensuous detail. These foreign factors, adopted by intelligence, are due, Kant found himself impelled to say, although he was aware that it is a hazardous mode of speech, to excitation of the mind; and the admission of such excitation requires the postulation of a reality beyond experience as its cause. On this account, therefore, the object known must be regarded as merely phenomenal of the thing-in-itself.

The weakest position of the Kantian philosophy comes here to view, and Jacobi summed up the difficulties of most students of the *Kritik* when he declared that without the supposition we have been considering he had found it impossible to enter into the critical system, whilst with it he had found it impossible to remain therein.[1] One objection to the doctrine in question is obvious at the outset. Whoever avails himself of the conception of sensations as "affections" or "excitations" of the mind is, *ex hypothesi*, identifying the mind of which he is speaking with the concrete individual existence of a particular conscious subject at some specific interval of time and under specific empirical conditions. But, as we have already seen, the Kantian theory in regard to the intelligible relations of natural phenomena is by no means synonymous with the doctrine, propounded, for example, by Berkeley, that the objects of experience are dependent upon the existence of individual conscious subjects. Quite the contrary. The proof offered of the necessary implications of conscious intelligence in nature had been perfectly general in its scope and had been limited by no one of its terms to the particular concrete existence of the individual thinking subject. Nay, Kant had insisted, as I have tried to make clear, that the existence of concrete individual subjects itself called for and was capable of interpretation only in terms appropriate to a world conceived as involving, or dependent upon, Thought or Intelligence. The transcendental Unity of Consciousness was not, that is to say, an existing entity that could be acted upon, or influenced by, other existing entities; it was a general principle, a logical condition, realized in particular existents,

[1] Jacobi's *Werke*, i, p. 304.

but not itself a particular existent, occupying a position alongside of, or amongst other particular existents. Moreover, the relation of cause and effect was one of the modes in which Unity of Consciousness expressed itself in the realm of knowable objects, a relation subsisting between occurrences in nature in consequence of the dependence of nature upon Intelligence. Now, this relation must be viewed either in one way or the other—either as a relation arising from Intelligence, and in that case intelligence itself cannot be regarded as springing out of it, or as a relation not arising from Intelligence, and, in that case, instead of the critical theory of knowledge, we should be thrown back once more upon the ordinary, crude, uncritical assumption of things and minds, as existing independently of one another, and of experience as resulting from the operation of the former upon the latter. Further, Kant never succeeded in showing how, on this supposition, any organic synthesis of contingent particulars and *a priori* relations is so much as conceivable. Were the material elements really given in haphazard fashion, no manipulation of them by the understanding would ever transform them into constituents of a world in which rational law and order reigned. On the whole, therefore, this line of reflexion must be pronounced irreconcilable with the main principles of the critical philosophy.

Kant has, however, other and stronger arguments to advance in respect to the existence of supersensible realities.

He insisted, in the second place, upon a thought which reflexion on the contrast of Understanding and Sense inevitably awakens. The realm of determinate knowledge evinces itself as limited and as limited in two ways. On the one hand, the general forms of connexion entering into knowledge are restricted in their application to the elements of sense intuition, in the absence of which their significance vanishes. But, to draw a limit, even though within its boundaries there may be said to lie all that can be said to be in the strict sense known implies a distinction; and the ground for that distinction must be found somewhere in the nature of Intelligence itself. Reflective thought frames, as it were of necessity, the idea of a reality freed from the limitations of the world of experience and distinguishable, therefore, from the world of experience. The idea of this supersensible reality is thus a *Grenzbegriff*, a limiting notion, and it may at least serve to warn us that sense apprehension has no legitimate claim to be regarded as exhaustive of the whole realm of being. The idea in question may be called the idea of a noumenon, the idea of what would be apprehensible by an intelligence not tied down as ours is to finite categories and to given data of sense.

There is yet a third trend of reflexion followed in the *Kritik* which, although not at first assigned the same prominence as the others, comes in the long run to be the most important of the considerations

that weighed with Kant in carrying his thought beyond this world of space and time. To the categories had been attributed in a word the general function of rendering possible a united connected experience for an apprehending subject. Such connected experience, it had been shown, the presence of the categories did up to a certain point secure; objective law, regularity, possibility of passing from one natural fact to another—all this had been traced to an intelligible ground. Yet, when more closely looked at, the phenomenal world, so Kant urged, will be found to fall short of the unity for which we are in search. Every part of it, when carefully scrutinized, will exhibit marks indicating unmistakably that something more is wanted in order to give satisfaction to the effort, inevitable on the part of a self-conscious being, to work together his experience into one connected whole. Knowledge of the parts presupposes unity of the whole, and it is still incumbent upon us to endeavour in some way to determine what the whole is of which they are parts. Nay more. The very forms of Understanding, requisite and adapted for knowledge of the relative and the conditioned, prove themselves to be inadequate and ill adapted for knowledge of the absolute and unconditioned totality. But, argued Kant, recognition of this inadequacy, recognition of the problems for the solution of which the categories are insufficient, is only to be accounted for on the supposition that reflective self-consciousness in some way contemplates a world—call it meanwhile a world of existence—other than and distinct from the world of our ordinary experience, which other world is, in truth, the world of things-in-themselves. It was, in fact, from the presence of an additional element in self-consciousness, over and above what has entered into the construction of ordinary experience that the conception of things-in-itself arises and through which it takes the more positive form of a *complement* making up with the world of phenomena the sum total of intelligible reality.

Self-consciousness, then, is not, according to Kant, exhausted in the Understanding and its modes of expression. A self-conscious being exercises also the higher function called by him specifically Reason (*Vernunft*), and the great problems of the moral and spiritual life group themselves round that of determining the authority which may be legitimately accorded to the deliverances of Reason. Reason, as Kant viewed it, is the faculty which seeks completed explanation of the piecemeal experience presented in cognition; it is the faculty from which emanate Ideas—adopting Plato's term—of the Unconditioned, the Unlimited, the Absolute. Carrying back the fragmentary results of human experience to what seem to be their ultimate issues in a summed-up totality, Reason postulates the three Ideas of the Soul, as the simple, perdurable, immaterial substance from which the phenomena of consciousness are derivative manifestations, of the

World as a whole of external phenomena, of God as the supreme reality, that transcends, creates, and keeps in relation all the diversities of existence. Bringing the instrument of criticism to bear upon these efforts of Reason, it was Kant's purpose to show that we cannot theoretically demonstrate the actual existence of realities corresponding to any of the Ideas. For, in the attempt to fill in the content of the Ideas, Reason has no other resources at its command than the categories, and the categories have validity only as forms whereby we construe to ourselves the parts of experience and the connexion of the parts each with each; severed from the sense material which they objectify, the categories lose their meaning and significance. Under these circumstances, then, Reason finds itself readily enough confronted with absurdities and contradictions. The illegitimate and transcendent employment of the categories leads us inevitably to regard the Unconditioned as an object. But whatever realities may correspond to the Ideas of Reason, these realities are certainly not objects, entities that stand over against a finite knower upon which his powers of observation can be directed. Construe the soul as an object, and you do but confuse the pure Unity of Self-consciousness with the empirical ego, and there results a hybrid whose immortality it would not be worth while either to assert or deny; construe the World in its entirety as an object and you become entangled in the antinomies which have perplexed and baffled human thought; construe God as an object, and you get the anthropomorphic notions of Deity that have estranged thoughtful minds from religion. The Ideas, then, are not realizable in knowable objects; they have not in experience a *constitutive* value, like the categories, and when we try to give that value to them they come to be constitutive of illusions merely. So far as science is concerned, the futile attempt to construct unconditioned objects serves but as an occupation of imaginative intellects. The empirical psychologist can pursue his course without the hypothesis of an invisible and immortal soul; the physicist can industriously carry on his researches without troubling to speculate about ultimate atoms or an ultimate void; and the astronomer who has swept the sky with his telescope and found no God need occasion us no alarm.

But, whilst he conceived scientific knowledge incapable of throwing light on the great questions of metaphysics—God, Freedom, and Immortality—Kant was very far indeed from suggesting that these are names of non-entities. Although it cannot be known, absolute reality can be—nay, must be—thought; and, however defective the thought may be, it is yet on a higher plane than the relative and discursive work of the Understanding. The faith of Reason has no affinity with the blind credulity of inexperience; rather is it the ripened fruit of the largest experience and the widest knowledge.

And the theses of a rational faith science is at least as little able to disprove as to prove. Furthermore, if the Ideas of Reason possess not constitutive value, they are yet in another and most significant respect supremely valuable. As *regulative* principles, they direct and govern the activity of the intellect; they enable us to organize our experience, to estimate its worth. They furnish the impulse to knowledge; they prescribe, so to speak, its problems, and set, at the same time, its ideals. In endeavouring to trace the working of the human mind, we invariably assume the identity of the soul throughout all its changing states, for no thinking being can conceive of himself as more than one soul, and the very notion of a soul as not one and identical involves a scepticism that strikes at the very possibility of knowledge. Yet to work out this apparently simple presupposition, to connect the diverse phenomena of the empirical subject *as if* they were states of one identical soul—that is the never completely attained goal which psychological science has before it. It is the ideal towards which psychological science strives, and it is likewise the motive which originates the striving. So, too, men assume, in however dim and confused a way, from the earliest stages of culture, that the world of experience is one whole, for even the uncivilized man looks upon the world as being in one time and in one space. And yet to make manifest the unity of the world, to show the natural interconnexion of all its parts with one another, to exhibit all its phenomena *as if* they were constituents of one systematic universe—that is the ultimate goal of physical science which in truth it never completely attains. It is the ideal towards which physical science strives and it is also the motive which originates the striving. Finally, the intercourse of the individual mind with nature never fails to awaken the thought of a supreme Intelligence in and through whom mind and nature are related. The consciousness of a divine existence has been at the root of the religious experience of men in all ages, and to live *as if* that consciousness conveyed a true report has been the aspiration of the purest minds. And yet to free the thought of God from all obscurity, to reconcile with it the fate that befalls individuals and the history of the race—that would be to attain the goal of religious reflexion, no less than the last result of philosophy. It is the ideal towards which all philosophy and all religion strive, it is also the motive which originates the striving.

Science, then, reposes ultimately upon a faith, a hope, a trust—the faith of Reason in its own supremacy or in the rationality of the world. The Ideas of Reason are not ideas of objects, but they are Ideas through which we go in quest of the meaning of objects. Man, however, doth not live by science alone, and the logic of science is not the sole code of his intellectual and spiritual life. The examination of our nature as moral agents in the *Kritik of Practical Reason* enabled

Kant to discover a significance of the Ideas richer and deeper than the regulative import they possess in the field of theoretical cognition. Already Reason had evinced itself as that in experience which is primordial and supreme; already the Ideas of Reason have been seen to be, in reference to the world of sense, Ideas of worth or value—Ideas of what *should* or *ought to be*—and, as such gradually, though never completely realizing themselves in the direction they give to the processes of knowing. But, whilst our theoretical experience exhibits no other than determined objects and occurrences, each of which might find a kind of explanation in a statement of the relations in which it stands to the other members of the system, practice or conduct exhibits what Kant insisted must be called a fact, yet a fact which from its nature can find no place in the system of reciprocally determining objects, but which requires as the ground of its possibility, over and above the categories of the Understanding, the notion of Freedom. The fact in question is the fact of Duty. In the fact of Duty Kant found a positive exemplification of that kind of reality to which the Ideas of Reason had all along been leading, a reality, namely, which although having a definite content, is in no sense an object in the context of experience. Duty, that which ought to be, indicates something altogether distinct from the objects of nature, something which does not stand over against us as other than and external to ourselves, yet something nevertheless whose reality is none the less certain. The truth with which we are here concerned evidently has specific reference to the nature of man. From the treatment of cognition itself, it had become obvious that man cannot be regarded as *merely* a natural object. The human subject, participating in the Unity of Self-consciousness, is clearly more than the empirical ego that can be psychologically examined and dissected; the supersensible factor in his being expresses itself in the notions that render a sensuous world possible and in the Ideas that carry his thought beyond it. When, however, man is considered as a moral agent, his two-fold character becomes still more strikingly apparent. Looked at from one point of view, man undoubtedly belongs to the realm of nature. His appetites, his impulses, his inclinations have a natural origin, and come about through his connexion with the things of sense. Did he, however, belong entirely to the realm of nature, his actions would be determined solely after the manner in which every event in nature is determined, mechanically, inevitably, according to the law of causation. Yet self-consciousman ascribes his actions to himself, regards himself as determining his own line of conduct, conceives of himself as the source of what he resolves or wills. And Kant's contention was that a man who can only act under the idea of Freedom must *be* free; a man who thinks himself free is *ipso facto* free. Freedom, then, the characteristic of man as a member of the spiritual

or supersensible realm, cannot but be accepted as a reality, even though we can give of it, in terms appropriate to theoretical knowledge, no explanation. Now, freedom is only another name for self-determination; it is identical with autonomy of will, with Reason as practical prescribing a law for itself. That law, the moral law, comes to recognition in the fact or consciousness of Duty. In the consciousness of Duty we have no other than the Supremacy of Reason, as constituting the very core or essence of Self-consciousness. The "I ought" of Duty is the assertion by the rational self of its own authoritative rank as contrasted with all that belongs to the empirical ego, the assertion of its own sovereign pre-eminence over the impulses and inclinations of the sensuous side of our nature. And since Reason has here to do, so to speak, with itself—to determine its own life, to make its own maxim the principle of its action—it requires nothing but what is capable of being fulfilled, the *sollen* implies *können*. Accordingly, the ideal of Reason, which in the sphere of theoretical knowledge took the form of faith or trust makes itself felt in practice as an unconditional command, a categorical imperative. The realization of the good will is neither a merit that calls for praise nor a means to gratification as a reward; respect or reverence for a self-imposed law is the one feeling that accompanies it. Hence Kant was the strong opponent of all *Trinkgeldmoral*, which is ready and willing enough to perform the virtuous deed, and then holds out its hand in the hope that *some* little consideration in the shape of pleasure may fall to its lot, and the merciless critic no less of that *Tugendeitelkeit*, which prides itself upon having prudently chosen the better part and upon having won real bliss thereby.

There should now be no difficulty in seeing why Kant assigned what he called the primacy to Reason in its attitude or function as practical. For only in respect to practice or conduct does it, in his view, become absolutely impossible for any reflective mind to interpret Self-consciousness after the fashion of objective fact. In theoretical experience the Ideas of Reason suggest the possibility of the orderly systematic laws of phenomena being ways in which a spiritual or noumenal reality appears to us, but in the sphere of conduct this possibility gains the additional evidence needed to convert it into assured certainty. Reason in relation to practice brings before us in very vivid fashion a mode of being transcending the limited sphere of the categories, and only from what there is given in the sphere of practice can anything definite be concluded as to the further determination of the world of spiritual reality. Kant never wavered in regard to the supreme importance of Reason in the universe of being. We think, and must think, the ends prescribed by Reason to be the dominating factors in the realm of intelligible reality. The chief end prescribed by Reason in its practical aspect, the subordination,

namely, of the sensuous side of our nature to the requirements of morality, postulates as the conditions of its fulfilment the immortality of the soul, positive freedom of will, and the existence of an intelligent ground of both. What, then, the theoretical Reason in that it is weak through its dependence upon sense could not do becomes possible for the moral consciousness which is not so dependent. Instead of the bare idea of the permanence of a thinking substance, it offers us the practical and rational certainty of the unbroken continuance of the individual's self-conscious life as progressively realizing the moral law. Instead of the contradictory notion of the phenomenal world as complete in itself, it offers us the practical guarantee of freedom in self-determination, and with it of man's citizenship in the spiritual kingdom. Instead of the mere conception of an absolute Being whose existence could not be proved, it offers us the practical warrant of the reality of a Mind that is morally perfect and in and through whom the harmonizing of the spheres of sense and of Reason is secured. Thus the *Kritik of Practical Reason* expands and gives concreteness to the abstract conception of Reason as Self-determining which alone had remained from the analysis of theoretical knowledge.

Reconciliation of the two spheres, those of necessity and freedom, which seemed at first so disparate, Kant came to recognize as incumbent upon philosophical reflexion, owing to the circumstance that the ideals of Reason have to be realized in the phenomenal world. And in the third *Kritik*, the *Kritik of Judgement* (*Urteilskraft*), he faced and wrestled with this final question: What conception are we compelled to form of nature, if it is to be regarded as the field of action, the field of development, for conscious subjects with moral and spiritual ideals? It was through means of the notion of the *adaptation* of empirical fact to the ends of Reason, through the notion, in other words, of purpose or design in nature, that he attempted to span the gulf between the two worlds previously kept apart and to solve the problem in which his researches so far had culminated. In two specific departments of the natural world he found illustration of the adaptation for which he was in search.

On the one hand, the analysis of aesthetic judgements, judgements asserting that objects are beautiful or that nature is sublime, reveals, he argued, the fact that the opposition of sense and thought can be transcended, if not in knowledge, yet in feeling. The appreciation of beauty arises in the case of the consciousness of an object in which the particulars of sense are felt, if not known, to be in conformity with the demands of Reason. Such judgements rest, it is true, upon subjective experience, and yet we unhesitatingly claim for them universality and objective validity. Beauty would seem to be for us the realization in the phenomenal world, and as if by free grace, of an idea that cannot be verified in knowledge, the spiritual breaking

through, as it were, the impedimenta of sense and giving us an *Ahnung* of what lies beyond. So, again, the sublime in nature indicates the presence of a higher greatness than the materials of nature can hold or express. Thus the starry heavens, which at first by their immeasurable magnitude appal us, come at length to suggest to us the majesty of the unconditional moral law within us, and hence seem to reveal to us something in sympathy with our essential and better self. Consciousness of the beautiful and of the sublime leads us, then, to discern in nature the work of a spirit akin to our own.

On the other hand, still more markedly is the appearance of objective validity in the teleological judgements we pass on certain phenomena of outer nature. Our world is the home of organic life; and, in regard to organic beings, we seem compelled to resort to the category of purpose. We find in them a mode of growth wholly unlike the only mode of growth compatible with mechanical principles, the addition, namely, of part to part. We find in them, again, a mode of structure not in the least resembling such an aggregate of components as is exemplified in inorganic things, for the whole and the parts of an organism appear to stand in a position of mutual dependence and reciprocal determination. In interpreting the existence and growth of organic beings, we inevitably, therefore, bring to our aid the conception of causality according to ends, a conception of causality in which the parts do not determine the whole but the whole the parts, in which the *idea* of the whole is antecedent to the existence of the parts.

We cannot, however, stop here. In our judgements in respect to organisms there is and must be a perfectly general principle involved. Otherwise the possibility of passing such judgements in this special case would be inexplicable. And this general principle is none other than the idea of the structure of nature as being *adapted to* Reason or Intelligence. The employment of the teleological principle with respect to organisms suggests, and indeed compels, the extension of it to the world as a whole, and more especially to the entire sphere of human life. When, however, we fashion to ourselves the idea of the intelligibility of nature in its contingent particulars, we must of necessity take such idea to be that of a determination of the particular by an Understanding wherein the particular, for us contingent, is a necessary expression of its universal principles. Thus, the more concrete expression of the idea of the intelligibility of nature, of end in nature, is the idea of an *intuitive Understanding*, an Understanding that produces the particulars in and through the representation of the whole. So far as the sphere of theoretical knowledge is concerned, the idea of such an understanding is of no more avail than the regulative principles of Reason, of which, indeed, it may be said to be a concrete expression. Moreover, in the sphere of theoretical cognition it can

never be possible to regard any one part of what is known as itself constituting an absolute end. But in the sphere of practice a final end is presented. Man, not as a natural product, but as the bearer of the moral law, *is* a final end, a final end not merely in respect to nature where such a conception is, indeed, foreign, but in the whole system of intelligible reality. An ethical teleology, according to which the entire system of real fact is adapted to the attainment on the part of human beings of the life of goodness, may be said, therefore, to be the final form of the Kantian metaphysics. "The world," Kant averred, "must be represented as having originated from an Idea if it is to harmonize with that use of Reason without which we should hold ourselves unworthy of Reason, namely, the moral use, which rests entirely on the idea of the Supreme Good."

Even from an account of the critical philosophy so meagre as the foregoing it is apparent that divergent principles come to light at different stages in the development of the system. Taken as a whole these divergent lines of reflexion exhibit a suspicious tendency to fall asunder, and not seldom the devices to which Kant had recourse for the purpose of holding them together present the aspect of being strained and artificial. Thus, it is not surprising that various antagonistic streams of metaphysical speculation found their starting-point and many of the arguments by which they were supported in the Kantian philosophy. By following out the central thought of Kant's theory of knowledge and the path suggested by his treatment of Reason and of the idea of end or purpose, his immediate successors reached a view of existence as dependent in its entirety upon one ultimate ground or principle of Self-consciousness, the view characteristic of Post-Kantian idealism (Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel). Again, in so far as stress was laid in the Kantian philosophy upon the necessity of assuming things-in-themselves, as real entities which were the causes of sense-impressions, it prepared the way for that form of realism which was subsequently developed by Herbart. Once more, the primacy attributed by Kant to the practical Reason led by a series of easy stages to the metaphysical theory of Schopenhauer of the Will as the ultimate reality.

I should like, however, in conclusion, to revert to the considerations which induced Kant to describe the world of things-in-themselves as a *complement* making up with the world of phenomena what we may call the world of intelligible existence. As the Kantian *Kritik* proceeds, and stage by stage the supreme significance of Reason or Self-consciousness in the structure of reality as a whole is brought to light, it becomes clear, I think, that Kant had offered no sufficient ground for maintaining that the expression just used, a complement to the world of phenomena, is either accurate or justifiable. In developing his conception of Self-consciousness, Kant

himself effectively disposed of the view that the realm of phenomena and the realm of things-in-themselves form two parts of the world of existence, the term "existence" being applied in the same sense to each. It would have been truer to his own mode of interpreting reality had he said that in the strict meaning of the term "existence" the world of phenomena does *not* exist. For he made it abundantly evident that phenomena cannot be regarded as separate independent entities, that they can be no more than the orderly connected ways in which reality is apprehended by a finite mind under the restrictions of sense-intuition. The reality of a phenomenon certainly, therefore, did not indicate for him *existence* of that phenomenon in the ultimate sense; it indicated rather the orderly connexion of one part of the experience of a thinking mind with other parts. This conclusion, however, having been reached, we can readily see how easy it was for Kant to fall into the habit of treating the world of experience after the fashion of a resultant, produced by the intercourse of two entirely unknown entitities—on the one hand, the unknown things-in-themselves which are other than the mind and, on the other hand, the equally unknown thing-in-itself which is the mind. And then it followed, by an inevitable inference, that ultimate reality eludes knowledge, that real being can be affirmed only in so far as a ground of explanation for the limited and finite character of knowledge must be sought. Yet, by the help of such a supposition, the finite and limited character of knowledge cannot itself be regarded as connected in any vital or integral fashion with the ultimate nature of existence, but only as in some inexplicable and mysterious way following from it. In short, the conception of things-in-themselves which thus emerges evinces its untenability in face of the following dilemma. If things-in-themselves are in no way connected with things as known and do not enter into the same system with them, the assumption of their existence aids us not at all in solving the problem of the possibility of knowledge; if they are in any way connected with things as known and do enter into the same system with them, it cannot be legitimate to deny to them the relations, the connexions, which would render them possible facts of knowledge for a self-conscious subject. Kant's own criticism itself affords, that is to say, sufficient warrant for refusing to recognize the possibility of any realm of the Unknowable, however unhesitatingly it has to be admitted that vast regions are to us unknown.

THE PARADOXES OF KANT'S ETHICS

A. C. EWING, M.A., Litt.D.

Nobody interested in philosophy need be deterred by Kant's reputation for difficulty from familiarizing himself with his ethics. While the *Critique of Pure Reason* and his other non-ethical works are very hard to follow, the first two chapters of the *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*[1] at least are clear and straightforward and presuppose little previous acquaintance with philosophy. The third chapter is not about ethics as such but about the metaphysical problem of freedom and should be omitted by anyone who is not familiar with Kant's general philosophy, but the first two give a fairly complete though outline account of his main ethical principles and can be grasped by themselves as a whole. The difficulty the reader will feel is not so much in understanding what Kant says as in understanding why he says it. I wish to help him with this and show what case can be made out for the two main ethical doctrines of Kant which are most likely to strike him as repellent. Now, while any reader who is not prejudiced in favour of naturalism or hedonism will probably see that Kant has something very important to say at least about one side of our moral experience, it must be admitted that there is no great moral philosopher whom it is so easy to criticize as Kant. To point out obvious objections to his central ethical doctrines does not seem to be beyond the capacity of even a third-class student. This is due, I think, partly to the fact that his ethics is very much out of harmony with the spirit of the present day, though this is not *necessarily* an objection to Kant, and partly to his very laconic way of stating the fundamental principles of his system. He does not say enough to make it clear how he would have answered objections, and consequently in considering them we have to guess what he would have said or think for ourselves how his words might be interpreted so as to

[1] This should be distinguished from the *Metaphysic of Morals*, which is a more detailed ethical treatise but is much less important and not often read. The *Critique of Practical Judgment*, while giving Kant's ethical principles, has as its main object the connection of Kant's ethics with the rest of his philosophy and presupposes the *Critique of Pure Reason*. *Kant's Theory of Ethics* by Abbott consists of a translation of the *Fundamental Principles* . . . and the *Critique of the Practical Reason* in full besides some selections from other works. The best criticisms of Kant's ethics that I know are to be found in chapters in Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. i, and Broad, *Five Types of Ethical Theory*.

escape them. For I think that it is, in dealing with a great philosopher, always better, if possible, to interpret his words in a way which will make them seem defensible rather than in a way which will make them seem simply foolish. Unless we have conclusive reasons for supposing that Kant made a fool of himself, it is surely more likely that he has not done so than that he has, and he should therefore, if possible, be interpreted accordingly. I shall go on this principle in the present article.

The two most characteristic and startling doctrines of Kant are his view that the rightness of an action is to be determined *a priori* irrespective of its consequences and his denial of value to all actions that are motived by desire. I am no adherent of Kant on these points and incline to a very different theory of ethics from his, but I wish to give him a fair run for his money. As a preliminary I must first mention one other point briefly. People sometimes think of Kant as holding the view that the good will is the only thing good otherwise than as a mere means. But this is not true, for Kant did regard pleasure as good otherwise than as a means. What he refused to admit was that pleasure was good unconditionally, i.e. under all circumstances. According to him the pleasure of a bad man is bad, not good, but the pleasure of a good man is good irrespective of its consequences. It is better even according to Kant that a good man should enjoy himself than that he should not, even if he were annihilated next moment and his enjoyment produced no appreciable good effect. This makes pleasure good otherwise than as a means, but it does not make it unconditionally good, for it can only be good if the man who enjoys it is morally good. Consequently for Kant there are always two goods, the good will, which is unconditionally good, and pleasure, which is good only when it accompanies the former. He does not admit any other good and expressly denies any difference in value according to quality between different pleasures. The doctrines that pleasure is only good if it is enjoyed by a morally good man (an assumption which will seem less plausible to many people when it is pointed out that it implies the retributive theory of punishment) and that there are no other goods besides pleasure and the good will are not proved, but then no assertions about what is good-in-itself can be. What is good-in-itself is a question to be answered ultimately by intuitive insight rather than by argument.

Now, to return to the first of the two doctrines of Kant mentioned at the beginning of the previous paragraph, we must not exaggerate Kant's attitude. There is no need to suppose that he meant that empirical facts should never be considered at all in deciding what is right. He insists that empirical objects must not be "the condition" or "determining-ground" of a moral law, but this is not to deny that

empirical knowledge is required to carry out the law. It is plain in the first place that, if the major premiss—all lies are wrong—is *a priori*, we must, before we can act on it, have given in experience the minor premiss—this is (or would be) a lie. Further it is incredible that Kant can have failed to realize that detailed empirical knowledge may be required in order to carry out the principle, e.g., to discover the best way of telling the truth so as to make it clear to the individual to whom it is our duty to tell it. With two of the moral laws (categorical imperatives) he gives—develop our talents and help those in need—it is still more obvious that if they are to be applied effectively much empirical knowledge is necessary. We must consider consequences then according to Kant, but only up to a point. We must consider the effect of our truthful words on the state of mind of the person to whom we speak them so far as to determine whether they really will make the truth clear to him, but not so far as to determine whether they will give him and others more pleasure than pain. What we must not do according to Kant is base the general principle forbidding us to tell lies on empirical grounds, such as the bad consequences of lying, or to make exceptions to the law in particular cases on the ground that to tell a lie in this or that special case will produce more good than evil. It is thus only the general law and not its particular applications which according to Kant can be seen to be independent of consequences and *a priori*.

Kant's attitude on this point may be traced to the following causes: (1) For Kant the only things which are intrinsically good are the good will and, in a lesser degree and subordinate position, pleasure, provided it is deserved by the person who enjoys it. Now the good will is not a consequence but something inherent in the act. Kant's morality, therefore, could only have been based on consequences if he had been prepared to be a hedonist.

(2) Moral action cannot, according to Kant, be determined by empirical cases because otherwise it would not be free. But the only non-empirical cause is the consciousness of a law *a priori*, therefore it must be determined by that. (This ground for Kant's view cannot be adequately appreciated without knowledge of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.)

(3) We seem, sometimes at least—I am afraid Kant implies "always," which is quite untenable—to know with certainty, and not merely to have a probable opinion, that an act is right; but if its rightness or wrongness were to be judged by its consequences we could, owing to our lack of ability to foretell the future, never be quite certain of this.

(4) Experience can only tell us what is, but ethics deals with what ought to be; and this is unfortunately often very different from what is, therefore ethics cannot be empirical.

(5) We are conscious of the moral law as carrying with it an absolute, unconditional necessity, therefore it cannot depend on particular circumstances or even on features common to all men but not to all possible rational beings.

From the supposed *a priori* nature of ethics various others of the fundamental doctrines of Kant would seem to follow. An *a priori* proposition, it seems, must be universal; if it is necessary *a priori* that *S* should be *P*, it is impossible that it could be sometimes not-*P*. Therefore Kant concluded that moral laws must be universal and must not admit of exceptions in particular cases. Just as it is inadmissible to say 5 + 7 usually = 12, but in this case I had better suppose that they = 13 because otherwise my accounts will not balance, Kant would insist that it is inadmissible to say—It is usually wrong to tell lies, but in this particular case I shall do more good than harm by telling a lie, therefore I had better lie. Further, an *a priori* principle must be such that its truth or falsehood is capable of being seen without reference to empirical circumstances, and therefore a moral law would seem to be in the same position and cannot depend for its validity on the empirical fact that its observance is likely to produce good consequences. Further, an *a priori* principle would seem to be one the denial of which was self-contradictory,[1] and to show this would seem to be the only way of proving it if it is not self-evident but requires proof. So Kant's main test for showing the wrongness of different kinds of acts is by showing that they express a self-contradictory principle. Thus by a series of plausible steps we seem to be led to a position like Kant's. I do not think myself that we can stop there, or that the arguments given are all indisputably valid, but I hope I have said sufficient to show that Kant's doctrine of universal *a priori* moral laws is not merely gratuitous but has something to be said in its favour. I think myself that Kant was right in holding that universal *a priori* propositions are presupposed in all ethical judgment, but wrong as to the nature of the former. He thought they were propositions to the effect that a certain kind of act is right under all circumstances, but this has been generally rejected by other moral philosophers, I think rightly. The alternative is to hold that the universal *a priori* propositions are either propositions about what is good, or propositions about *prima facie* obligations in Ross's sense (e.g., that we are always under an obligation to keep a promise although this may be occasionally outweighed by a stronger obligation) or both.

[1] Kant admitted exceptions to this in the theoretical sphere with his synthetic *a priori* principles, but they can only be synthetic according to his philosophy because they are dependent on the forms of sensible intuition, space and time, and they are therefore not completely *a priori* in the sense in which the principles of ethics are. There is nothing analogous to these in his ethics.

Kant's principal means of testing whether an act is right or wrong is by asking if one could without inconsistency will the universal application of the maxim on which it is based. In the *Grundlegung* (Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals) he claims to show by this method that it is wrong to commit suicide when life has become more painful than pleasant, wrong to make promises which you do not intend to keep, wrong to neglect to develop your talents, and wrong to refuse help to those in need of it.[1] In each case he contends that, while we may will these wrong acts ourselves if we are immoral, we could not will that such a principle should be univeralized. The method has been much criticized, and I should agree with the criticisms in so far as they show that Kant did not succeed in demonstrating the presence of a contradiction in any of these wrong principles such that it would be logically impossible for a race to exist in which they were applied universally. This is, however, entirely a new point. Kant only claims to find such a contradiction in the first two of the four wrong principles, i.e. the principle of committing suicide as soon as we can see that the remainder of life is likely to yield a surplus of pain over pleasure and the principle of making promises whenever it suits our interests without intending to keep them. He does not even attempt to do so in the case of the last two, neglect to develop one's own talents and neglect to help other people. The reason he gives why these actions are wrong is not that the principles cannot be *thought* as holding universally but that they cannot be *willed* to hold universally, as "such a will would contradict itself."[2] Now I think that this distinction is very important and that Kant would have made out a much stronger case if he had confined himself to saying in all four instances that *willing* the law to hold universally would contradict itself and had not added in the first two that it was self-contradictory even to think them to hold universally. A race in which people lied and made false promises whenever they thought it suited their interests is perfectly thinkable and might well continue to exist, though in an unsatisfactory condition, but to will that such a principle should be universally practised might still be said to be self-contradictory in the sense of being *a purpose which tended to its own defeat.* For if everybody lied the liar would not be believed and therefore he could not consistently will that his principle should be universalized, though he may well enough will to make an exception in his own case. It has been objected against Kant that many right principles such as—help the destitute—would, if universalized, likewise be self-contradictory, since there would then be no destitute people left to help, but this is to overlook a fundamental difference between the two cases. A man who helps the destitute could

[1] Abbott, *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, p. 39 ff. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

univeralize his principle without inconsistency because, if there were as a result no destitute people left to help, this would only mean that his purpose had been completely fulfilled; but the liar could not thus universalize his principle for, if as a result, there could be no more lies because they would not be believed, his purpose would be thwarted, not fulfilled. The liar is pursuing a policy which may or may not be successful in securing his individual ends (Kant leaves this point open here), but which if universalized would be self-defeating and therefore could not be universalized consistently. No doubt a particular man might hope that, even if his principle were universalized, he would be able to lie more plausibly than other people, and so still gain the advantage, but this could not apply to all liars, and the universalization of the principle would at least *tend*, other things being equal, to its own defeat, while the universalization of the principle of helping the destitute would tend to the success of the purpose of the men who embraced this principle and not to its defeat.

I cannot see that the argument which Kant chooses to show the wrongness of suicide is more than a sophistry. Both Rashdall[1] and Field[2] give a wrong account of the grounds for Kant's condemnation of suicide in the *Grundlegung*, saying that his reason is that, if everybody committed suicide, there would be nobody left to commit it and therefore the principle could not be universalized. Kant's real argument[3] is more subtle. It is as follows: If I commit suicide in order to escape pain I am acting out of self-love. But the object of self-love is to further life. Therefore it is self-contradictory to kill oneself out of self-love. The argument seems to depend on an ambiguous use of self-love to mean the desire for pleasure and aversion to pain in the first premiss and the desire to preserve life in the second. It also covers only the case of a man who commits suicide on hedonistic grounds. Kant therefore fails to justify the prohibition of suicide as an independent principle. No doubt it could in most cases be brought under the principle of not refusing your help to a world which needs it, but this would not enable one to rule out euthanasia *a priori*, as Kant would have liked to do, since it would be very difficult to forbid the suicide of many hopeless and suffering invalids under this principle.

I think, however, that a case can be made for Kant's treatment of the other two principles. Kant says that the man who refuses to help those in need is acting on a principle which, if universalized, would defeat its own end, since it would deprive him of the chance of being helped by others and there is no man who can be certain that he will not sometimes need this help. He has refused to give

[1] *Theory of Good and Evil*, pp. 114–115.
[2] *Moral Theory*, p. 24. [3] Abbott, p. 39.

because he prefers his own comfort and pleasure, but his own comfort and pleasure are liable to depend on or at least to be greatly influenced by the uncovenanted kindness of others. We should not interpret Kant so narrowly as to limit his meaning to financial help, and, in fact, while everybody does not need "charity" in the financial sense, everybody, however prosperous, does need kindness from others in the ordinary intercourse of life. It has been objected that this account bases the rule on consequences after all and even on selfish expediency, so that Kant contradicts his own principles; but there is a fundamental difference between giving something because we expect we shall be repaid for that particular gift ourselves and giving it because we realize that it is unfair not to give when we know that we should not wish to be ourselves debarred from the hope of receiving any kindness from others. A man who sends a cheque to a particular charity is usually not at all likely to be helped later on by that particular charity himself or to gain help from any other source because of that cheque, but it remains true that one of the reasons why, if he can afford it, he should give money for charitable purposes is because he would wish others to help him if he needed their help, and therefore in all consistency he ought also to help others who need his help. To appeal to the consequences of the hypothetical practice of the general rule is not to appeal to the consequences of the particular act itself. It would be a morally worthless act if I gave only because I thought I could get back more for myself by giving, but it is not morally worthless if I give because I realize that it is inconsistent to expect kindness from others and yet refuse to show it to others myself. Now this is certainly *one* of the reasons why it is a duty to help others, though Kant, I must admit, is wrong in speaking as though it were the only one.

It has been objected against Kant that there are people who would prefer to suffer want themselves rather than to have their pride offended by being helped by somebody else, and that such people might therefore cheerfully will the universalization of the principle that one should give no help to others. But while there seem to be people who would rather starve than apply to the Poor Law, it is extremely doubtful whether there are any who would wish to be cut off from all possibility of kindness on the part of others, though they might say they did without really meaning it. And, even if there be such people, Kant could say that, though they willed the universalization of the wrong principle, they willed it inconsistently. For they would will it either for the sake of their own happiness or out of pride. But the universalization of the principle would certainly be detrimental to their chances of happiness and would hinder rather than promote the attainment of

anything for which they could legitimately feel pride. Therefore in either case the principle they willed would tend to its own defeat if universalized.

The argument for the principle that we ought to develop our own talents is stated as though it were simply that a man's talents are useful to himself in general, but it is capable of the same development as in the case of the principle that we ought to help others. A man who neglects to develop his capacities does so usually in order to secure enjoyment and ease, but if this principle had been applied universally it would have meant less, not more, enjoyment and ease for humanity as a whole and for the man himself as an individual. We should have had, e.g., no labour-saving inventions. The policy, if universalized, would have again therefore defeated the very purpose for which it was adopted by the individual.

It cannot be contended that Kant has justified all his categorical imperatives in this way, but then he only puts these forward as examples of his method. But it is at least arguable that in general all wrong action expresses a self-defeating principle because, while a particular wrong act may gain its end, the principle on which it is based could not be made universal without conducing to the defeat of this very end. We must not say that the particular wrong act will necessarily interfere with the satisfaction of the doer and that therefore he ought not to do it—in that case we are advocating a selfish morality which is altogether opposed to the spirit of Kant—but we may say consistently with his spirit that the reason why we ought not to do it is because *if universalized* it would have that effect. The wrong act may be conducive to the man's own happiness, —apart from theological postulates such as Kant makes elsewhere about a future life—but it is the expression of a principle which could not be applied in all cases without defeating itself, and therefore it is a principle which it is impossible to apply impartially without destroying any reason that could be given for its application.

Kant has thus, I think, found a characteristic which belongs to all wrong acts and which gives one of the reasons why the acts in question ought not to be performed, namely, a certain inconsistency which reveals itself if the principle is universalized. In this he expresses one important aspect of ethics which has been worked out by writers like Paton. But it is not the only side. One of the reasons why I ought to help those in distress is that, if I were in distress myself I should need the help of others, and I am therefore not acting fairly in refusing to them what I should expect from them myself if the positions were reversed. But surely another reason is simply that it produces good or at least lessens their pain (an evil). It *may* indeed still be the case that the first reason is ultimately

reducible to the second and that the only reason why we ought to act fairly is because on the whole it will produce the greatest good, but it is clear that the second reason cannot be reduced to the first. There is clearly some obligation to remove evils that we can remove just because they are evil and for no other reason.

In the second place Kant has not given a strict proof that any of the acts of which he speaks are wrong. All he has done is to advance considerations that would be likely to make a man who is not a complete ethical sceptic see better that and why these acts are wrong. We may add that this is in any case probably all that a philosopher can do. Kant himself vacillates between the view that ethical principles are capable of formal logical proof and the view that they are self-evident, and I doubt whether he intended to give a proof with his last two examples, though he did with his first two. To me it seems clear that no strict proof of Kant's kind is possible in either case, and this for the following reasons:

(1) It does not follow because the universal performance of a certain kind of act would be *inconsistent* or even *logically impossible* that to do it in any case or indeed in all cases would be *morally wrong*. The notion of moral necessity (obligation) is not deducible from that of logical necessity, nor the notion of moral badness from that of logical inconsistency. They are quite different concepts, and Kant provides no intermediate links to bridge the gulf between them. Even granted that it would defeat my purpose if everybody did what I do, why should I not do it all the same if it suits my end, knowing that in fact everybody else will not do it? Indeed, why should it be immoral even for everybody to do it always? It would fail to give them what they wanted, but Kant would be the last to wish to derive obligation from desire. Even if it were logically impossible, that would not make it or any attempt at approximation to it immoral.

(2) We might succeed in showing that the universalization of a principle would be inconsistent with the fulfilment of the desires which lead people to practise it, but that would not trouble anybody who asserted the principle as a categorical and not only as a hypothetical imperative. Kant can show that the universal practice of lying would be inconsistent with the attainment of the ends normally thought to be secured by lying, but if anybody maintained that it was a "categorical imperative," a duty for its own sake, to tell lies, as Kant said it was to tell the truth, this would not trouble him. In fact, I suppose nobody would maintain this, but the logical possibility of it is sufficient to show that Kant has not succeeded in his proof. The principle of telling the truth for its own sake is consistent in a way in which the principle of telling lies to suit one's particular ends is not, but how can we show that the principle of

telling the truth for its own sake is more consistent than the principle of lying for its own sake would be?

(3) While Kant intends his argument to be *a priori* and independent of human psychology, it really in each case assumes certain empirical facts about human nature. Universal lying would not defeat its own end if it were not an empirical fact that human beings tended to disbelieve assertions when they had already been deceived or knew others to have been deceived. The principle of not helping others would likewise not be self-defeating if it were not for the empirical fact that there is nobody whatever who can count on never having any use for the kindness of others. But, though Kant has not *proved* the rightness or wrongness of any acts, he has advanced considerations which help us to see better why they are right or wrong.

Further, I am not prepared to agree with Kant that the laws in question admit of no exception, still less that we (in the strictest sense) know this to be the case. It is not, indeed, desirable to think very much about the possibility of exceptions, since the great majority of people are far more likely to sin through departing from truth when they ought not to do so than through failing to depart from it in the very rare cases when they ought to do so. But I cannot hold, as Kant does, that it would be wrong to tell a murderer a lie in order to save his victim, and still less can it be admitted that *all* duties are capable of being brought under the heading of fairly simple universal laws which allow of no exception. If we are to retain universality and certainty for the moral laws, we must make an amendment which Kant would not have countenanced and say that they are not absolute duties but prima facie duties in the sense in which the term is used by Ross.[1] It may be sometimes right to tell a lie, e.g., in order to save life, but we could still say that it was always a *prima facie* duty not to lie, meaning that it was an absolute duty unless overridden by a more binding moral claim. Whether even the *prima facie* duties are not themselves always dependent on some good to be realized or some evil to be averted is a very difficult question.

One difficulty about Kant's method is to decide what exactly it is we are to universalize in a given case. If *A* wishes to marry *B* he certainly could not consistently will that everybody else should do so, but this would hardly make the action of marrying *B* wrong. It is obvious that, if we ask Kant's question, we must ask it about something more general than that. On the other hand, it cannot be made completely general, or it would provide no clue at all as to what is right or wrong in a particular case. But what degree of generality is required? I could not consistently will that everybody should devote his working life to philosophizing, because in that case

[1] *The Right and the Good*, p. 19 ff.

we should all starve, including myself, but it does not follow that it is wrong of me to do so. Yet can we say that the principle—philosophize all one's working life—is less general logically than the principles about lying and suicide? No doubt there are fewer people with whom the question arises, but this merely numerical point cannot be the point of difference which brings it about that the impossibility of willing the universalization of the principle is in one case an argument showing that the act is wrong, and in the other case quite compatible with its rightness. Kant might reply that the question of philosophizing fell under the more ultimate one of developing one's talents, the universalization of which is not self-contradictory, but he does not say how we are to tell when we have reached an ultimate principle. So, though Kant's criterion is no doubt sometimes very useful, there are certainly difficulties about its application.

Let us now turn to the second question which I expressed my intention of discussing, the question of the value or non-value of actions which are motived by some desire and not by "respect for the moral law." It is sometimes said that Kant supposed we could and ought to perform moral acts without having any desire to do so; but this, though strictly accurate, is misleading, since Kant says that such acts are performed out of "respect for the moral law," and this "respect for the moral law," though sharply differentiated from other desires, is regarded by him as being analogous to a desire in so far as it can serve as a motive for action. It really makes very little difference whether we describe the tendency to find satisfaction in doing one's duty as a desire, and then add, as we should have to do in any case, that it is different from other desires, or we deny, like Kant, that it is a desire and then add that it is something analogous to desire. But it remains a paradox that value is ascribed only to actions motived by respect for the moral law and not to actions motived by a so-called higher desire, especially love. A distinction ought, however, to be drawn between (1) acting because of such a desire, and (2) merely acting in accordance with the desire, and I am not sure whether Kant meant to exclude all value from the latter or only from the former actions.

Now for the position that there is no value, or at least no moral value, in action from such a desire a good case can be made out. If I do something merely because I desire, say, the advance of knowledge or another person's welfare, this, though it would be generally held to be a case of a higher as opposed to a lower desire, cannot give my action moral value. For, if I act merely from a particular desire, however "high," I am wantonly taking the risk that my act may be wrong since I cannot be certain that the acts to which any particular desire prompts me will coincide with the

right ones. Even if they do coincide and the act is externally right, I cannot claim any merit for this, any more than I can when an act prompted by a selfish desire is thus in accord with the general good. For, since I am acting simply from desire without asking about what is right, this coincidence is a mere accident. If my motive is only a desire without reference to the moral law, it might rather seem that I was morally to blame for taking the risk that my act might be wrong. If I do something merely because I want to without considering whether it is right or wrong, am I not definitely guilty of immorality whether it does in fact turn out right or wrong?

Nevertheless, despite these arguments, most people feel that somebody who was always thinking of the moral law and consciously applying it to all his everyday choices would be more likely to be a prig than a saint and that the action of a man who sacrifices himself from love without thinking of the moral law at all may have a great deal of value. The answer to this difficulty seems to be that we are sometimes justified in acting from desire and *taking it for granted* that what we do if we choose the best means to the end set by the desire will be morally right. Thus I have a certain desire to teach philosophy effectively and it is while engaged in my teaching work almost always morally right for me to do what will most further the end of that desire. I can almost always take for granted that if, when teaching, I act from this desire to the best of my ability, I shall be doing what is morally right, also I know that to ask further in detail about each particular step I take to that end—say, each sentence in a lecture—whether it is also for the greatest good in general and does not conflict with any other moral law would be useless and would prevent my doing my work effectively by wasting time and distracting my attention from the pursuit of the end which I can take for granted I ought to pursue here. The reason is simply that the act which is best fitted to promote this end will only in very rare cases clash with other ends of superior importance, and it is fortunately quite possible to take this for granted without thinking about it in almost all cases and yet make an exception in case of a real conflict, e.g., interrupt a lesson to save life. No doubt, if there is a conflict between the desire in question and another desire such as the desire to save trouble or perhaps the desire to make others believe that I am teaching effectively, it is desirable that one's moral consciousness should intervene in order to turn the scale in favour of the first desire. The moral man need not be always thinking about the moral law but may simply follow his desires as long as he is justified in taking it for granted that the acts prompted by the desire will be in accord with the moral law. This taking for granted is done at his peril, but the risk must be taken, because if he always asked explicitly about every act, whether

it was an exception or not he would probably make more mistakes and certainly get very much less work done. Kant himself reprimands the person who is always asking whether his acts correspond to the moral law in trivial cases; yet, of course, in proportion as a man is morally good he will be less likely to overlook real exceptions.

It would not necessarily follow from this that actions done simply from, e.g., love had any *intrinsic* value. Most people would, however, say that they had, and I should agree with them. But, granted that they have value, have they *moral* value? Perhaps it may be objected that this is only a question of terminology, but there may be and, I should say, clearly are different species of intrinsic value, and it might be contended that Kant had given a perfectly correct account of moral value and merely erred in forgetting that there were other kinds of non-hedonistic value and so identifying this very important species of value with all values (excepting the case of a good man's pleasure, which Kant holds also to be good in a non-instrumental sense). There certainly seems to me to be something quite specific about the nature of moral value as described by Kant sufficient to justify us in making it a separate species distinct from other kinds. It is also true that if a person possesses this kind of value he is in a fair way to attain himself and produce for other people the remaining kinds also, as far as physical obstacles permit, a circumstance which gives it a special importance. Also besides being instrumentally the most important, it is intrinsically the highest in some important sense of the term.

Further, while we may perhaps refuse to ascribe "moral value" to any action which is not due to the moral motive, we need not suppose that the latter must necessarily take the form of respect for an abstract universal law. It may take this form, as it did in Kant, but it may also take the form of a desire to produce good, not any particular sort of good but all goods in proportion to their relative values, or it may take the form of what McDougall calls the self-regarding sentiment, the desire to be the sort of man I could respect; or, again, in a religious man it may take the form of love of a righteous God. To limit the moral motive to respect for the moral law as described by Kant would be to say that a person who thinks in terms of a moral theory conflicting with Kant's, or has not the same kind of psychology as Kant, cannot be moral. Even if thinking of morality in one of the ways I have just mentioned should turn out on analysis to presuppose a wrong theory of ethics, we must not therefore conclude that people who thought in that way were not moral, and I do not suppose Kant really meant to draw this conclusion himself. I am only warning the reader against a possible inference from his words. No doubt to each of the motives I have mentioned in their genuine and desirable form

there corresponds one or more spurious forms, e.g., the desire not to be the sort of man that could be respected but rather actually to be respected by myself and others (egotism[1]), or the desire to do God's will for fear of being punished if I do not. Neither do I commit myself to the view that all these motives, or rather all these different forms taken by the moral motive, are of equal value.

There remains the question of the value of an action which accords with the agent's strongest desire at the time but is not done wholly from that desire but partly at least out of respect for the moral law. By "strongest desire" I do not mean the desire which prevails but the desire which is felt most strongly at the time. In this sense of "strongest" it is certainly not an *a priori* necessary proposition that I must always act from the strongest desire. People have confused the tautology that I can only act from the desire which prevails with the synthetic and not in the least necessary proposition that I can only act from the desire which I feel most keenly, and have consequently raised quite unnecessary difficulties. There is no more difficulty in denying that there is a causal law according to which my actions are invariably determined by or correspond to the felt keenness of desire than in denying any other causal proposition the denial of which is warranted by experience. Now, suppose the moral motive happens to be accompanied by another desire which will also be fulfilled by acting morally, and suppose this other desire is felt more strongly at the time than any conflicting desire. Does the action possess no moral value in that case, or is its value diminished? It is not quite clear what answer Kant would give to this question. It is generally assumed by critics that he would hold the moral value of the action to be at least diminished, but I am not quite sure that this is so. He certainly commits himself to the view that we cannot in such cases tell whether the action has moral value or not,[2] either when it is another's or even when it is our own action that we are judging; but this might be simply because we could never know in these cases whether the moral motive would have been sufficient to lead to the act without the other desire, and it need not preclude some such actions in accordance with desire from really having moral value, though we could not tell of any particular actual one whether it had it or not. Nor need it necessarily preclude them even from having the same degree of moral value as they would have had if the desire had not been present, provided only the moral motive was sufficiently strong for it to be the case that it would have produced action even in the absence of that other desire. This is one possible interpretation of Kant's words.

But, even if we ascribe to him the extreme view that such actions never have any moral value at all, he might make quite a good case

[1] Leon, *Ethics of Power*.

[2] E.g. Abbott, p. 13.

for himself on the basis of common-sense ethics by contending that it cannot be a mark of any special merit to do just what one wants most of all to do. On that view moral value would belong only to actions against the strongest desire—(not to actions prompted by no desire, for there are no such actions,[1] unless we, like Kant, refuse to class the moral motive as a desire). And I should certainly accept the more moderate view that, other things being equal, the moral value of an action is increased if it is done against the agent's strongest desire. We do admire a man more for an action in which he has to overcome a really strong temptation than we should if he had not felt the temptation, though we may in some cases think the worse of his previous acts because he has lived in such a way as to make himself liable to this temptation, and it seems to me that this admiration is perfectly justified. The action of a man who on moral grounds refused to give false witness against somebody else without having any motive to do the opposite would, though morally impeccable, have little or no positive intrinsic value; but, if he were threatened with the rack by a tyrant for not doing so, if he were implored by his parents, wife, and children to yield because the tyrant had threatened otherwise to wreak vengeance on them, if all his friends were persuaded by lies that he was really to blame himself for the punishment which befell him so that he was completely disgraced in the eyes of the world as the result of his morality, and yet he persisted in doing his duty, the moral value of his action would surely be greatly increased. We should no doubt deplore the state of things as a whole most gravely, involving as it would both moral evil on the part of the tyrant and great suffering on the part of others, but, if we took the victim's action by itself and assessed its moral value, we should have to give it a very high rank indeed, while the action of a man who told the truth because he thought it right, when there was no temptation not to do so, would not deserve any special praise whatever. Indeed, it might be doubted not only whether it had much intrinsic value but whether it had any at all. To take another case, I know that I ought to pay, say, 2d. for a bus ticket if I use the bus, and I pay automatically without any conflict against a desire to evade payment. Has my action any intrinsic value at all? I doubt it. Yet if I were a child brought up with scanty pocket-money in a home where honesty was regarded rather lightly, and paying the 2d. meant going without a bun or not having enough money to go to the pictures, there might be considerable moral value in the act of payment just because there was a strong temptation not to perform it. Almost everybody performs countless similar actions for which they could not claim

[1] Excepting purely habitual behaviour, and I should not call cases of this "action."

any moral value but which would have great moral value if they were done in spite of a strong desire for something incompatible with them. It might be objected that in the cases where the actions have no moral value they are done merely from habit and not because they are right. No doubt this would apply, e.g., to most cases in which I pay for bus tickets, but as I have chosen this example it is quite likely that the next time I pay for one I shall remember it and be consciously aware that I morally ought to pay the money, so that the cause of my paying in that case will be not habit but the awareness that it is right. But will this give my action of paying moral value? I doubt it.

It would seem from these examples that an action has no moral value unless there is a temptation not to do it, i.e. unless there is some felt desire which conflicts with it, though other felt desires may support it. This seems perhaps extreme, but it may be defended if we take account of the following points.

(*a*) I should not go so far as to say that for the action to have moral value it must necessarily be opposed to our strongest desire, only that there must be some felt desire which is in conflict with the performance of it. No doubt if the desire opposing it is actually stronger, i.e. felt more keenly, than the desire or desires in its favour, the moral value of the act will be increased, but this is not, I think, a necessary condition of its having any moral value whatever.

(*b*) We need not, like Kant, make moral value the only value other than pleasure. The acts in question may be allowed some intrinsic value but not this specific kind of value. Love for another person could still be intrinsically good, but it would be a different species of good from moral value. In that case the assertion perhaps amounts to no more than this, that actions done out of the moral motive in face of a conflicting desire have a specifically different kind of value from any belonging to other acts or to anything else in the universe.

(*c*) It is a recognized objection against Kant's view that if a man acts morally for long enough the conflict with desire is apt to cease or at least become very much less marked. Thus we are led to the paradoxical result that continued moral action would destroy moral value. Kant would reply that, if moral perfection does imply this, no human being at any rate can attain moral perfection. But further it may be doubted whether even moral perfection would necessarily imply this. It would certainly imply the absence of any intrinsically evil desires like malice, but most derelictions of duty are due not to intrinsically evil but to indifferent desires, which might be felt even by a morally perfect being. It is not a necessary consequence of the notion of a morally perfect being that such a being should like to be roasted alive or even to suffer minor pains, yet it might

be his duty to expose himself to the pains. Further, it might be the duty of such a being sometimes to give pain to others, for their own or the general good, and his very goodness would make him dislike that. No doubt a man who has, e.g., been addicted too much to drink and reforms himself to such an extent that he is no longer even tempted by it will thereby lose his ability to show moral value in abstaining from drink, but he will have ample opportunity of showing moral value at a higher level in other actions.

It would not even matter very much to a theist if he were forced to admit that, since God is perfect, the acts of God could not have moral value in this sense. He might still say, as Kant did, that what shows itself in us as moral value, shows itself in a far higher but different form in God (the "holy will"), though we cannot know what this is like. It is only reasonable to suppose that the kinds of value which a perfect being would possess would be different from any within the range of such imperfect beings as ourselves. It is indeed essential to a theism capable of giving any religious satisfaction worth having that God's actions should be good and should conform to the moral principles we see to be true, but, while this would imply that God is aware of those same moral principles which we really see to be true, and acts on them in so far as they can be relevant to his actions, his experience in being thus aware of them and in acting on them would not need to be very like ours and so might exhibit quite different kinds of values.

(*d*) We must distinguish between an action being against the agent's desire and an action being against his interests in the sense of his own greatest happiness. We all want at times very much to do things which are clearly against our own interests. The belief that it will do him harm in the long run if he neglects a certain piece of work or if he vents his anger does not automatically stop a man from desiring to do these things more than he at the time desires the later good which he will forfeit by doing them now. Now Kant certainly holds that, if an action is in the agent's interests but yet conflicts with his desire, the action can still have moral value. In fact, he holds that the world is so ordered that all right actions will be ultimately to the interest of the agent, in a future life if not in this. Only he holds that they must not be done from this motive, if they are to have moral value.

Kant's views are therefore, if not above criticism, at any rate not so unwarranted as they appear at first sight, and I shall have achieved my object if the reader is led to feel that the study of Kant's ethics may be useful at least as an antidote and supplement to the opposite tendencies of the present time.

IS POLITICAL ACTIVITY UNDER A DIFFERENT LAW FROM THAT OF PERSONAL ETHICS?

HILDA D. OAKELEY, D.Lit.

In the course of his discussion of the work of the Disarmament Commission, in his book on the League of Nations, Sir Alfred Zimmern asks why the British people were so active in sponsoring disarmament. The question arises because, as he points out, the project must evoke proposals in regard to security which they were in no mood to consider. "The explanation," he proceeds, "no doubt is that the eventuality, however obvious it may seem in retrospect, was overlooked in the enthusiasm for what had become for a certain type of British opinion a moral crusade, rather than a realistic political procedure." Why must the two kinds of practical movement thus indicated be radically distinguished and even opposed in their aims and outcome? Why should the "realistic political procedure" show nothing of the spirit which enters into "a moral crusade," with the result that many have justified what would be regarded as crimes before the bar of ethics, because they were committed for political ends?

The main purpose of this article is to consider whether philosophy has been able to throw much light on this problem, whether by showing grounds for the distinction involved between the ethical significance of conduct in spheres described respectively as public and private, or by disclosing confusions of thought which lie behind it.

I

In order to make clear the exact issue on which an appeal lies to philosophy, some preliminary analysis seems required. The question which meets us at once may be stated in the following way—Is it a true view of the case, to say that the individual has a different conscience in his capacity as private individual and in that of statesman or of citizen judging the action of the statesman? If this were granted there would arise the further question—Is this difference one of degree, or of the height of the moral standard recognized in the two cases? Or is it a difference of kind, such that a man may be said to pass into another moral order where political action is concerned, or even as the implied opposition suggests, into an order not moral, but outside morality? A modification of the

second alternative might be formulated in the following way. Granted that the individual must in all circumstances stand under the moral law, there arise in various special fields of conduct further principles of action relative to that field. There may be even contingencies in which the rule or form of practice required may be incapable of rigid subsumption under the generally recognized principles of ethics. There are, for instance, professional codes in which, though the universal characters of right and wrong do not change places, the balance or relation between the cardinal virtues may change. The subordination of the gentler or typically Christian virtues to the sterner qualities may reach the point of a rejection of the Christian requirement. Or in the code of business ethics a less rigid adherence to strict veracity is regarded as permissible. The case of the soldier's rule of conduct in war raises problems of too large and distinctive a character to be included in the scope of this article. If it be allowed that there do exist professional codes affecting ethics in some degree, it must further—as may be argued—be admitted that this holds good above all, and in a more unquestionable sense, in the political sphere. On examination of the question—on what grounds can such distinctions be based, the following aspects of the political career emerge. Even without appealing to psychology, experience and certain common assumptions of ordinary life suggest that in some situations and kinds of activity the individual exhibits a self or personality which is not revealed in the normal procedure of his private life. The political life would show the more extreme form of this modification which at times is almost transformation of the self in a particular environment or set of claims. For instance, the individual who is timid in private life, may show cool courage in a responsible position. The basis for the putting on of this new self would be of much greater weight than in the professional type of case already referred to. In this light the individual is, *qua* moral agent, a person of another kind in his political function. In the capacity of statesman, to take the standard case, he stands for his people or nation, and a new moral situation comes into existence for him. There are two great aspects of his sphere of duties in this position, that of his official relations with the people as community, and that of the interrelations between the community or society with other such societies. For the purposes of the illustration, whilst recognizing that the representative of the state may be either an individual or a number of individuals associated as a government, to simplify the problem we may here assume as typical the statesman as individual or the political life in an individual. As we fix our attention on the significance of the first aspect of his functions a truth becomes clear which is by no means always recognized in regard to the public character of any individual who assumes duties

on behalf of and affecting the interests of the community in general. The law he is under in his public capacity, far from being lower in its standard than that of private life, is intrinsically higher in that it demands a still greater moral energy, in a field for the most part beset with greater difficulties and where vaster human ends are posited. It appears then that in the court of ethics, it must in the nature of the case be required of political action as the action of the individual or individuals entrusted above others with care for the interests and well-being of the community, that it is guided by the highest principles. This which may seem paradoxical on account of the low esteem, at least in some countries and periods in which the political office is held, yet follows logically from the meaning of the political function. The paradox in fact lies not in the ideal view, but in the degradation of the meaning. When Aristotle declared that if the perfectly wise and beneficent individual were found we could not refuse to make him king, he was referring to despotic rule. But his idea gives symbolic expression to the ideal character and justification of the political office. Without reflecting on the subject in this way the modern community in its normal condition, may be seen to imply such a view in its attitude towards the legislation of its representative assembly, the work of administrative departments, etc. The individuals *qua* acting for the public institutions are assumed to be disinterestedly aiming at the best. Criticism and attack proceed on the assumption that anything else would show them to be false to their office. The true and accepted idea then of the activity of the state within the nation is that it should express the highest value in public action. The organization exists in Aristotle's phrase for the sake of good life. The politician is not excused for falling below this standard, because the temptations of the love of power have for the most part much greater force here than in private life. It is not taken as an excuse for decay of friendship, if as Mr. Lloyd George[1] observes, the political life and rivalries are particularly liable to estrange friends. Nor are those conditions of party politics which are so often deplored intrinsically essential to the exercise of the political function. These facts may be so, but they do not establish the view that the political life requires a different ethical code, or again to quote Aristotle, that "it is perhaps not the same thing to be a good man and to be a good citizen." It is when we turn to the other main division of the political activity, viz. its direction to the relations of the society as "state" with other such societies, that the situation is evident which is inherently responsible for the belief that political ethics, if it is not a contradiction in terms, demands different standards from those of private ethics. It is of course clear that this sphere of action cannot be

[1] In his *Memoirs*.

completely separated from political activities within the state, and that the outlook in "foreign affairs" may have a deleterious influence on that of the home department. But the lowering of standards which at times comes about in the field of party-politics and elsewhere, whilst excuses for it may be forthcoming, is generally recognized as an infringement of moral principles, or a clouding of the moral atmosphere. The ideal remains, and is honoured even in the breach. It is otherwise in the case of the principles guiding the statesman in international procedure. Here there is not only failure to behave in accordance with the principles of inter-personal ethics, but that this is the appropriate and inevitable state of affairs in respect to the relations between states is defended by a weighty body of argument. These relations, it is asserted, cannot be under the moral law for individuals as such. The questions that here arise lead directly to considerations of a definitely philosophical character. There confronts us at once that of the being of the state. If there is such a genuine entity, by what ethical principles should its behaviour be guided? What is the moral position of the statesman who acts for his country? And what is the relation of the individuals constituting the community, who must under democratic constitutions at least, be held also to be concerned in its policy to that organization of the state which is their face and form towards the outside world? It must in passing be noticed that non-democratic nations cannot truly be excluded from the implications of this question since however difficult the situation of their peoples, they must in the end be held responsible for the constitution under which they live. I think that there are two very distinct views one or other of which may be seen to be implied in the usual standpoints in regard to this question. Either the relations between states are not yet or only very imperfectly conditioned by moral principles, there is no recognized morality in this province. States lag ethically far behind individuals. Only the rudiments of international ethics exist. Or political morality has a different basis from private morals. The standards are different and the motives of the agents. It is other in quality rather than lower in degree. Any moral duty of the state towards other states in so far as such exists is wholly subordinate to its duty to its own people. Thus arises the view usually known by the name of its greatest modern exponent, though in Thucydides' account of the debate of the Athenians with the conquered Melians, Machiavellianism already raised its head. F. S. Oliver amongst recent writers considers the statesman's duty from a Machiavellian standpoint.[1] The love of power and patriotism are declared by him to be the dominating motives of the statesman. The same type of conduct which is vice in private life, may be duty on the public

[1] *A Political Testament.*

stage. Oliver quotes with evident approval Montaigne's observation: "In every government there are necessary offices which are not only base but wicked. Wickedness finds a place there and is employed in sewing us together, as poison is used for the preservation of our health." Private interest is not worth a great strain upon our conscience, but public interest certainly. Oliver himself writes with contempt of men who are so faint-hearted that they will not sin for their country. Bismarck is his outstanding example of the great-hearted in this respect. In regard to his responsibility for the war of 1870, the treachery which made it appear that France was the real aggressor: "Would not any statesman have rejoiced to do so signal a service to his country by whatever injustice and wrong?" We may here reflect that the mills of history grind exceeding slow, but have they not ground out for Germany a fatal harvest of Bismarck's wrong? "The laws of the hive," proceeds Oliver, "differ from those that regulate the conduct of human beings one to another, not so much in being less under the rule of conscience as in owing their fealty to a different kind of conscience." This kind he seems to regard as higher. Here there is some confusion in the adoption of the principle that the interests of the whole are superior to those of any member, since the whole is greater and of higher value. Where this principle is accepted by pure ethics, as in Stoicism, the service of the whole nearest to us logically leads on to the service of greater wholes, all humanity, the cosmos. The principle has no limits. But the standard of hive morality which seems to find some favour to-day, applies to a narrowly limited whole and is a degradation of human ideals. It appeals to the lowest instead of the highest idea of the living whole.

II

From the beginning of political philosophy the question whether the state is an ethical institution has been, whether openly or by implication, a critical issue. Plato whose *Republic* has been regarded by a long succession of students as a fountain-head of moral idealism does not, when we make the effort to think free from the philosophic tradition, speak to us with so certain a voice as we had imagined ourselves to hear. At the outset his close analogy between state and individual demands scrutiny. Identical principles are to secure the completely well-ordered life for both. Reason has the same authority, courage the same strength, temperance or reverence a closely similar relation. Above all, justice,[1] the most essential quality in the relations of men and classes, is also as Plato curiously argues the essential virtue within the individual giving order to the baser

[1] "The doing of one's true work."

elements of human nature. The manifestation of the good is everywhere for Plato the form of order. Order, the law of the universe, is law also in the soul, and the state in its perfect harmony is image of the eternal good. Yet if this state were realized, would it be more than a second or third best? From the outset it is founded on a "noble lie." The men who believed that they were composed of inferior metal would not be "class-conscious." The idea that perfection is in the whole is so ruthlessly carried out that to the best men, the philosophers is assigned an impoverished life, without freedom, home, or the consolations of philosophy to any extent until age releases them. Aristotle will not sacrifice his best man. Let the latter contemplate truth, apart from the world in glorious self-sufficiency.[1] For this is possible, but the best state (as the major part of his *Politics* testifies) is not possible. Is Plato's political ideal that of a man who knows human nature too well in Athens and Syracuse, or even in the Academy, to suppose that true freedom can be won except by the very few? His state must be always "laid up in heaven," and for us it is a beautiful myth, accompanied by bulwarks of profound philosophy and poetic genius. The greatest value of the myth is in its symbolism of order in the soul. This is ethically beautiful because it is a personal unity. The identical type of order is not ethically beautiful in the state because its unity is not of the personal type, since its different elements or classes are collections of different persons. Here there can be no ethical principle without freedom. It is noteworthy that the question of international morality is hardly touched by Plato and then only in respect to the interrelations of the Greek city states. Modern philosophical attempts to conceive the state as a real being, a kind of super-person, have fallen into greater contradictions than that of Plato, partly no doubt because it is impossible to put forward a consistent philosophy of the state in the modern world, which ignores, or does not give full value to the existence of many states. The outstanding example is the Hegelian state which has influenced many thinkers and directly or indirectly some men of action. Hegel's state, the expression of reason based on logic, is a paradox of extreme form. It seems logically incontrovertible that if we appeal to the principle of universality as the reason and basis of the state, the principle invoked must take us beyond the limits of particular societies, whether cities, nations, or empires to the most universal community of rational beings, that of all humanity. The particular state is not the creation or product of reason. It is the creature of history, objectively viewed, and since there is no *a priori* reason that human society should take this form and empirical evidence cannot prove its universality, it is not impossible that history will leave it behind. That the Hegelian

[1] *Ethics*, X, vii.

state is not based on essentially rational principles is evident from the fact that any one Hegelian state must deny the value of other states. This is partly obscured by the method which appears to assume that there is only one true state—"The state," as such. "Hegel's views in regard to war," it has been said, "result with absolute logic from his doctrine of the state. If the state is truly the highest expression of the spirit, perfect crystallization of morality —the real God, it is evident that nothing ought to affect its sovereignty. Now war is the highest affirmation of the sovereignty of a people—the moment in which it attains its ideal unity."[1] If war is necessary, then other states are necessary, for Hegel does not argue that the opposing societies, lacking true statehood are rebels against the true state. But the result is that reason is at conflict with itself, in its different manifestations. It may be said that it is the gratuitous assumption that war is "the moment in which a people attains its ideal unity" which causes this paradox in Hegel's doctrine. But the chief source of the fallacy is the attempt to base the idea of the state on principles of logic. If the idea and institution of the state can receive a philosophical justification, it can only be in the sphere of ethics. The state is a construct of history, an institution brought into being by historic forces, and a category for historic knowledge. Now history itself, as something more than the natural history of the human species in its struggle for life with nature and other species, and the struggle of different races with each other, is an ideal creation of the human mind through the meaning or value-significance given to the process of events. This meaning is given by men in the course of the struggle from the first awakening of the sense of humanity, continually gaining in depth and elaboration, pervaded by fatal errors but from time to time elevated by genius. When history comes to be written the meaning is emphasized and new ideas which both classify and obscure, ennoble and degrade, added by interpretation of memory and record. The content of history, the values and disvalues concerned, are primarily ethical in character, though with advance of culture, written history becomes more and more a department of knowledge, acknowledging only the value of truth. In the most general sense, the state if we seek for it a philosophical basis, must be a construction required by the moral nature of men in the broadest significance, the nature of the practical being working under the influence of ideas of good and evil. Such a basis, however, cannot be found for it. It has been built up out of the makeshifts of historic contingency, in the devising of instruments for the preservation of social order, instruments seized by men possessed of the desire for power beyond the average. It has been associated with the community as city or nation, falsely

[1] *Les Doctrines politiques de l'Allamagne*, chap. vi, Hegel. Victor Basch.

assuming and claiming the historic values on which these groupings rest. The nation is not rightly conceived as a personality though the love of its members for it may approach personal love, for a collection of individuals cannot constitute a person. Less harmless and more irrational is it to personify the nation-state, since this burdens history and politics with the idea of a magnified person as theme of the historian, and master of the statesman, a person of lower moral type than the individual. This is the primary source of the divorce between ethics and politics. The ethical ideal is in the perfection of the relations between persons. This perfection cannot be approached without some insight into the nature and worth of other persons. In that order of practice which is signified and constituted by relations between states, the personality of the individuals who are conceived to make up the states is obscured. Each state stands in the way. Individual members of different states perceive each other as it were through a haze or veil that distorts. This of course only refers to the general effect of the division of peoples into states, or the tendencies of this type of classification. The effect is seldom or never completely realized in fact unless in times of war. The state is the extreme case of what Bergson terms a "closed society." That men should form themselves into groups belongs to the nature of humanity universally, and the group as community has been the basis of high values. The existence of diverse national cultures, and national characters has been a gain in the development of the many-sided genius of the human race. The strength of the bonds which make for union in the case of the group as nation need not prevent it from being an "open" society in Bergson's sense[1] if these bonds are not hardened into principles of division from all other societies in the artificial construction of the state. The state does not as such stand for the ideal history of a society. It is the supreme organization of the society in command of power. It has no ethical being of its own. Non-moral, or at best imperfectly moral in its relations with other states, it cannot present the loftiest moral ideal to its own citizens. Does this mean that a poisonous element is thus introduced into its relations to them? To clear up this point it seems necessary to abandon the myth of the state and remember that however masked in institutional organs, in departmental functioning, in ministerial pronouncements, or in that bizarre parody of a universal intelligence the myriad-voiced words of a single man propagated through space identically for all listeners, there is no mind of the state, no will, but only the personal will, and individual minds. The moral burden of the man who in sincerity acts for the community, is immensely greater than that of the private individual. He feels the pressure of all the diverse

[1] Les deux sources de la religion et de la morale.

opinions of his duty or of the national duty held by the men and women for whom he acts. The ideas of past generations symbolized in institutions have to be taken account of, but it is for the minds of the present to interpret them and give them their value for the present. Yet always as argued above, his action is, in a moral light, bound by the same law as that holding for him as private individual. There can be no political law of right inconsistent with the moral, though in some situations the best action may be only a choice between two evils. The degree of moral value which can be achieved may be very low on account of the wide prevalence of the state myth determining the breaking up of humanity into a number of states regarding themselves as absolute in separateness from each other. It becomes difficult for the agents of the state, in the secondary form of being which truly attaches to it as instrument of the will of all its members to present to the outside world their genuine moral purpose. The claim for the state itself as a superior entity to have a kind of personal being may bring about the confusion or suppression of this purpose.

For these reasons it may seem impossible to apply to political action the principle of any absolute system of ethics, such as Kant's Categorical Imperative. This might perhaps be interpreted by the statesman as admitting of a uniquely individual application. "Act only in accordance with that maxim which thou canst at the same time will to be a universal law." Yes—but as he might feel, the maxim he requires could never be rightly followed in a second case because the situation is once for all. History never repeats itself. If it did the maxim would hold I do not think, however, that Kant's rule truly admits of this way out for exceptions. He postulates universal principles making the lie, the theft, the injustice, the broken promise to be always and everywhere against the moral law. Can it then be argued that a different type of ethical doctrine is appropriate in the political sphere allowing of a broader method of application to the concrete case? The ideal as "Greatest Happiness of the greatest number" for instance, inadequate for personal ethics, may be held to have its true province in political or public ethics, where conscience and motive cannot be inspected as by the individual in his own case. To what other ideals can the statesman look, to hold before parliament, chamber, or congress? The truth seems to be that the chief forms in which the ethical end has been stated in different systems have some value as guides in particular situations. They are abstractions from the concrete forces determining individual action *qua* moral in circumstances more or less widely met with. Bentham's "Greatest Happiness" principle, his fundamental law of morals and legislation seems especially appropriate as a guide to legislation. Aristotle's "Energy of the Soul in accordance with Excellence"

gives an end higher in quality though narrower in extension. The legislator can aim at the happiness of all. He cannot make them a gift of the soul's excellence. In Aristotle's less exalted sounding conception of phronesis, practical reason, or "wisdom of life," as I should translate this pregnant word, it seems that a principle is supplied capable of application universally to every unique call for action. The man who has wisdom of life, the "phronimos" brings the results of all his moral experience, his knowledge of life and history, his reverence for the greatest ideals to bear upon the particular call for action. He has a kind of intuition or insight into the moral demands of the case, although he has never met one exactly similar, because of his consistent striving to see life ethically. These are not Aristotle's words, but an interpretation of them. A clue seems to be provided to the statesman's principle of action. No static, unchangeable principle is a sufficient guide without qualification, because no such law can be relevant absolutely in every individual case. The moral activity is dynamic in a dynamic course of events. Where the absolute principle cannot be brought surely to bear because the crisis points to two such principles whose application conflicts in the concrete though in the abstract (as Socrates insists) all virtue is one, there remains the hope that the phronimos through insight will discover the highest principle of which the actual situation is capable. It is perhaps a dangerous doctrine and it may be well that all the devotees of absolute principles will turn at such moments upon the statesman who has striven to act in accordance with the wisdom of life and history, and overwhelm him with their scorn. For the ideal must not be forgotten, or trampled in the dust.

As regards the contrast from which this article started, between the moral crusade and the realistic political procedure, the conclusion seems to be that the opposition is not inherent in the nature of politics, but belongs to a profound aberration from that nature, favoured by the many contingencies of history which have fed the love of power in individuals and societies. It would perhaps not be difficult to argue that it is because attempts at a realistic political procedure have continuously followed upon one another in European history that the ends at which statesmen were really aiming have so seldom been attained, or otherwise regarded, that if all peoples were concurrently to engage in moral crusades, these real ends would most easily and unexpectedly be achieved. The appeal to history would supply some evidence in support of this contention, even without adopting the device by which Socrates in Plato's *Gorgias* proves that the tyrant never attains the object of his desire, but attains that which he supposed to be his object. The ethical explanation of the corrupting influence of what should be the

highest type of activity lies, as I believe, in the very nature of personality whose intrinsic tendency to transcend limiting conditions, easily degenerates into a striving to attain power. Hence the paradox of the *corruptio optimi pessima*. This is still more far-reaching than Plato revealed. The corruption of the best individual becomes the corruption of the state. The moral evil appears in its most gigantic proportions in the political, since it is the tragedy of all history.

ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY

Professor D. T. JACK

In a recent article in *Philosophy* (April, 1936) Professor Knox makes a plea for a philosophic treatment of economic activity by way of contrast to either the specialized study of economic history or of economic science. The conclusion which was reached was embodied in the statement that "the historical and scientific methods of the study of economic activity leave incompletely satisfied the curiosity of *students,* and reach results which need special interpretation before they can be useful to politicians, let alone to *business men*" (p. 159). Each of these methods is said to involve unreal abstractions which detract from the usefulness of the study. A philosophic approach, on the other hand, is required to (*a*) promote the investigation itself, (*b*) add to its usefulness in application, and (*c*) complete the study of philosophy as concerned with the whole of experience. It is possible to be in general sympathy with the broad conclusion reached by Professor Knox and yet to remain dissatisfied with his method of reaching that conclusion. Moreover, since his concern in the first instance was with the usefulness of economic study to the man of business, it would seem to be necessary to elaborate the manner in which such a philosophic study would increase that particular form of usefulness, and on that point the article in question has surprisingly little to say.

The philosophic parentage of modern economics is well-known; and if the infant has attempted, on reaching maturity, to set up a separate domicile of its own, it has done no more than follow a precedent which had already been established. Among the early Greeks, any discussion of economic problems, slight at the most, was subordinated to considerations of the good life and the perfect state. In the middle ages, economic discussion was subordinated to considerations of ethics and theology. In the eighteenth century, the founders of modern economic investigation—the Physiocrats in France and David Hume and Adam Smith in this country—developed their economic ideas on the basis of larger philosophical systems. And, in the early nineteenth century, even the British classical economists who endeavoured to develop a more scientific treatment of economic problems were directly affected by the assumptions of philosophical utilitarianism, while hedonism has for long exercised a considerable degree of authority over the develop-

ment of economic theory. The very fact that the study of economics is concerned with an aspect of human conduct makes it impossible to divorce that study at least from certain assumptions of a psychological and ethical character. It is doubtful whether any economist of repute would deny that economic action, being a part of conduct in general, had an ethical aspect at least as regards its end or object. Yet the study of economics has frequently been criticized for its excessive dependence on particular psychological and ethical assumptions. "No one," says Mr. Hawtrey, "would propose to build economics on so shifting a foundation as the theories of moral philosophers";[1] though the same writer recognizes that "every voluntary action in practical life is an essay in applied ethics."

The first problem which arises concerns the advantages and limitations of any attempt to build up a corpus of scientific knowledge with regard to economic problems. The fact that a science of economics must start from certain basic assumptions does not of itself invalidate a scientific approach since every science must proceed along similar lines and the usefulness of science is not therefore destroyed. It is in that way that uniformities or laws are established and the primary concern of the student is with such uniformities. One difficulty which Professor Knox revives is that of formulating uniformities of importance where the forces to be examined are based on human volition. The pliability of human nature as contrasted with the apparent rigidity of the impersonal forces which operate in the external world appears at first to preclude the possibility of arriving at general truths in the social sciences. The difficulty here may easily be overstated. Human nature, despite its varying manifestations, is not devoid of certain definite characteristics which become more pronounced when groups of individuals are examined, and these elements of permanence in the flux of experience are as vital to moral philosophy as they are to any of the social sciences. Without a recognition of these elements of permanence any study of economic problems, whether approached scientifically or philosophically, would be no more than a shapeless catalogue of events. If the difficulty mentioned is a real one it destroys not merely the possibility of a systematic study of economics but also of psychology and of ethics itself.

But the practical validity of any scientific conclusion is governed by the practical validity of the assumptions on which the investigation is based. Formal validity also is governed by initial assumptions, but in this case there is no particular need to examine critically the assumptions which are adopted. Thus it is possible to start from such assumptions as the statement that all men prefer a greater to a lesser satisfaction and to arrive at certain conclusions as to what

[1] Cf. Hawtrey: *The Economic Problem*, p. viii.

results are likely to follow. These conclusions will be formally valid. Equally one might start from other assumptions such as the statement that all men, being altruists or ascetics, prefer a smaller to a greater satisfaction and arrive at certain conclusions as to what results are likely to follow, and again the conclusions will be formally valid. The character of action will be different in the two cases, just as the moves are different in the orthodox game of draughts and in the unorthodox game of "first off the board." Certain schools of economic thought in their eagerness to attain scientific precision have doubtless exaggerated the search for formal validity by neglecting to examine critically the authority of their basic assumptions. Thus Pantaleoni wrote: "Whether and to what extent the hypothesis of psychological hedonism—from which every economic truth is deduced—is in harmony or at variance with the motives that really determine human actions—either generally, or more particularly as regards the acquisition and disposal of wealth—is not a question that need be solved before we can decide as to the truth or accuracy of the economic theorems that flow from it."[1] In recent years the positive results attained by the so-called mathematical school of economists have been meagre in comparison with the effort expended in pursuing that mode of approach. But this criticism is not applicable to all modern economists. Marshall's remark that "there is no room in economics for long chains of deductive reasoning"[2] is a timely reminder that something more than formal validity is required in a study which has an aspect of human conduct for its subject-matter.

Thus practical validity, as distinct from formal validity, requires that the economist must be prepared to examine and, if necessary, revise his initial assumptions. But he is not thereby precluded from prosecuting his search for formally valid conclusions. The fact that,

[1] Cf. Pantaleoni: *Pure Economics*, p. 9. In fairness to Pantaleoni, however, it should be mentioned that an attempt is made to justify the assumption of psychological hedonism on the ground that even if altruistic motives governed human conduct the same effects would be produced as those which occur on the assumption of egoism; and "it would probably be convenient to work out the problem relating to it in terms of egoism, just as it is sometimes convenient to invert the signs of an equation in order to solve it" (p. 10). The argument as to the validity of the assumption is in effect that universal altruism neutralizes itself. "Titus, e.g., from altruistic motives, asks much less than the current rate of interest for the capital he lends. In that case, Caius will, from similar motives, feel bound to offer much more than the current rate. Titus is willing to work *gratis* as a labourer, and Caius is constrained by altruism to pay him handsomely. Moreover, in order to realize the maximum altruistic effect, one would have to act in accordance with the most downright egoism."

[2] Cf. Marshall: *Principles of Economics*, p. 781.

as in Meredith's phrase, "in a high wind a dead leaf will fly like a bird" is no disproof of the law of gravity; nor is the general law of demand as formulated by scientific economists invalidated by the fact that during a period of crisis the amount of a particular demand may be unresponsive to a fall in price. In fact, it is a well-known economic proposition that if there is a general expectation that a further fall in price will occur, as during a period of deflation, the amount of demand may diminish with a fall in price instead of responding in the way suggested by the general law. But first things first. A complex problem must of necessity be broken up if the investigation is to be productive of knowledge. One of the immediate objects of the scientific analysis of forces—of whatever kind—is to discover the ultimate conditions which these forces tend to establish. And in the first instance each force is investigated by itself, on the assumption that its operation is not exposed to interference. The *ceteris paribus* of the theoretical economist reflects not a propensity to evade the issue, nor a simple passion for tidy-mindedness, but rather an anxiety for precision and the avoidance of ambiguity. Professor Knox, however, has in mind an apparent difference between economic laws and the laws of other non-social sciences in so far as it is claimed that the former are alterable while the latter are inexorable. Strictly speaking, of course, it is the forces rather than the laws which appear to be alterable or otherwise. This is reminiscent of John Stuart Mill's suggested distinction, within the sphere of economics itself, between the laws of production which seemed to be akin to physical laws and the laws of distribution which were regarded as social laws and capable of change. But Professor Knox bases his contention as to the alterability of economic laws on the fact of individual freedom of choice so that a generalization as to past experience provides no *a priori* probability as to its future applicability. Surely there is misconception here. The day has long past since it was possible to say that the economist took demand for granted. In his discussion of the problem of value the modern economist has much to say about freedom of choice but he is not called upon to predict what particular desires will be manifested by individuals at some future date, nor to forecast their intensities. Even a philosophical economics, as contemplated by Professor Knox, would be unable to make such predictions, and to that extent presumably would be useless to the man of business. But it is still an appropriate inquiry to consider what implications are attached to a given set of economic desires and what results may be expected to follow from a given change in the character of these desires or in their intensities. It is no part of the business of economics, however treated, to furnish a set of ready-made answers to particular problems which may or may not occur in fact; but it is

part of its business to indicate how such answers may be obtained given the situations.[1]

The advantage of a scientific study of economic problems lies simply in the greater possibility of attaining accurate knowledge by the specialized analysis of a selected field of experience. In this respect there is no significant difference between the scientific study of economic problems and the scientific study of any other group of phenomena. "The physical sciences," wrote Marshall, "made slow progress so long as the brilliant but impatient Greek genius insisted on searching after a single basis for the explanation of all physical phenomena; and their rapid progress in the modern age is due to a breaking up of broad problems into their component parts."[2] Admittedly, such specialism involves abstraction, but abstraction has its advantages as well as its drawbacks. "A fact," says Professor Schumpeter, "is never exclusively or purely economic; other—and often more important—aspects always exist. Nevertheless, we speak of economic facts in science just as in ordinary life, and with the same right; with the same right, too, with which we may write a history of literature even though the literature of a people is inseparably connected with all the other elements of its existence."[3] The very fact of the incompleteness involved in scientific abstraction sharpens its edge as an instrument for the attainment of knowledge.

The legitimacy of a scientific study of economics presupposes the existence of a group of problems with a distinctive character. Such problems arise whenever available resources are limited in supply relatively to the various uses to which they may be put. Thus the fact of scarcity is fundamental even though the degree of scarcity may vary. The same type of situation introduces choice in the allocation of limited resources, and the exercise of choice implies a certain order of preferences.[4] This volitional action is an essential element in any economic situation. The positive economist, however, is concerned with such activity as a means to an end rather than with the moral legitimacy of the ends themselves. Professor Knox

[1] It would be interesting to know how a philosophic approach to economic study as suggested by Professor Knox would, to take his own example, "help even a politician to decide whether or no to place a tariff on indigo" (p. 158).

[2] Cf. Marshall: *Principles of Economics*, p. 770.

[3] Cf. Schumpeter: *The Theory of Economic Development*, p. 3.

[4] Modern economic theory has tended more and more to examine the problem of value on the basis of *preferences* as data; preferences being less likely to raise difficulties connected with any particular assumptions as to the ethical or psychological character of desire, and thereby escaping from the earlier dominance of hedonism which persisted in economic terminology after its philosophical implications had been abandoned.

complains that this "involves abstracting from human conduct as a whole, treating it as behaviour only and not as intention as well. This abstraction in fact reduces action from something that men do to something that happens to them" (p. 155). Such criticism overlooks the fact that the actions of individuals have widespread effects, frequently reaching far beyond the scope of the initial intention, and these effects may have great practical significance. To that extent it cannot be useless to investigate the nature of these effects. Any study which confined itself to an examination of the conscious decisions of individuals would throw little light upon those other results of action which are created by the interactions of a multiplicity of individual decisions. Professor Knox's complaint contains within itself a justification for a positive economic inquiry. The conscious decisions of one set of individuals lead to actions, and these actions are among the things that happen to other individuals.

Professor Knox, however, is more concerned with the frequent neglect of conscious purpose in ordinary discussions of the problem. Thus he refers to the tendency to assume that "prosperity is a matter not of human effort but of economic laws, the outcome of a system of organization or of parliamentary regulation, not something that men create, but something that happens to them, like falling to a stone" (p. 162). If this is a protest against an extreme form of economic fatalism, the criticism may be accepted without demur. But does it not call for some modification or elaboration? For many individuals, prosperity (or adversity) *is* something that "happens to them, like falling to a stone." The business man has no doubt as to the meaning of "windfall gains and losses"; and many wage-earners may be forgiven if they feel that

> Things are in the saddle
> And ride mankind.

Systems of organization and parliamentary regulation are not irrelevant to prosperity or adversity. But they remain conditions of prosperity, not causes of it; and they are themselves the results of human action.

Granted the possibility of a positive scientific investigation of economic phenomena, what of its usefulness? This may be considered from the point of view of public policy and from the point of view of business policy.[1] The knowledge of the implications of certain types of public policy cannot be unimportant to the legis-

[1] Incidentally, the description of economic activity as concerned with "buying and selling for profit" (p. 147) even if "interpreted in the widest sense" is surely unhappy and misleading to the untutored mind. Even buying and selling as ordinarily understood do not exhaust economic activity. Neither science nor philosophy stand to gain from so narrow a definition.

lator. If import duties are to be imposed for revenue or protective purposes the elasticities of demand for the dutiable goods will be relevant in fixing the duties which are to provide the desired result. It is no reply to this to argue that this knowledge may be ignored by that "insidious and crafty animal, vulgarly called a statesman or politician, whose councils are directed by the momentary fluctuations of affairs." Of greater importance is the fact, also recognized by Adam Smith, that economic policy may only be one aspect of public policy so that considerations of economic advantage may be overruled by considerations of another order, as in the famous dictum that "as defence is of much more importance than opulence, the act of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England." But if an economic advantage and a political advantage appear to conflict, it cannot be unimportant to understand the magnitude and nature of the economic loss which is involved if the former advantage is sacrificed in an attempt to realize the latter.

Similar considerations are relevant with regard to business policy. The impatience of the business man with the postulates and findings of the theoretical economist proceeds primarily from the fact that the business man is a pragmatist, whereas the chief concern of the scientist and the philosopher is with the truth of the conclusions which are reached. The common idea that there is an unbridgeable gulf between theory and practice completely misses the point. The scientist cannot theorize about nothing; and the business man in executing his policy implies some theory at each and every stage of his conduct. When he alters his methods, he assumes both the possibility and the desirability of a lower cost combination of available resources. When he alters his price policy, he assumes a certain type of response on the part of his customers to that particular change. But it is sufficient for his purpose if his theory "works" in the particular case where it is applied. The apparently irrational element in the business decisions of entrepreneurs of outstanding success—to which Professor Knox draws attention (p. 160)—refers to no more than the place of intuitive judgment in the sphere of economic activity, although why such judgments should be described as illogical is hardly clear except in so far as they do not proceed from conscious syllogisms. Judgments of this type raise no problem for economics that is not raised by intuition in other departments of knowledge and conduct. Certainly theoretical economists have not failed to recognize the importance in fact of special gifts of insight for purposes of business administration, and no one is likely to quarrel with the statement that specialized forms of business training are unlikely to produce more leaders with such natural gifts.[1]

[1] Cf. Professor Knox's comments on p. 161. It is not necessary here to produce an apology for instructional curricula for business careers, but some

The preceding sections of this paper have been concerned primarily with the defence of positive economic investigation against certain attacks to which it has been exposed, and in particular against the notion that the abstraction which is involved in economic science undermines its usefulness. No reason has appeared for endorsing the view that a philosophic as distinct from a scientific approach to economic analysis, as contemplated by Professor Knox, would provide results which would be more acceptable on grounds of usefulness to the legislator or to the man of business. It now remains to consider how far the incompleteness of the scientific approach to economics requires to be supplemented by philosophy.

It has already been indicated that any study which abstracts from within the field of experience must be prepared to subject its assumptions to the critical scrutiny of philosophy, and it is possible for philosophy to make some contribution which will be useful in the further development of the particular scientific investigation. An example may be cited. In the development of the economic theory of value during the last sixty-odd years, emphasis has been laid on the importance of demand; and demand, among other things, appears to express a desire for satisfaction. Moreover, the general law of demand has been based upon the conception of diminishing utility, and in the treatment of this aspect of the problem the tendency has been to regard desires as independent entities and as ultimate data. Thus even Marshall remarks that "there is an endless variety of wants, but there is a limit to each separate want. This familiar and fundamental tendency of human nature may be stated in the *law of satiable wants* or *of diminishing utility* thus: The total utility of a thing to anyone (that is, the total pleasure or other benefit it yields him) increases with every increase in his stock of it, but not as fast as his stock increases."[1] This assumption may be convenient at a certain stage of the investigation, but it raises wider issues which are of philosophical importance, and it is possible that some modification of the assumption, as suggested by philosophical scrutiny, may facilitate the further development of the economic theory of value. Clearly, the various desires of an individual are not independent entities: they are atomic only in abstraction. As the desires of an individual they constitute a unity or system, and in terms of personality it is the system of desires which is important. This conclusion possesses significance for economic theory, because

defence is at least possible. The supply of entrepreneurs with outstanding ability is exceedingly scarce and is insufficient to "go round." It may therefore not be inappropriate to train men for business careers even though the ability thus produced is of a lesser order than that displayed by those who are endowed with rare natural qualities which make for outstanding success.

[1] Cf. Marshall: *Principles of Economics*, p. 93.

the ordinary law of diminishing utility was developed on the basis of the assumed atomic nature of desires, and if the assumption is revised the place of diminishing utility in the economic theory of value may also call for revision. Thus the development of a system of desires may involve increasing as distinct from diminishing utility in relation to particular desires in the system. It may not be the business of economics to examine the active principle in the development of personality, but the unity of personality may provide economics with an assumption which is more appropriate to its own task of analysis.[1]

A further consideration may be advanced. Desires have been treated by positive economics as ultimate data and as a-moral. If this assumption is accepted as adequate there can be no *raison d'être* for ethics except as economics under another name. But the assumption is not adequate. Desires are intrinsically subject to change, and cannot in the last resort be statically conceived. Activity, whether economic or not, is therefore not completely considered as concerned with the satisfaction of desires. "Life," says Professor F. H. Knight, "is not fundamentally a striving for ends, for satisfactions, but rather for bases for further striving; desire is more fundamental to conduct than is achievement, or perhaps better, the true achievement is the refinement and elevation of the plane of desire, the cultivation of taste. And . . . all this is true *to the person acting*, not simply to the outsider, philosophizing after the event."[2] This is perhaps an overstatement. Activity may be an important element in happiness, but only one among others. Hume's account may be more apposite. "Human happiness, according to the most received notions, seems to consist in three ingredients: action, pleasure, and indolence. And though these ingredients ought to be mixed in different proportions, according to the particular disposition of the person; yet no one ingredient can be entirely wanting, without destroying, in some measure, the relish of the whole composition."[3]

Nothing has been said in the preceding pages which can be interpreted as denying or even minimizing the dangers which arise from a failure to recognize the limitations of a specialized and abstract analysis. The greatest danger occurs where a specialist in one department of knowledge endeavours to construct a philosophical

[1] The possibility of increasing utility was mentioned casually by Marshall in a footnote. Later it was incorporated in an article by Professor Chapman in the *Economic Journal*. It was developed more fully philosophically and economically by Professor W. R. Scott in *Is Increasing Utility Possible?* Further reference may be made to the recent work of Mr. A. L. Macfie, *An Essay on the Nature of Economy and Value*.

[2] Cf. Knight: *The Ethics of Competition*, p. 23.

[3] Cf. Hume: *Essays*, vol. 1, p. 266.

system on the basis of his own particular set of abstractions. There can be no ultimacy about science. The methods of science are such that any particular science is inherently disqualified from resolving ultimate problems by itself. Physicists, chemists, biologists, and astronomers are frequently convicted on the charge of failing to recognize the philosophical limitations of their own advances. And it is equally possible for the scientific economist to commit similar error. The frequent tendency to construct a system of metaphysics on the basis of the assumptions and results obtained in a physical science can have as its counterpart the attempt to construct a theory of the final nature of society on the assumptions and results of a particular social science. "It is," says Professor Stout, "a leap in the dark to assume that what science can for its own purpose ignore, does not really exist."[1]

One aspect of this conclusion remains to be considered. Conscious human activity is by its very nature moral. Philosophers have had little difficulty in demonstrating that the question "Why should I be moral?" is an irrational question. A modern economist has emphasized in another direction this aspect of man's effort. "It is not life that he strives for, but the good life, or at the ultimate minimum a decent life, which is a conventional, cultural concept, and for this he will throw away life itself; he will have that or nothing. He has similar physical requirements with the animals, but has become so "particular" as to their mode of gratification that the form dominates the substance. A life in which bare existence is the end is *intolerable* to him. When his artificial, cultural values are in ultimate conflict with physical needs, he rather typically chooses the former, sacrificing quantity of life to quality, and it is hard to see how he could be prevented from so doing."[2] Wordsworth's sonnet which begins, "The world is too much with us" does not deny the predominance of cultural values, but merely criticizes the particular set of cultural values in authority.

Surely this means that positive economics must be harmonized with normative ethics, not in the sense that the two are prevented

[1] Cf. Stout: *Mind and Matter*, p. 143. It may be suggested that economists have a better record in this respect than other scientists. This in turn may not be unconnected with the interesting observation that in this country at least most of the leading economists have been trained in philosophy—outstanding examples being Adam Smith, the Mills, Jevons, Sidgwick, Marshall, Pigou, and Keynes; for a training in philosophy should enable the economist to recognize more clearly the limits to his own investigation. In this respect, Professor Knox's plea for a philosophical approach to economics may be entirely endorsed.

[2] Cf. Knight: *The Ethics of Competition*, pp. 27–8. As Professor Knight adds: "It is of interest that the conduct which men denounce by calling it 'bestial' (in the field of sex and elsewhere) is typically of a sort in which the 'beasts' never indulge."

from conflicting with one another,[1] but in the sense that they form aspects of the one reality? And an important step can be taken in that direction by regarding economy itself as a value and as an ingredient in the moral life. If ethics and economics are ultimately distinct, a problem is raised to which no solution is possible without denying the existence either of the one or of the other. But positive economics, useful though it may be in its allotted sphere, is incomplete without a normative economics to supplement the investigation. The problem here has much philosophical interest and importance. Moral philosophers in the past have frequently appeared to fail to come to grips with the ethical problems which arise in ordinary life, and if the man of affairs has been impatient with the scientific economist, he has been no less impatient with the moral philosopher. May it not be that the moral philosopher has on occasion been guilty of abstraction while failing to recognize the limitations of such a method?[2]

It may therefore be suggested that there exists a field of investigation which is concerned with that territory in which the economic problem merges into the ethical problem and where no sharp dissinction between the two is recognized apart from purposes of abstract analysis. The exploration of such territory may be justified for two reasons: (*a*) that all economic conduct has an ethical reference, and (*b*) that economy has some claim to be regarded as a value and therefore as falling within the scope of ethical inquiry. The first of these is obvious enough, and calls for no further comment. The second is less apparent, and is frequently ignored.[3] Instead of regarding economy as an unfortunate necessity imposed upon man by the parsimony of nature, it may with greater significance be regarded as an aspect of the good life which man seeks to attain, however varied and wayward his attempts in that direction may appear.

[1] Thus Professor Robbins in his *Nature and Significance of Economic Science*, p. 132, speaks of economics and ethics as existing on different planes of discourse. This may make it possible to avoid any conflict between them, but only by a deliberate evasion of the issue.

[2] It would perhaps not be unfair to remark that to the majority of moral philosophers, the modern development of the economic theory of value has remained a closed book. Dr. Inge, indeed, remarks: "The use of the word value in economics will not be any help to us, though it has been discussed at perhaps unnecessary length by some recent writers on the idea of value" (cf. *God and the Astronomers*, p. 179). But there is nothing in the text which either supports this conclusion or even indicates what the modern theory of value in economics is. On the basis of this view, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that ethics and economics must remain ultimately apart—a conclusion which is clearly intellectually unsatisfactory. Professor Laird, in his *Idea of Value*, is an example of a philosopher who has endeavoured to take account of the contribution of marginal analysis in the theory of economics.

[3] The elaboration of this idea has been strikingly worked out in Mr. Macfie's *Essay on the Nature of Economy and Value*.

Certain aspects of this last consideration may be indicated. In any view of the moral life which recognizes the need to effect some reconciliation between particular virtues which are in apparent conflict, some principle of organization is required, as in the Platonic conceptions of justice and temperance. In real life, as ordinarily experienced, there is no such thing as an isolated value, and in speculative thought isolated values are conceived only in abstraction. From this point of view, conflict is to be regarded not merely in the sense of active opposition—as when "good" encounters "evil"—but as including disharmonies within a system—as when there are excesses and deficiencies of particular "goods"—with active opposition as the extreme or limiting case. Such disharmonies may in turn be related to the dynamic element in the activity which seeks new satisfaction by resolving presently experienced conflicts. Thus the consciousness of disharmony particularizes itself in the form of desires whose satisfaction appears to remove the immediate disharmony which is their occasion.

In so far as these disharmonies within the system of personality imply scarcity and choice, there appears to be no fundamental difference between the problem thus created in the sphere of ethics and the problem which arises in the more restricted sphere which is investigated by positive economics. The economic principle—expressed by positive economics as the realization of equi-marginal satisfactions as the condition of maximum satisfaction from given resources—has its counterpart in the sphere of ethics, so that economy appears as an ingredient in the moral life. But for this purpose it is necessary to break away from the popularly conceived notion of economy as a negative "doing without"—the idea which is stressed during "economy campaigns." Similarly, is it necessary to think of economy as something more than the structural or architectonic principle which is emphasized in positive economics, even though that is much in advance of the popular conception of the term. The claims of economy to recognition as a direct source of satisfaction have to be examined. Here the appeal to experience is suggestive, for there is no department of human activity in which a given result is not more pleasing when attained with "efficiency" than when attended by "waste." The apparent difficulty that economy must always remain as an instrument rather than as an objective arises from an overdrawn distinction between means and end. If the moral life can be conceived statically with definite objective ends, the means of attaining these ends may perhaps be capable of clear distinction. But when the moral life is regarded in its dynamic aspect the distinction becomes blurred. The realization of values at one stage is but the means towards the recognition of higher values which may still be attained. What are regarded as "means" may be more

fittingly described as ends statically conceived, or as ends of a lower order. More important to philosophy than the distinction between means and ends is the notion of a developing system of personality within which values have their appropriate places. "The values which we experience are members of a system, a system which we have to create and keep in order."[1]

The broad conclusion of the argument may therefore be stated in general terms. The ethical and economic problems which are distinguished in real life are essentially dynamic problems which can be regarded statically only for purposes of analytical convenience. Moreover, the distinction between the ethical and the economic spheres of reference is also a convenience which is both useful and important at a certain stage of the investigation, but it has no ultimate justification. The results of positive economics must be reinterpreted in the light of ethics and embodied in a normative economics which involves a larger synthesis. The argument of the present paper has endeavoured to present the view that this larger synthesis can best be promoted not merely by superimposing ethical judgments on the findings of positive economics, but by recognizing economy as itself an ingredient in the moral life, and as one of the values which have to be harmonized in the system of values which expresses the personality of the individual. An investigation into normative economics as thus conceived may claim to be "useful" both to the positive study of economics and to the philosophical study of experience as a whole, and may even be developed in a manner which has significance for "the man of affairs."

[1] Cf. Macfie: *op. cit.*, p. 102. A certain superficial resemblance may appear between the view here outlined and the late Dr. Bosanquet's description of morality as a realm of "claims and conflicting counter-claims" which Professor Taylor has described as a "misrepresentation as grotesque as dangerous"(cf. *The Faith of a Moralist*, vol. 1, p. 414). Professor Taylor's criticism, however, is directed against the Bosanquettian doctrine of individual human personality as mere illusion, and he himself insists on what he calls the "relativity of all loyalties except the highest." The co-ordination of loyalties or of values is a problem of practical ethics which constantly confronts the individual in directing his conduct, and the co-ordination which is required is something that cannot be incorporated in any contractual bond. The similarity between the view here advanced and that adopted by Bosanquet is, however, little more than superficial. It has much more in common with the Aristotelian mean.

DISCUSSION

COLOUR: AN ALTERNATIVE STATEMENT

I

In an interesting article in a recent number of *Philosophy* (October 1937) Mr. H. Wallis Chapman examines Colour as one of the commonest illustrations of the universal; and comes to conclusions of a nominalist kind. I desire to propose alternative solutions for the problems he deals with. If my statements seem too dogmatic, or my quotations too brief, the motive is economy of space. I trust that any reader of the present paper will read the whole of Mr. Chapman's.

Mr. Chapman begins by calling attention to the variability of colour. "The colour perceived on any particular occasion is a function of the whole physical situation including the object perceived, the illumination, the medium, and the physical condition of the percipient" (p. 444). What then, shall we say, is an object's real colour? He defines it (447–8) as "the colour seen when the object is viewed by vision of the greatest power of discrimination in circumstances permitting of the greatest discrimination. But this colour is not actually seen, or is seen only by accident. . . . In short, the colour of an object is not perceived, but constructed."

At this point I propose my first, and fundamental, alternative. I take my stand on the fact that our various careful statements ("The object in this light and in these surroundings is bluish"; "As I saw it an hour ago it was almost grey"; etc.) are true statements, and true of the object, and of the object in its aspect as coloured; and that therefore it seems not unfair to say that all these statements (or corresponding statements with some agreed alteration in their wording) shall be taken as true about the object's colour. That is, what we call the real colour shall be, not one particular tint selected from those actually seen or conceivably seen, but something which can appear as each of them and all of them. It shall be a universal whose appearances vary with the situation in which it appears.

Mr. Chapman's real colour (the fixed particular tint) may never be seen, or may be seen only by accident. Mine (the universal) will be seen in every perception of the object, sometimes with a large measure of adequacy (with good eyes under good conditions), sometimes with a very small measure (in the night when all cows are black). No single perception, nor any finite number of perceptions, will allow of complete display, but a few good observations may give us a very fair idea and enable us to forecast others. It is convenient to give to the real colour the same name (green, for instance) that we give to the tints in which under the best conditions it appears. But we must remember that in applying that name to the colour we are applying it to a universal, and must be prepared to say if necessary, "This green, in these surroundings, does not appear as green at all." Instead of giving the short name, we may prefer to give a longer account, and say "The colour is such that in most conditions, and in the best light, it is green, but also such that in the following setting it is bluish and in this other it is grey."

My suggestion is that anything which we pause to study and find out

about, and designate as "real," will prove itself a universal; or, more accurately, will be caused to exhibit itself in its aspect of being a universal; as an identity which shows itself in different ways with different contacts. "Amongst all these changing moods, which is the real man?" The proper answer is that every mood gives some vision of the real man, though they differ so much in the amount and the importance of what they show of him. Each of these, like each tint which the colour shows, gives some access to the reality. With each meeting, though with some much more than others, our acquaintance improves. As Mr. Chapman well says, "if the object is only seen once, our statement that it has a particular colour is vague and doubtful."

2.

The next question raised in Mr. Chapman's paper is that of the landmarks in our map of colours. "As the geometry of a sphere gives no means for locating any place on it and we must choose a meridian of Greenwich on non-geometrical grounds, so our ordered colour-continuum requires grounds going beyond colour-resemblance for choosing particular regions of it to bear special names. . . . The colour-sensations which group themselves round massive or impressive experiences, the green of the leaves, the blue of the sky, the red of blood, will seem to form natural classes. . . . "Redness" includes the emotional reaction to objects resembling certain typical and important objects; it is by no means a simple term as is sometimes supposed." (450–1). I willingly accept this in principle, and express it by saying that the identity which governs that colour-region is a blend of at least two universals, of which at least one has some emotional importance. A prosaic parallel could be found in the series of integers where the interest of what-one-can-count-on-one's-fingers breaks into equal pieces a procession which might have no break or rhythm in a less practical world; and gives different emotional tones to 7 and to 17. In the first piece of the series pre-eminently the dual universal stands out. "This is what Number-That-We-Can-Handle can do with itself." "These numbers resemble one another not only in being numbers but in being things we can use familiarly and play with."

The nature of resemblance may conveniently be dealt with here. We say that things are similar, I suggest, when (1) they show an identity in spite of their differences, and also (2) the identity to some extent pervades them. A universal which has any practical or emotional importance tends to become pervasive. Names ending in the same letter (unless it were an unusual ending) would hardly be called similar names; but those beginning with the same letter, especially if it is A, do look similar to one another, and dissimilar from names beginning with B, and much more dissimilar from those beginning with W. The A-names are showing not only the same three-line shape at their left-hand extremity, but the universal demand, "Put us near the head of your alphabetical lists," "Deal early with us"; and that universal affects the name as a whole.—Unlikeness as well as likeness rests on identity in difference. Mere disparates are neither like nor unlike, until their disparateness is overcome by our seeing them somehow as the same sort of thing.

Returning to the colour of an object, and the various tints in which, according to the circumstances, it shows itself to us, we may ask, as Mr. Chapman asks in other words (454), whether it ever shows itself twice in exactly the same way;—whether, with the same observer or with another, an experienced tint is ever repeated; or whether two different objects may show on occasion exactly the same tint. Mr. Chapman answers that, in the special case where

a single observer has two cases simultaneously before him, we must take his word for their identity, but that otherwise we can never be sure. I have no reason to dispute this. "Colour," "shape," "the economic motive," "the scientific study of this problem," "the movement for penal reform,"—all such interesting universals may vary their particulars without end, with each variant a function of its whole situation. We may make mistakes in comparing them;—may discover on further inspection (through renewed perception or through careful remembering) that a difference exists where we thought there was none; between two showings of the same object, or two forms of the economic motive, or two instances of the colour Red. The identity of the universal need not be disturbed by its varying specifications, since that is the way in which a universal is accustomed to exist.

3

I have followed Mr. Chapman in his affirmations of fact (or hope that I have done so), only expressing them in different terms. But when he draws his conclusions I cannot follow him; I lose my footing. In the first place, he feels (454) that the fact which I have described as the blending of universals obliges him to give a nominalist answer to the problem of universals. I cannot see how this follows. A scheme of colour names, as he says, "divides the manifold into a number of regions which are determined . . . by the experience of the imposers of the names in respect of matters other than colour." This will complicate, but surely does not abolish, the identity which displays itself within the region of each name.—In the second place, the fact that colour-memories can be mistaken raises (he considers) great difficulties (455). "These difficulties can be avoided if it is really meaningless to speak of numerical identity or difference between the colours perceived on different occasions, absolute colour having no more significance than absolute position. The fundamental perception will then be, not "This occasion has this or that colour," but "this occasion has more or less colour resemblance to these other occasions." Colour-resemblance will be a specific type of resemblance directly perceived, but as it essentially admits of more and less our former difficulties vanish."—I cannot see this. (*a*) Error is *sui generis*, and every theory finds some difficulty in rendering into other language the fact that we can make mistakes; but why should mistakes about degrees of resemblance be so much easier to deal with than mistakes about identity? (*b*) On numerical identity or difference, I may misunderstand his use of the words, but it seems to me that to call them meaningless in this reference (as he proposes) will not suit Mr. Chapman's purpose at all. He needs to be able to say that the colours perceived on different occasions (the perceived tints, as I have called them) *are* numerically different, as much as I need to say that a numerically identical real colour must in different situations appear in these different forms of itself.

I offer now a conjecture which might bridge the gap between us. Mr. Chapman's whole argument is a polemic against false simplicity. With regard to general colour-terms, he has shown that we should lose much of their interest if we tried to squeeze out the emotional shades that are blended with the colours. With regard to specific experienced tints, he has shown that we follow a barren chase if we set store by their unaltered multiplication (454). "There is no appeal from the judgment that two colours seen by the same person at the same moment are the same, but the grounds on which we have come to this conclusion show how little meaning or value it has." He thinks that the two parts of the polemic hang together: (456) "The importance of our

earlier discussion of colour names is now clear; if they were really simple, as is usually supposed, the theory I have just set forth would be very difficult to maintain, for such simple terms would denote entities of the sort which I have denied; but if 'red,' for example, is a term of extremely complex reference, grounded, not merely in simple perception, but in the whole history of the race, there is no reason why it should denote a simple recurring entity." I cannot follow this link; I don't see why a simple term has a necessary right to recur in experience, nor why a complex one should not have an equal right. But I think that, without depending on each other, both parts of the main argument are sound. Let us reject therefore, as uninteresting if not inapplicable, the conception of an identity which excludes complication and forbids diversity.[1] Absolute colour (says Mr. Chapman) has no more significance than absolute position;—that is, I suppose, there is nothing in either case which can be stated independently of its context. With different situations specified the same object may be described as high or low, dark or light, bluish or greenish; and all the descriptions, with their background understood, will be true.

With the main point we are bound to agree. The only interesting identity is one which can show itself in diverse aspects and behave in diverse ways. Absolute reality, in any sense in which we wish to keep the conception, must be that which we discern as appearing variously but more and more calculably and intelligibly as our knowledge grows. Mr. Chapman's observations ought to lead us, I suggest, to a sane Realism. When you study Colour (he should say), you will find that the reality you are dealing with is complex and appears in varying forms; and so it is with everything to which it is worth while to attend. But to lead us towards this he would have to allow the "real colour" of an object to be a universal, whereas he has previously tied that name to one particular tint out of the whole system of actual and possible particulars;—a tint which may never be seen at all. So in the end, looking for something actually experienced and useful which will maintain identity without difference, he finds nothing except the *name*. But the name itself (I reply), as soon as we attend to it with interested study, will be found to betray us. It may easily never meet us twice with exactly the same sound, or exactly similar marks of black upon white. We cannot work with identity without difference, anywhere.

Mr. Chapman proposes that we should be Nominalists. I propose as an alternative that, adopting his good observations to assist us, we should all be Realists of the right kind.

HELEN WODEHOUSE.

HUME'S DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION

An Answer to Dr. Laing

HUME'S *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* are still much with us. What appears to be the definitive edition was published by Professor Norman Kemp Smith in 1935 with a learned introduction which, among other things, assembled a mass of evidence pointing to the conclusion that Philo is to be

[1] Repeated allusions to a phrase of Whitehead's, about colours being "eternal objects . . . haunting time like a spirit," suggest that Mr. Chapman takes this writer to be upholding the blank kind of identity. The reference is not given, but the typical legends of haunting spirits allow their appearance and behaviour to vary much as those of embodied spirits vary, with the circumstances and with the seer.

identified with Hume himself, and that Hume in the *Dialogues* is deliberately trying to undermine the religious hypothesis. Though these conclusions have been widely accepted, Dr. B. M. Laing, in the April issue of *Philosophy*, strenuously attacked them in an ingenious argument based in part on his already published thesis that Hume's fundamental philosophy is not really the scepticism so long assigned him. Dr. Laing takes the opportunity in passing to indicate his sympathy with the recent position of a distinguished British poet that Voltaire, also, has been traditionally abused in the assumption that on the question of religion he wrote with his tongue in his cheek. The present examination is not designed to inquire into this new mode of making the wicked pious; nor to push the question back from the *Dialogues* to Hume's basic philosophy; nor to press the writer's conviction ["The Enigma of Hume," *Mind*, XLV (July, 1936) pp. 334–349] that not only is Philo to be identified as Hume, but in addition, Cleanthes as Joseph Butler, and Demea as Samuel Clarke. The present purpose is solely to indicate certain unhistorical bases of Dr. Laing's attack on the more traditional view so ably championed by Professor Norman Kemp Smith.

An adequate reply to Dr. Laing might well limit itself to the refutation of his two arguments brought against Professor Smith's belief "that in the *Dialogues* Hume is deliberately and consciously undermining the religious hypothesis."

> First (replies Dr. Laing), the *Dialogues* are concerned purely with Natural Religion, and even for a very large section of orthodox divines in the eighteenth century the arguments of Natural Religion were a sort of heretical argument; and the deliberate exposure of their weakness, an exposure even ending in scepticism so far as that line of reasoning was concerned, would have caused no dismay, in fact would have met with approval, for it would have left their own position untouched, if not strengthened.

What outstanding figures would Dr. Laing place in that "very large section of orthodox divines in the eighteenth century"? Surely not any of the most distinguished Anglican theologians belonging to the tradition which started with Hooker and ran through the entire seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; all Anglican theology of those periods began with Natural Religion. The naturalistic trends of Hooker and the Cambridge Platonists were strengthened by the naturalistic and experimental trends of Boyle and Newton. The Boyle Lectures, founded by the great chemist to defend Revealed Religion, almost invariably did so by way of the New Science; and the Boyle Lecturers include many famous names chosen from among the Anglican theologians of the eighteenth century. Bishop Butler, called by Newman a century later, "the greatest name in the Anglican Church," devoted, as the very title indicates, the first half of the famous *Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature* (1736), to Natural Religion. Butler was trying to convince the Deists or Naturalists, that Natural Religion which they acknowledged, is open to the same objections as Revealed Religion; Butler's purpose was not to invalidate both or either thereby, but avowedly to indicate the absurdity of rejecting either. Is Dr. Laing willing to maintain that Hooker was unorthodox? And what of the Cambridge Platonists, of the Latitudinarians of the seventeenth century? What of Archbishop King, of Bishop Butler, of Bishop William Law, of Dr. Paley in Hume's own century? Has not Dr. Laing confused the orthodoxy of such distinguished names, an orthodoxy fully cognizant of contemporary movements of thought, with the

perhaps less philosophical orthodoxy of the average parish priest? Hume had no concern, as his letters clearly reveal, with the complete dogmatist. He was directing his *Dialogues* to those divines to whom Natural Religion not only was not repugnant, but represented the most important philosophical bulwark of Revealed Religion itself. Hume's aim was to show how the arguments of even such a distinguished work as the *Analogy of Religion* were basically sceptical in their outcome.

Dr. Laing argues secondly that

> Professor Kemp Smith's assertion is made in face of Hume's express declaration in a letter to Sir Gilbert Elliot that "any Propensity you imagine I have to the other side (that is, in favour of the sceptical views of Philo) crept in upon me against my will," and in face of a definite request for assistance in strengthening the case of Cleanthes who, he says, is made the hero of the *Dialogues*. Unless this letter is to be regarded as another piece of artfulness, it is impossible to admit Professor Kemp Smith's assertion.

The challenge may be accepted on Dr. Laing's own terms; it is perhaps even unnecessary to recall that in a letter to Henry Home, Hume openly admits being an "infidel" and sees no ill consequences to having such a reputation. It is sufficient to examine the implications of Hume's statement that the sceptical propensity crept in upon him against his will, but that *it did seize him*. Hume explains to Elliot how in his youth he strove against scepticism with all of his intellectual strength, but to no ultimate avail. Hume's statement regarding Philo the sceptic proves nothing about the character of the finished *Dialogues*, but only gives us a fact concerning Hume's psychology, a fact which no one recognized better then he himself. His request for assistance in bolstering up the argument of Cleanthes was undoubtedly made in good faith, for, he was anxious, he tells Elliot in the same letter, to avoid that vulgar error "of putting nothing but Nonsense into the Mouth of the Adversary."

Perhaps a word ought to be added regarding Dr. Laing's position that Philo's arguments are largely borrowed from previous writers and that *therefore*, unless more credit for originality is given to the position of Cleanthes, the *Dialogues* are reduced to "insignificance." If the romantic notion of complete originality is the supreme test of philosophical "significance," consider how we must lower our estimates of Hobbes, Locke, and Newton, to name but a few eminent English thinkers of before Hume's time. Surely great genius may be allowed to represent its age, to accept the current "climate of opinion." True originality lies often in the individual synthesis of what all accept without question, rather than in the newness of the component fragments. Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* have the stamp of greatness imprinted upon them, and their significance is in no way impaired by late discoveries of the origins of their various arguments. Notwithstanding, the scholar is always glad to know of such origins for whatever comparative information they may render regarding the treatment of similar ideas by different minds. For this research, rather than for his perhaps unfortunate applications, a real debt of gratitude is due to Dr. Laing. For certainly too much can never be known regarding Hume's sources.

ERNEST C. MOSSNER.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY

One of the fundamental differences between English and German civilisation which leads to different philosophical problems is their attitude to the reality of history. The English "live" history as if it were nature. They found at least by the thirteenth century their own form of life, of government, constitution, and state, which have lasted ever since through all changes so that a rich system of traditions has developed. Germany did not find a lasting unity as early as that, but, being divided into many autonomous parts, religions, and tribes, it did not reach a strong social or moral tradition. Consequently the "rise of the historical consciousness" and even the wish to awaken the nation as a whole to it is in Germany an intellectual product. But what has been a disadvantage in the sphere of politics has been an advantage to science and philosophy. The German even believes it to be one of their chief contributions to the History of Thought that they have developed a scientific history and all the sciences which analyse its field, and above that the "Historism," a historical *Weltanschauung* or the task of interpreting the whole world from the point of view of history.

In any case that was one of the chief tendencies of W. Dilthey. His posthumous works, under review to-day, bear witness to it. Dilthey's European significance may perhaps be stated thus. If Hegel represents the stage of the self-consciousness of the European Mind, the stage at which this mind, conscious of its own power, remembers its whole history and constructs a system, Dilthey represents the next *stage of the self-consciousness of this self-consciousness*. For he tries (1) to give a philosophy of philosophy, that is to say, he seeks to show why and how the different forms of philosophy take shape, why they emerge from life; (2) believing it impossible to construct a metaphysics of his own, he satisfies himself with a system of possible types of philosophy; (3) he not only sets out to give a History of the European Mind, but includes a history of the historian, and one of his central problems is just the rise of the historical consciousness in Europe; (4) he does not, like Hegel, develop a philosophy of history, but he starts by analysing the moral sciences, the reputation of which he desires to strengthen by showing that they are the basis of the study of history.

But between Hegel and Dilthey lie all the attacks on the Mind (the materialistic attack of Feuerbach and Marx, the positivistic of Comte and Mill, the religious of Kierkegaard); and Dilthey, who has gone through the school of positivistic thought and empirical history and is deeply influenced by both, is faced with the paradoxical situation that his task of writing the history of the European Mind and of producing a theory of its historical appearance, is going on in a period when this mind has already reached the stage of its dissolution. Consequently the positivistic thesis of the impossibility of metaphysics, the historical thesis of the unit of philosophy and history, and the thesis of the relativistic character of each philosophical system are now making their appearance. But more than that, even the basis of the European philosophy of mind, the cartesian *Cogito sum*, is abandoned and

replaced by the *Vivo sum*. So *malgré lui* a philosophy arises which since Scheler has been called the Philosophy of Life. But if O. F. Bollnow, in his book on Dilthey,[1] represents the whole of his philosophy as a philosophy of life and gives useful analyses of Dilthey's categories of life and theory of knowledge and expression, this must be kept in mind. Even if he were right regarding Dilthey's later period, since 1900; even if Dilthey were a "Philosopher of Life," his Philosophy of Life would not have the force of the theories of Nietzsche and Bergson, which derive their strength from their attacks on the mind; it would be but the result of the dissolution of the mind itself. More important is the publication[2] on the young Dilthey. It contributes much interesting new material for his development. I only wonder why the diaries are again given in the same abridgement in which they had already once been published in 1915, and that no account is given of the other parts. Perhaps some of them would have been more interesting than some of the family letters. Very impressive is the clear account this book gives of Dilthey's origin and early development, and of the wide range of his studies, which included theology, philology, history (as a pupil of Ranke), the theory of music, physiology. Even as professor at Kiel he took up a course in higher mathematics, in order to understand better the development of European Philosophy since Descartes.

In the closest connection with the above-named problems, Vol. XI of the Collected Papers[3] contains chiefly a history of German historiography, characteristics of Johannes von Müller, Niebuhr, Schlosser, Dahlmann, von Raumer, Ranke, Treitschke, Haym, Droysen, Mommsen, J. Burckhardt. It includes even the historians of literary history Gervinus, Hettner, Julian Schmidt. His sketches, based on personal reminiscences, e.g. of Ranke, as the great epic historian, a second Herodotus, and of Treitschke, as the politician, who was neither historian nor orator nor student of political science, but all three at once, are of the highest order. But he did not see the danger of men like Treitschke as M. Weber did. Vol. XII of Dilthey's Collected Papers[4] contains chiefly the papers on the reorganizers of the Prussian State and a paper on the "Preussische Landrecht." The latter is especially interesting as an example of Dilthey's method, because it interprets this law as the expression of the State of Frederic the Great, marking the transition from the absolute state to the modern constitutional state, in restricting the will of the monarch through laws given by himself. But from a European point of view it is to be regretted that this volume is restricted to articles on Prussian history. In reality both volumes are chiefly drawn from articles which the young Dilthey published in different journals (see the list at the end of Vol. XII). If you examine the original journals the impression you receive is somehow different. The material is vast and unlimited. There are articles on Schleiermacher, Baur, the history of Spain, Kant, Novalis, etc.; some of them, like those on Gibbon, J. S. Mill, Balzac, Alfieri, at least as interesting as those published. The majority of them are occasioned by some chance (e.g. appearance of books on the subject), and written on account of necessity, anonymously or under two or three pseudonyms, often not at all corrected. The number of books which he has reviewed in some of the numbers is so incredible that he cannot possibly have read them. (Not contained in the above-named list is a review of Haym's *Herder* in Vol. 49 of *Westermann's*

[1] Dilthey: *Eine Einführung in seine Philosophie*, B. G. Teubner, Leipzig, 1936.
[2] Der junge Dilthey: *Ein Lebensbild in Briefen und Tagebüchern*, 1852–70, B. G. Teubner, Leipzig, 1933.
[3] *Vom Aufgang des geschichtlichen Bewusstseins*, Leipzig, 1936.
[4] *Zur Preussischen Geschichte*, B. G. Teubner, Leipzig, 1936.

Monatshefte, which gives in a few words a better character sketch of Herder than many large books, describing him as a spirit who possesses dreams of thought in place of real thoughts, foreknowledge in place of knowledge, and who hardly anywhere succeeds in mastering the masses of thought.)

Very enjoyable and instructive is a volume[1] containing papers on the Germanic ethos, on the medieval epos, on the great German music of the eighteenth century—Bach, Händel, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven—and on Klopstock, Schiller, Jean Paul. It gives further evidence for the width of Dilthey's conception of the history of the mind, and shows clearly the impossibility of its realization by a single man.

The edition of Dilthey's letters to Rudolf Haym, 1861–1873,[2] is of interest only to the specialist, not to the general public.

As a sign that Dilthey's school still continues in Germany may be taken the fact that one of his pupils, Hermann Nohl, Professor of Pedagogic at the University of Goettingen, has published the second edition of his interesting and important work[3] on the pedagogical movement in Germany. It starts with Dilthey's concept of the reality of education (*Erziehungswirklichkeit*), that is to say, that the realm of education constitutes a peculiar province in the realm of mind. Nevertheless, he transcends this conception in a twofold direction. On the one hand, he arrives at a general theory of education, on the other hand, he sees the chief aim of education in the transformation of the objective values given by one generation into the subjectivity of a new youth.

About thirty years younger than Dilthey, Max Weber, a master in the field of historical research (but considered from a sociological point of view), the most comprehensive and penetrating scholar in this field in the Germany of 1890–1920, is Dilthey's complement. For his strength is the force of the concept, of definition and of the understanding. With his letters[4] I had a peculiar experience. I was excited about the earlier letters of the schoolboy, which show a really remarkable clearness of observation and certainty of judgment, and I very strongly recommend these. But on going on, I was disappointed. There are so many family letters of no general interest whatsoever, that a large proportion of the book is superfluous. The chief point which this book adds to our knowledge of Weber is this: he is a person without real youth, without a real development. Notwithstanding his regarding practice as his main interest and theory merely as an interruption of practice, his strength is, nevertheless, intellectual, and his intellect is perfect at the beginning. What changes is the situations and occupations and objects of study.

A pupil of Weber's, Karl Jaspers, one of the most original and attractive thinkers of the Germany of to-day, has published two new books, one of them on Nietzsche,[5] the other one on Descartes. Both of them are interesting and deserve deeper consideration than we are able to give in the short space at our disposal. Jaspers, originally a psychologist, is a thinker of the reflective type and of high philosophical culture. I believe it is right to say that his thought represents a *new stage in the development of the philosophy of the mind*,

[1] *Von Deutscher Dichtung und Musik. Aus Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Geistes* B. G. Teubner, Leipzig, 1933.

[2] *Briefe Wilhelm Diltheys an Rudolf Haym*, 1861–1873. *Mitgeteilt von E. Weniger. Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Berlin, 1936.

[3] *Die pädagogische Bewegung in Deutschland und ihre Theorie*, G. Schulte-Bulmke, Frankfurt a. Main, 1935.

[4] *Jugendbriefe*, J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen.

[5] NIETZSCHE: *Einführung in das Verständnis seines Philosophierens*, de Gruyter, Berlin, 1936.

that of its self-dissolution (*Selbstverzehrung*). Consequently he takes Nietzsche as a mind dissolving itself which constructs no world and leaves essentially nothing behind it (surely a misrepresentation, for nearly every page of Nietzsche contains some sort of insight, very often incoherent, but always elucidating either the problems of his time or his personality). This book is important and interesting perhaps even more through its errors than through its new interpretations. It sees rightly that a new beginning has to be made. But instead of starting with this beginning itself, it seeks an escape. H. G. Wells, in his excellent *Anatomy of Frustration*, escapes to the future, to the idea of a world revolution; Jaspers escapes to Nietzsche. He is right in his assumption that a new start has to be found, he is wrong in his supposing that it is only to be found in Nietzsche. It is very interesting to read Jaspers' account of Nietzsche's central idea of the eternal return of the same, which Nietzsche believed to be the new religion of religions. Jaspers pursues the development of the thought through its different, even contradictory shapes and he sees the emptiness of this idea, which is far from fulfilling the expectations of its author. But he does not succeed in destroying this idea, he does not see that this idea is an expression of the same escape, a translation of the Christian idea of rebirth or better of the "Apokatastasis panton" into the language of ecstatic nihilism. Whereas in the idea of the return of every creature to God a way of redemption is shown, in this compensation-idea the eternal return of the same senseless and unimportant being without any sort of redemption is taught. No, that is not a beginning but an end.

Jaspers is right in establishing a new contact with Nietzsche. As Nietzsche took Schopenhauer in his famous essay as his educator (and I venture to suggest its rereading together with Jaspers' book), Jaspers takes Nietzsche in the same way. But because Nietzsche can be interpreted in more than one way and because Jaspers' situation is very different, he takes Nietzsche in the way of his own philosophy as a man who does not want to teach certain doctrines, but whose chief object is to bring the pupil to his own essence (*Erwecker der Existenz*). But when confronted with the fact that Nietzsche has many aspects Jaspers makes a very interesting effort to reconcile them as different stages of one single dialectic movement, or he introduces into Nietzsche the same movement which is so characteristic of his own thought. Thus he arrives at many unknown connections. As the centre of Nietzsche's personality appears a desire of truth.

The importance of this task lies in the fact that it represents one of the possible interpretations of Nietzsche. It penetrates as far as mere reflection can penetrate. But, nevertheless, the task finds its natural limits because a unity of reflection does not exist in Nietzsche. It is the fate of Nietzsche to have different personalities in himself, or to fulfil in himself the processes of preservation, of dissolution, and of a new beginning as well, and to reach heights and depths above and below reflection. Jaspers' book, very rich in material and quotations, containing a useful bibliography and index, is, without any doubt, one of the best books on the subject.

In Jaspers' second book[1] the dissolution of the self-consciousness is raised to a dissolution of modern consciousness at its beginning. Descartes is considered to be the doom of modern philosophy. His mistake lay in wanting philosophy in the form of modern science. Thus he misrepresented philosophy and did not reach the full meaning of science. He constructs science and neglects all true principles of real research (hypothetical character—but see: Descartes, ed. Adam et Tannéry, Vol. II, pp. 76, 6 ff.—experiment, etc.). In the opinion of Jaspers he lost existence, he lost nature, he lost history, he

[1] *Descartes und die Philosophie*, de Gruyter, Berlin, 1937.

lost experience. This paper, originally written for the Descartes number of the *Revue Philosophique*, represents an attempt to criticize Descartes from the standpoint of the philosophy of existence. Thereby and by means of elucidating psychological analyses of Descartes's character it attains its unique position in the literature of Descartes. Even if it does not achieve its critical aim (and I am afraid reflection criticizing clear mathematical thinking must always fail), it has a very illuminating, searching, analysing power which leads to much more than merely negative results.

This picture of German research in the field of the philosophical analysis of history would be incomplete without the fundamentally different catholic point of view, represented in a remarkable manner by Theodor Haecker.[1] Here the problems are very different. Here a tradition is given, but not in the sense of profane, but of soteriological history. The problem is here how to understand the first from the point of view of the second, how to comprehend their unity and diversity. Haecker develops consequently a metaphysics of history based on catholic principles. His first thesis is that only those beings have history which have a beginning and an end (neither God nor abstract ideas have history), and his second thesis introduces a hierarchical order of values as the measure of historical movements. A criticism of this book would demand an analysis of its presuppositions.

It would, however, be wrong to suppose that the present stage of German philosophy is to be characterized as being the analysis of the historical consciousness and the dissolution of this consciousness. On the contrary. The wish to overcome relativism and scepticism resulting from the historical approach was the *Leitmotif* in the phenomenological movement of Husserl and Scheler. Therefore I conclude this survey with some remarks on two books which represent this anti-relativistic tendency. The first of them is Herbert Spiegelberg's *Antirelativism.*[2] I agree entirely with Spiegelberg's determination to reject relativism. I only doubt whether it is not too exclusively reflective. Would it not be necessary to ask: what is the real reason for the present relativism, and does the author really believe that the mere postulation of a moral absolutism (even in the restricted sense which he gives to the word), that a sort of ethical objectivism is sufficient to get rid of this relativism which we all deplore? Is not a deeper change in the subject demanded, without which every form of a postulated objectivism must remain void and powerless? Herbert Spiegelberg's second large book[3] contains much valuable material for the analysis of the concept of law and for the study of the difference between practical and theoretical law. His thesis is that we use the word law in an equivocal manner for the two fields, that no common universal concept of law exists, that the practical law is the original one, from which the theoretical is derived. Especially valuable is the second part, dealing with the history of the moral law and of the problem of law in ethics and the philosophy of law. The chief aim in both parts is the demand for an ethics without law based on an autonomous moral order. That such an ethics is possible nobody can deny. Plato, e.g. realized it in his *Republic*, founding it on the common order of cosmos and polis. But where is the basis for such an order in Spiegelberg's thought? I must say I am extremely sceptical of his ontological analysis, of his assumption that the last basis of moral judgment and of moral law is the *ontische Sittenordnung* which he believes is revealed to us by a specific moral intuition. And I am sorry I cannot follow him at all, if he believes that the categorical imperative and

[1] *Der Christ und die Geschichte*, Hegner, Leipzig, 1935.
[2] *Antirelativismus*, Max Niehaus, Zürich.
[3] *Gesetz und Sittengesetz*, Max Niehaus, Zürich.

every concept of law are unworthy of science and ought to be removed from the realm of ethics. It would be wonderful if man could live without laws; but that could only be accomplished if they would fulfil in themselves the law with such perfection that it was no longer needed. This evidently would only be possible in a society of superhuman beings or angels, which unfortunately we do not find on this dark earth. Therefore I believe it would be a more efficient weapon in our common struggle against the terrible moral relativism of our time to strengthen men's regard and reverence for the moral law than to undermine it by the idea of an ontological moral order which remains a mere postulate if not realized. But this fundamental difference of outlook does not prevent me from acknowledging the intrinsic value of the systematic and historical analyses of this book.

F. H. Heinemann.

NEW BOOKS

Order and Life. By JOSEPH NEEDHAM, Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, and Sir William Dunn Reader in Biochemistry, Cambridge. (London: Cambridge University Press. 1936. Pp. x + 178. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

This is a highly technical book, full of specialist knowledge. But it is principally concerned with the question whether the processes of life are ultimately explicable in terms of chemistry and physics. The author begins by criticizing and rejecting two views; one is J. S. Haldane's, that biology must start with the fact of life, and accept certain biological laws as equally ultimate with those of chemistry or physics (cf. p. 10). The other is Driesch's Theory of Entelechies. In opposition to these he accepts the judgment of K. Sapper, that it is "inconceivable that properties should be found in a material complex, which are not the result of the summation of the properties of the components"; and he claims that "although we are still in the earliest historical stages of any far-reaching organization-calculus, we can yet see that biological order, like (but very much more complicated than) crystal order, is a natural consequence of the properties of matter, and the characteristic mode of their manifestation" (p. 165).

"Biological order" may mean several things. There is the temporal order of the processes that make up the life-history of any one organism. There is the temporal order in which species have appeared and perished during the millennia in which living things have existed on the earth. There is the order of affinity between different species, simultaneously or successively existing. And there is the spatial order of the components of any one organization, into which its form may at any moment be regarded as analysable, though, of course, this order is not purely spatial, since its maintenance is compatible with much and continual change in the space-relations of limbs and other parts, which preserve unchanged through these changes their functions in the whole. I think that Dr. Needham's claim includes all these. But I am bound to say, so far as a non-specialist may presume to judge, that in my opinion his book does nothing to help us to see that biological order, in all or any of these senses, is a natural consequence of the properties of matter; though such failure, of course, does not prove that these properties do not account for biological order.

It is true that we are told that "biology cannot now ever be in the strict sense mechanistic"; but it is causal, and "a causal science can, indeed, be nothing if not mathematical, since the ideal axiom at the basis of all causality can only be stated in terms of the mathematical concept of function" (pp. 25–6). Here there seems to me to be some confusion. If there is causality between *a* and *b*, where *a* and *b* are particulars of certain kinds, and have quantitative features, then the frequency of *b*, or the amount of some quantitative feature in it, will be a function of the frequency of *a*, or of the amount of some quantitative feature in that. The displacements of two bodies towards each other may be a function of their masses and their distance. But what causes their approach is not hereby stated. Some have held that science is not concerned to ask this, and, if consistent, have gone on to say that it can dispense with the

notion of force. Its business then becomes that of discovering formulae, from which, given certain distributions of matter, we may calculate what others will be found, for such and such differences of time and space. The items whose distribution is given or inferred may be comparatively simple, like atoms, or complex to any degree, like men or nebulae. A mathematical formula will thus connect the present numbers of the population and its fertility-rate with the numbers 50 years hence, or the distributions of the nebulae at intervals of so many million light-years one with another. But the latter change is at bottom resoluble into the movements of the components of the atoms out of which the nebulae are constituted; and the former certainly involves the movements of the components of the atoms out of which human beings and their environment are constituted. Now if biological science is mathematical in the same sense as astronomy, we need no more look beyond the laws exemplified in the movements of atoms or their components, at various distances and velocities and complexities of juxtaposition, in the former case than in the latter; and biology will then indeed be in the strict sense mechanistic.

The mathematical work of R. A. Fisher has given fresh support to those who think that a random supply of variations without directional trend may suffice for the modification of species by descent. And the Mendelian theory of heredity offers scope to mathematics in explaining how crossing and inbreeding from offspring of crosses give rise to new and pure strains, and so forth. But we cannot argue freely from phylogeny to autogeny. In the development of one individual are involved neither the "variation and selection" whose effect in the one case, nor the crossing and breeding from the hybrids whose effects in the other case can be submitted to mathematical treatment.

Dr. Needham, indeed, quotes from D'Arcy Thompson's *Growth and Form* the application of mathematical analysis to the differences between certain related animal forms. Conceive an animal to be embedded in a close rectangular three-dimensional network; or, though the network is of lines that have only length, perhaps we should say that the network is embedded in the animal. Now this geometrical system may be subjected to deformation. If the same parts of the animal are centred at the same points of intersection after deformation as before, we shall have a new but corresponding specific form (pp. 35–8). Here the mathematical treatment is admirable for description, but it does not help to explain. We are left asking why, when one part of the animal is modified, all the rest are modified correspondingly, so that the identity of form which mathematical analysis reveals is preserved. Dr. Needham seems to think that Thomsonian co-ordinates have done something to explain this. They have not.

Again, he considers (pp. 49–63) the fact, experimentally ascertained, that in the development of an embryo the "possible fates" of some part may be more numerous than its "presumptive fate." By the presumptive fate of a part is meant what it would grow into in normal conditions; but if the embryo is injured elsewhere, or if the part is transplanted into another embryo, the part may grow into something different; anything into which it may thus alternatively grow is a possible fate. A part of an embryo, when the rest is destroyed, may even grow into a complete organism, so that this is one of the possible fates of the part. But the possible fates of a part become less numerous as the development of the embryo proceeds, and after a certain date, whatever happens to the rest, or into whatever it is transplanted, the part, if it develops further at all, will develop only into its presumptive fate. Now, Dr. Needham describes the part for which divers fates are still possible as

in a position of unstable equilibrium; after it has lost this "pluri-potency," it is in a position of stable equilibrium. He finds geometrical expressions, in graphs or in models with uneven surfaces, for such facts. Conceive, for example (the example is an application of certain of his figures: see p. 58, and plate facing p. 60), a drop of quicksilver falling along the sloped surface of part of a miniature mountain-massif on to a pass; from the pass it may go right or left, so that this is a position of unstable equilibrium; whichever way it goes, it may come to a lower pass; but finally it reaches a cup or lake, and is in stable equilibrium; it has now no pluri-potency. There is certainly an analogy between this case, and the gradual restriction of the possible fates of the parts of an embryo during the period of its development. But the analogy offers no explanation, because the conditions which explain what is possible to the drop of quicksilver are not present in the embryo.

I take another illustration of the concept of restriction of potentiality by "multiple bifurcation." In Fig. 45, placed before the Index as an addendum, we have a view of a marshalling-yard on the L.N.E.R. "The photograph is taken from above the 'hump.' Up to this the freight wagons are pushed, and from it they run down individually over electric retarders to a number of alternative sidings, where they are ready to be despatched to a fresh destination. The top of the 'hump' corresponds to the totipotent or maximally unstable condition of the egg." Perhaps; but could the railway company marshal its wagons without a hump, without rails, without electric retarders? Are there any of these in an egg? Or would there be more destinations possible to a way on at one point than at another, without some one who is no part of the marshalling yard to vary the switches? And if not, what light does this illustration throw on our problem?

Or consider another analogy offered later in the book (pp. 156–64). It is said that the melting of a solid does not occur suddenly at one temperature, but that the particles acquire freedom of movement successively in each of the three dimensions of the solid at successive temperatures. Now, in amphibia, a limb-bud may be transplanted into another individual, and if inserted front foremost at the place of a left fore-limb, will grow into the limb proper to the place of insertion, whether it was a left or a right bud; not, however, if inserted back foremost. The bud acquires rigidity of development successively in different dimensions, as the solid loses its rigidity successively. Here, too, there is something analogous between the two sets of facts. But I do not see that the considerations which might explain the stages of melting having any application in the biological case.

Dr. Needham introduces in his third lecture the notion of a spatial "hierarchical continuity" within an organism. "A protein molecule in a colloidal particle in a nucleolus in a live cell in a liver in a mammal" is a member of a hierarchy of collections. With this is compared the mathematical conception of sets of points, among which a hierarchical order of so many levels of shells or envelopes is conceived to exist. We may suppose the membership of these levels to be constant, but the values of the co-ordinates of the points in any level to vary on certain principles, with consequent topological changes, but without any of the points in one shell crossing the continuous bounding surface between them and those of another next it. The consequences of any principles of variation can be worked out mathematically.[1] Similarly—if it is similar—we may suppose the constituents of the protein molecule to be determined not only by one another, each by the rest at its own level, but by the successive wholes, or the members of the successive wholes, which form

[1] I believe this is not an adequate account of the problems of topology, but I think it sufficiently indicates the argument of the text.

the spatial hierarchy. But in an organism, if we are to dispense with the hypothesis of some ordering form or "whole" factor distinct from the parts, the hierarchical aggregates must be as they are in consequence of how the ultimate parts affect each other, and cannot influence these ultimate parts. In a set of points there are no influences and no results. We may choose to regard different points as belonging to successive envelopes, but we cannot really regard the points into which we analyse (or think to analyse) space as themselves moving in space. We can only ask how particles at those points must move in space, if the hierarchical arrangement of envelopes is to be preserved throughout their motion, and what arrangement of them would result. The mathematician working out this problem is not concerned with the question whether particles could be caused to move so as to preserve the hierarchy, and the hierarchy is not a factor in explanation, but something whose maintenance would have to be explained. Dr. Needham observes (p. 142) that "entities which we believe to be intrinsically different can only be brought into the field of scientific discourse by being analysed into their constituent parts." If so, we must go down to the ultimate constituents, and then our hierarchy will have been dissolved.

Dr. Needham employs the conception a "biological field." Of this he accepts (p. 108) C. H. Waddington's as the best definition. "A field is a system of order such that the position taken up by unstable entities in one portion of the system bears a definite relation to the position taken up by unstable entities in other portions." I am surprised that this definition should please him. Every position bears a definite relation to every other. What he wants to say is that what position one entity takes up affects what positions others do. But why? It is useless to say that when this happens there is a field, and then to invoke the field as helping to explain its happening; and to say that a field is a system of order such that this happens amounted to nothing more. He is alive to this objection, for he anticipates that the "individuation-field" may seem "only yet another fig-leaf for our ignorance." I fear it is really no more.

Nor is it the only such fig-leaf decorating the book. He will have nothing to do with theories "which postulate some entity in the living organism *in addition to* the chemical elements C, H, N, O, P, etc., plus organizing relations" (p. 7). But what are "organizing relations"? All elements are in relations, whether they are components of an organism or not. What makes relations organize? We read of "an organizing entity having components standing in internal organizing relations to each other" (p. 74). There is much interesting information about parts whose presence seems necessary in the portion transferred from one embryo to another, if the development of an organ from that portion is to occur in its new host; and these parts are called organizers because without them the organization does not proceed. But the reproduction of form is not explained by discovering something without which it fails to occur. The particulate structure of the chromosomes has been found to be something helping to reveal conditions without which reproduction fails. It has not explained reproduction.

Again, hormones are said to be influences acting upon morphological form (pp. 79–80); but they are bodies, and bodies act on bodies, not on forms. Dr. Needham, of course, knows this; but that he should write what he does seems to me to betray a tendency not to look behind fig-leaves. So elsewhere (p. 95), "we are left with the conception of a sterol-like substance being liberated at a given point in the developing system and 'radiating' its organizing power from that spot." Is this any better than the "faculties" at which he scoffs? Again, can we rightly ascribe activity to a "field" (p. 100), and not

to the bodies in the field? This is a question which perhaps should be addressed to others as well as to a biologist. We are told that "the 'individuation-field' is a term expressing the tendency of an organizer to rearrange the regional structure both of itself and of any tissue lying near it in such a way as to make that tissue part of a complete embryo" (p. 101). If so, I submit it is name for part of the problem presented by the facts of growth, not for a factor of explanation. "Organ-forming potency falls off from" the centres of certain regions into which an embryo may in thought be divided "in a definitely measurable way" (p. 103). Is an organ-forming potency less mysterious than a "form or, "supra"-material factor" (p.165), such as Dr. Needham rejects? It is not a body, nor a collection of bodies thus and thus arranged. And those who would invoke a "form" would admit that the development of an organism so as to display it depends also on certain physical conditions in the organism. When, lastly, we read in the same context (p. 106) that "there must, of course, be some underlying factor, which we could call 'limb-forming intensity,' " we may wonder whether Dr. Needham is really finding sufficient those principles of explanation with which he professes to be content.

This review has perforce failed to do justice to the interest selected and marshalled of the biological facts in Dr. Needham's book. If it is purely critical, that is not because I would deny its value, but because the conclusiveness of a certain line of argument which forms its main theme is the only issue I am competent to raise. In a note near the end (p. 166, n. 91), we are offered a choice between an Emergent Evolutionism "which seems to hold that the specific properties of wholes are conferred on them over and above the specific properties of their parts by a continuous Creativity acting from outside," and a Dialectical Materialism which "seems to hold that the specific properties of wholes result from properties of the parts which are invisible or latent in isolation." The former view is said to be suited to a religious, and the latter to a scientific world-outlook. "The problem of which view is correct, if it is a problem, appears to be extra-scientific and quite insoluble." That what is insoluble is no problem, is a doctrine of "logical positivism," and logical positivism appears to have attractions for Dr. Needham (cf. pp. 78–9). But according to it, a proposition is either a tautology, or rests on induction from observed particulars (unless it is a record of a particular observation); and this induction cannot be justified. This is a position like what Hume adopted for the basis of science; science all rests on causality and causality is a matter of faith. Hume's attitude, as Dr. Whitehead observes, satisfied the Royal Society, but did not satisfy the Church.[1] I will not discuss Emergent Evolutionism; I am ready to say it will not do. But must we therefore accept Dr. Needham's doctrine, if that will not do either?

Is the kind of process, amenable ultimately to mathematical treatment, for which he looks in any development that is to be intelligible, the only intelligible process in the universe? If so, there is no purposive activity in it, or purposive activity is unintelligible; and if the writing of *Order and Life*, or of this review, were not purposive activities, awkward consequences will follow. But if there are purposive activities, though often failing to attain their purposes, then it is not absurd to suggest that growth is such an activity, though how this can take place in a body which does not appear to be connected with its own mind may not be understood. Even to speak of unconscious purpose would be at least no more unhelpful than to speak of the "latent properties" of parts from which the "manifest properties" of

[1] *Science and the Modern World.*

wholes are to result; for to speak of neither properties were latent like a jack in the box; and if not thus, then how?

H. W. B. Joseph.

Note.—A few slips may be noticed. P. 98, n. 74, last l. but two, "a laquelle" should be "à laquelle." P. 106, l. 18, Dr. Needham should not say "an excised piece will inhibit," but "the excision of a piece will inhibit." P. 112, l. 2, *ἀνα* should be *ἀνά*. P. 116, last l. but one, the word "meaning" seems misused. P. 127, last l. but two, "should" ought to be transposed to stand before "more." P. 145, l. 16, "along in the direction": one preposition is redundant. P. 162, n. 35, l. 3, for "Leaths" read "Leathes."

The Human Situation: The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow, 1935–1937. By W. Macneile Dixon. (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1937. Pp. 438. Price 18s.)

There have been many types of Gifford Lecturer—philosophers, theologians anthropologists, physicists, biologists; but comparatively few have been professional men-about-letters, or, in other words, professors of literature. Again, there are not very many of them who have strayed extensively and deliberately from their official *Fach*. They all have to talk somewhere about natural theology, but most of them approach that subject gradually and very obliquely, sometimes with lagging footsteps. In the third place very few of them, present their excursions and conclusions in a style that is either designed or is able to make a popular appeal. There have been notable exceptions, such as William James, but the exceptions are remarked when they occur. In the main the lecturers remain, in the spirit, in their classrooms and very seldom get beyond the Great Hall of a University either in spirit or in body. They do not address literate but not-too-studious firesides.

In all these respects the present set of lectures by the distinguished Professor Emeritus of English Literature in the University of Glasgow diverges notably from the common run. The subject of his chair is one from which very few have been asked to descend or to ascend to the Gifford rostrum. This man-about-letters has selected a philosophical subject, and has stuck to it, dialectics and high seriousness and all, with gusto and also with transparent honesty ("I propose," he says, "to speak my mind. I cannot believe you would wish me to say what I do not think, or think what I did not say. Nothing is to be gained by concealment or equivocation.") His lectures have the appeal of good literature and of cunning and refreshing rhetoric unempurpled but pungent and urbane. The book, in consequence, is quite unusual. It is vivid without clamour or fury, bright without glitter, brave without bitterness; and, as I have said, it is philosophical from the first page to the last. I do not say that most philosophers should emulate Mr. Dixon's methods. The style is the man. What they can all do is to enjoy him.

"I am not wholly unacquainted," the author says, "with the books of the famous speculators. I delight in their society. Under their subtle and eloquent guidance, I have made many excursions into the Empyrean of the Absolute. I have some little knowledge of the various metaphysical gambits, the opening moves, the Platonic, the Cartesian, the Kantian." That is meiosis. Such a book as this could neither have been conceived nor written if the author had not approached literature with the training and interests both of a classical and of a philosophical education, and if he had not applied the training and sustained the interest in all his consortium with belles lettres. He must always have been a metaphysical *littérateur*. He knows quite a lot about the end-games of philo-

sophers as well as about their opening gambits, and he knows as much as most philosophers do about the end-games of speculative science. It may be a little more doubtful whether his middle-game in philosophy is quite so convincing. I should have preferred to see more of it in his book; but for the most part he has deliberately developed his theme in such a way that philosophical opening moves, and philosophical end-games receive most attention.

The first ten lectures indeed (i.e. the first series in accordance with the Gifford Trust) is designed to be a set of excursions exhibiting the complexity of the human situation. The lecturer darts to and fro like a puzzled, glittering inquisitive ephemeron. What is a man's mind, his reason, his self? *Nil tam difficile est quin quaerendo investigari possit.* But how begin? With history? Philosophers "would write more convincingly if they had consorted, even in imagination, with cave-dwellers, and lake-dwellers, and tree-dwellers, talked with buffoons and mountebanks, and charlatans, with sadists and pimps and procurers, as well as with priests, prophets and professors." With anthropoid apes whose blood-groups are the same as man's? With the genes? With neutrons and positrons? With cosmogony? The first series of lectures is made up of these forays and sallies; it consists of essays in a diversitarian philosophy, and the essayist's art is everywhere apparent. This includes the art of avoiding tediousness by running away from topics that would have to be developed slowly. It also includes quips, and graciousness, and reverence and happy phrasing everywhere. But towards the close of the first series there is a longer and fuller note. "If nothing be worth dying for, nothing is worth living for." There is horror in the world and there is strife; but there is life too. "The inner truth is that every man is himself a creator, an artist, an architect, and fashioner of worlds. If this be madness . . . none the less it is the lunacy in which consists the romance of life, in which lies our chief glory and our only hope." "So far men are the crown of nature's efforts." "Whatever else you are, says nature to us, be a man."

With the eleventh lecture and the second series we enter upon a straighter road. When we look facts in the face the will-to-live is dominant in the human situation. "Your easy chair is your great breeder of melancholia, yet luxury itself cannot prevail against this inward imperative, this clinging to life whatever its conditions." Bunyan's pilgrim put his fingers in his ears and ran on crying, "Life, life, eternal life." Mr. Dixon reaffirms the emphatic yea of the plain man. "For his simple wisdom, his untutored soul, his shy, inexpressive intelligence, unperplexed by dialectic, unsubdued by failure, I confess an affectionate regard." He can even bear the plain man's plainness when it is not quite so engaging; but he does not like moralists and absolutists. The former he thinks should ask, "How is goodness to be made the object of passionate desire, as attractive as fame, success, or even adventure?" and he detests the categorical imperative. "I would say that to love life is to love the gods, and that in obeying the will-to-live we are obeying divine orders. (But here he is hard upon the categorical imperative which only says that dooty is dooty even when it is drab; and since he also wants dignity and stateliness in one's outlook upon both life and death," it is not so plain that the will-to-live is naturally stately, or that this stately ethics is more attractive, more adventurous or less burdensome than the veracity of Kant's "humble plain man," or even than the dignity of Kant's rational ends in themselves).

A critique of absolutism follows, and, at greater length, a critique of naturalism. The stream, it is argued, cannot rise about its source, and the result cannot outsoar its cause; and the way is prepared for a Leibnizian monadism of living monads. "What is matter? It is, physics tells us, simply energy. And what is energy? It is the expression of will or Being. We can go no further.

And whence is our idea of energy which gives rise to action derived? From ourselves, who can produce it by willing. Personality is, in its final analysis, simply will or cause."

That is the general conclusion of several lectures in which the middle work is elaborated more sedulously than in most other parts of the book. I regret that I do not have the space to pursue it more closely here. But the end-game, for once, appears to be hurried. If the result cannot outsoar its cause, how can Mr. Dixon outsoar protoplasm, and how can protoplasm outsoar abiological energy? Is anything gained by saying that all is life? Do electric charges obey divine orders when they are called by the name of life, and languish in outer darkness when they are called by some other name? Leibniz, who Dr. Dixon rather surprisingly describes as in the main an *a posteriori* thinker, made strenuous efforts to show with a sort of metaphysical detail conjecturally harmonious with experience that his monads did possess perception and appetition. Their spirituality, however low its degree, was therefore much more than nominal—or else Leibniz was wrong. Despite my delight in Mr. Dixon's work, I would not think of him, and he would not think of himself, as a second Leibniz. Nevertheless, I think Mr. Dixon's solution more verbal than it need have been had he addressed his able and cultured mind to the differences in energy-patterns.

At the end of the book the One is restored to favour. It has had its drubbing, but it is resplendent and eternal in art and in beauty. "In poetry and painting music and sculpture, the necessary and complementary character of Being and Becoming can be in a measure perceived and understood." "May we not say that the charm of all aesthetic experience consists in this, that it, too, presents the storm in the golden frame of peace? That it reconciles the opposites in the arrest or staying of the flux? Nothing is there denied, nothing denied of the tyrannies and injustices, the frets and fevers, the injurious wrongs that tax the intelligence and freeze the heart. Nothing is denied, all is affirmed. Yet as time with its magic wand deals with the past, so the divine arts with the troubles of the world." In the last lecture the miracle of endless personal survival is held to be not less astonishing than other indisputable miracles. Our lives are not a long fool's errand to the grave. "Since I am not prepared to believe the world a misery-go-round, a torture-chamber, a furnace of senseless affliction; since I am not prepared to believe the fiery, invincible soul a by-blow, a lamentable accident: I prefer to put my trust in the larger vision of the poets."

This is a moving, a gallant, and a charming book. I hope to take it down very often from my shelves, sometimes I admit for the joy of its phrases but often for the benefit of my professional occasions. It should beguile many and bemuse none. This I say having reviewed it, but I envy its readers who are not reviewers.

JOHN LAIRD.

Belief and Action. By VISCOUNT SAMUEL. (London: Cassell & Co., 1937. Pp. 366. Price 7s. 6d.)

In this book Viscount Samuel combines his admirable judgment, his vast experience of affairs, his extensive acquaintance with philosophy, and his love for his kind into a mature, restrained, effective, and charming volume. He calls it "an everyday philosophy," designing it to give a glimpse of daylight to Everyman, but it is not every day that such books appear, and if its light is meant to be the light of common day, that, after all, is the best illuminant.

The author's wish is to do something to remove "the mental mists that now confuse us." They are obdurate, he thinks, without a philosophy; so he

supplies one very briefly. His readers, he is sure, "are only waiting to discover whether, by some unusual happy chance, the author has any constructive ideas of his own to offer." He therefore offers a modestly realistic world view leaving its partial justification to a series of appendices, and so proceeds to his "everyday" construction. Religion, ethics and social adjustment are his chief concern. The great religions, in his judgment, must learn to settle their differences, and must also learn to accept modern "knowledge." A religion that is content to be either geographical or obscurantist cannot be true; and neither mysticism nor miracle is an adequate substitute for pedestrian reason. He admits, however, that there is a place for "intuition," a term which he wisely does not define (the term has a hundred and one philosophical meanings and no consistent ordinary meaning). In general, the author's views on this subject show a breadth and sanity scarcely possible without a varied experience of religion in many lands, and seldom achieved with that experience.

After accepting the fact of evil in an evolving world (but refusing to countenance either pessimism or a cheap evolutionary optimism) the author deals with ethical principles in chapters upon "Right and Wrong" and upon the motives or sanctions to right. Here he offers what I might call an agathetic utilitarianism (i.e. one that is not like Bentham's exclusively hedonistic). The standard is welfare—as it would seem, actual, not probable welfare. "Ideas, principles, laws, customs, actions, are to be judged by their consequences. They are to be accounted right if they will conduce to welfare, and wrong if they will not." This statement seems obscure. Does it mean that no action can be called right until after the event—that is to say never, since consequences go on for ever? It will hardly do to say that certain classes of actions have been successful in the past; for to mention nothing else, conditions might change. Again we learn from one of the appendices that good is subjective. Therefore welfare is subjective. Therefore right is subjective. And as we have seen, it is also prophetic. It does seem to me that further reflection might be appropriate in these regions.

From theory the author proceeds to application and passes in review marriage and the family, property and poverty, liberty, nationality, and peace. It would be difficult, I think, to overpraise the balance, lucidity, and breadth, in a word, the wisdom of these chapters. Whether Viscount Samuel is comparing the romantic felicities of sexual freedom with the solid social advantages of a monogamous union where divorce is rare and the children have a home, whether he is defending the British way of combining advantageous social expedients without making a fetish of a single Plan, whether he is reconciling freedom with discipline, or defending the possibilities of the League of Nations, his discussion is as full of the rarest good sense as an egg is full of protein. Any criticism one is disposed to make is either incidental or dialectical. I shall indulge in a few of these, but not before expressing the most genuine admiration for about a hundred pages of the greatest value (which value, I hope is *not* merely subjective).

Among the incidentals I shall mention only one. It occurs at the conclusion of the chapter on the family, where it seems to be seriously suggested that the children of domesticated parents will be relatively free from a roving disposition in the matter of sex.

Among dialectical points I might mention the following:—Admitting (as I personally believe) that a nation is only an organized group of persons, and is neither an additional person nor an additional entity to its component members so organized, it seems to me that the author assumes too easily that national and private moral codes cannot significantly differ. (He says, e.g., that "since national morality is nothing else than collective personal morality,

the conduct of nations may only be guided by the same motives as the conduct of persons." Here the word "motive" is vague, but I think the author is inclined to assume, if he does not explicitly state, identity of duties.) His criterion of right is conduciveness to welfare in the past assumed to hold also of the future. Let us take for example the payment of debts, and assume that it has been shown in the past that the payment of debts by private men to one another does increase welfare. Does it follow that nations should pay international war-debts? It is surely casuistical to say that the assumed benefit to private men necessarily applies to the benefit of nations. The proper argument would be that welfare had resulted from the payment of international war-debts—one wonders "to whom." Since no great nations on the modern scale have ever fulfilled such obligations, there is no experience to show whether they or anyone did benefit by such a course, and it is quite possible to argue that the world has benefited by their repudiations, although private men have not benefited from private repudiations. The same kind of argument might be, applied (with a better chance of a certain empirical verification) to the case of the prevalent treaty-breaking of modern post-war States, and I am not trying to give the answer. I am suggesting, however, that in terms of Viscount Samuel's criterion, the answer cannot be as simple as I think he assumes.

In his appendices Viscount Samuel maintains (*a*) that a realistic philosophy of the external world is more satisfactory than any alternative, (*b*) that values are subjective, (*c*) that mind "offers to philosophy a separate subject-matter" from matter, (*d*) that the modern indeterminists have failed in their attack on the principle of causality, (*e*) that causation applies universally to mind as well as to matter. He is lucid and careful in each of these, but has, I think, a more lively interest in the last two than in the others. Each of them is stated forcibly, fairly, and in a manner abreast with the time. Hence it is unfortunate that he has allowed himself some loose statements. Thus in what should have been an initial definition of causality we read:—"We find empirically that certain things do follow upon others, and we choose to call the earlier ones causes and the later ones effects; the fact of the sequence we call causation." As the reviewer said about Keats, "This will never do." Again on p. 306 we find the amazing statement that "we *know* (italics mine) that nowadays, in the population of forty million in England and Wales, not fewer than one hundred persons and not more than one hundred and thirty persons will be the victims of murder in any given year." The ridiculous reason for this ridiculous prophecy is that the number of *convictions* for murder has exceeded a hundred for twenty-two consecutive years after 1914 and has been less than a hundred and thirty from 1928 onwards although it invariably exceeded a hundred and thirty from 1914 to 1927 inclusive.

JOHN LAIRD.

Towards a Religious Philosophy. By W. G. DE BURGH. (London: Macdonald & Evans. 1937. Pp. xix + 260. Price 10s.)

In these days when we are being assured in certain authoritative quarters that all metaphysical speculation is merely sound without sense, and when Christian theism in particular is widely regarded as an outmoded way of thinking which merely survives rather than is really alive to-day, it is refreshing to meet with a restatement of theistic philosophy as unrepentant and challenging as that of Professor de Burgh. He disclaims any "attempt to construct a religious philosophy," but that is just the characteristic British self-depreciation, for in this country thinkers are nearly always intensely reluctant to admit that they are venturing on constructive speculation. In this

book we have at any rate something more than a shrewd survey of the ground and a clearing away from the site of much impeding rubbish. And the reader is made to feel that, whether or no the argument is convincing throughout, it never sounds the note of apology or defensive compromise. The author is (as one would expect) from first to last occupied with carrying the war into the enemy's country.

The fact that the book is made up of twelve essays, many of which have previously appeared in periodicals, inevitably impairs its unity of texture, though, as the author claims, the chapters are all "directed to a single purpose." But if there are repetitions and new beginnings, by way of compensation each chapter makes thereby the more pointed onset and effect.

Beginning with a defence of the wider view of reason as including intuition and faith as well as the processes of logical inference, Professor de Burgh goes on to consider the relation between metaphysical and religious knowledge and in what sense the two may be brought together in a "religious philosophy." Such a philosophy would be excluded if metaphysics were committed to a purely immanentist theory; and accordingly he discusses next two forms of "immanentism" in the doctrines of Spinoza and the neo-Idealism of Gentile, in order to show the inadequacy of a pure doctrine of "immanence." He then proceeds, "by way of selective illustration to show how a religious philosophy would answer certain questions of primary importance," *viz.* those of Time, the World-Order, and Cosmic Teleology. The relation of morality to religion is next discussed, and the latter is claimed to be essentially *theoria* rather than practice, i.e. the knowledge of God. The three concluding essays develop the contrast between the two forms of humanism, the theocentric and the anthropocentric or secular. The attempt to derive an adequate ideal in terms of the concept of "self-realization," which has been so prominent in the idealist tradition, is then examined: it is shown that this gives no sufficient alternative to a frankly other-worldly humanism. Finally the whole argument is brought to bear upon the predicament of the present generation. After a diagnosis of our contemporary malaise and the "menace of unreason," which in one form or another is to-day of such grave import, the author urges that what is needed is a reconstruction in a new and living form (this is emphasized) of the theocentric world-view which gave medieval Christianity its sanity and stability, but to which in its older form there can be no return. In all this we have certainly more than mere "prolegomena," as the author too modestly would call his work.

Being as I am in close agreement with Professor de Burgh's standpoint and general approach, I can only be grateful to him for the admirable vigour and clarity of his exposition and the effectiveness of his vindication. He would be the first to admit that his argument traverses some very familiar ground: the defender of theism is debarred from startling novelty in the matter of his conclusions, though he may—as here he certainly does—requicken an old argument or shed new light upon familiar affirmations.

The title of the book is, I think, an unfortunate misnomer. What Professor de Burgh is commending to us is clearly not a religious philosophy, nor even a *theistic* philosophy, but a Christian philosophy, and I think it would have been better to have put this beyond question in the title. For though he professes a more comprehensive aim (p. 36), one remains perplexed in spite of the discussion in the third chapter what precisely a "religious" philosophy "in general" is. Is it a philosophical system (or quest) which takes religion seriously as an experience which cannot be simply ignored or explained away? That gives a much less specific programme than we require: materialism would perhaps be the only type of philosophy necessarily excluded. Or is it a

philosophy which accepts as well-grounded certain claims to non-scientific knowledge about a transcendent reality (God) and seeks to correlate these in one interpretation with our "secular" experience? But the difficulty here is that so far as I can see there is no such agreement as Professor de Burgh implies between the *content* of such religious beliefs and claims even among the "higher religions." Buddhism, for instance, has been called a religion lacking any doctrine of God. And has a religious philosophy which is committed to a doctrine of *Maya* any really essential community with that which is here expounded or commended? It is fairly obvious that in Professor de Burgh's hands the term religion is intended to, or at least tends to, exclude any form of Pantheism and that it is not very hospitable to certain forms of Theism. Is it, for instance, true of every high religion (including, e.g. Islam) or even of every type of Christian belief, that it "finds no contradiction between (God's) all-embracing providence and man's relative independence" (p. 111)? Or that "the *religious* consciousness draws its life from the assurance of Eternal Love as the ground of all that lives and moves? And remembering the many varieties of even Christian experience, can we believe (p. 121) that "contentment and harmony of temper" so signally distinguish "religious men and women"?

Spinoza's philosophy was a *religious* one in a genuine sense of the term, though anything but a *Christian* one. If on our way "towards a religious philosophy" we have to pass Spinoza by, it can only be because it is in the latter sense that we use the term.

On Spinoza Professor de Burgh is all the more convincing because he responds so strongly to the elevation and greatness of the man. But he is surely misusing terms when he speaks of Spinoza's "God's love toward men and the mind's intellectual love towards God are one and the same" as meaning that God "is able to reciprocate men's knowledge and love" (p. 63), or that *sentimus experimurque nos*[1] *aeternos esse* means that "Spinoza's way of life culminates in personal fruition." For a monist like Spinoza *reciprocation* and *personal* fruition are precisely what must be rejected.

It is a mystery to some of us why a doctrine so extravagant as that of Gentile and his school has been on the whole treated with such consideration. But if the theory had to be criticized at such length this could not have been done more effectively than it is done here. It is excellently said (p. 91) that "philosophies of pure immanence (subjectivism?) have a way of relegating to the realm of appearance what, on their theory of reality, could never conceivably appear."

On a later page (p. 170), however, Professor de Burgh seems to come near to the position he quotes from Gentile ("without evil, no good"; the spirit needing its non-being "as the flame has need of the combustible"). "Where there is no conflict," he says, "there is no longer a place for moral action." It is doubtless true that, as Aristotle saw, where there is friendship there is no need for justice, no need for any system of guaranteed rights. But unless self-sacrifice for another is not "moral action" the opportunity for moral action will not cease so long as transactions between agents are possible. Good does not suffer "euthanasia" in its "complete victory," as flame does over fuel, for it is superordinate to evil, not co-ordinate with or correlative to it, as Gentile (and Herakleitus before him) holds.

I have dwelt too long on minor criticisms and will add but one more. Stoicism is rather too unsympathetically dismissed. It was, after all, a religion

[1] "The plural," notes Professor de Burgh, "is unambiguous." But a monistic pantheist who is not a Solipist is bound to use plural pronouns even though he disbelieves in the ultimate plurality of persons.

as well as a philosophical system. The Stoic faith in Cosmopolis was not an anthropocentric humanist conception, and it might have been given some credit for the breaking of the "closed society" of humanist ethics.

But in general lack of sympathy is the last charge that can be brought against the author. His apparatus of learning is formidable and his survey panoramic. And in his last chapters he shows himself wise in his prescription as well as acute in his diagnosis. If these are in truth but *prolegomena*, it is to be hoped that the main *logos* will follow without undue delay.

J. W. Harvey.

Value and Ethical Objectivity: a Study in Ethical Objectivity and the Objectivity of Value. By Gordon S. Jury. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1937. Pp. 258. Price 7s. 6d.)

Mr. Jury's book is an interesting study of the present position of ethics and of its relation to theory of value. His general object may be said to be that of maintaining the autonomy of ethics—its independence of metaphysics on the one side and of psychology and sociology on the other. He begins with a rather general survey of recent currents of thought about ethics and axiology, and settles down in his second chapter to an attempt, which is one of the most interesting things in the book, to classify ethical theories on a new principle, viz. on the ground of the relation asserted by them to exist between ethical and other values. He recognizes three types of theory, the inclusive, the restrictive, and the exclusive. "By the Inclusive Theory is meant the view that the field of ethical inquiry is co-extensive with that of Axiology though its emphasis is focused upon certain values which it investigates with special exactness." (p. 49). This view is subdivided into two kinds: (*a*) that which rests on purely axiological grounds without metaphysical implications, and (*b*) that which rests on axiological grounds with metaphysical implications. On the first view no difference in kinds of value is recognized, the notion of goodness or value being regarded as a simple one. The various groups of valuable things are characterized by non-axiological characteristics; e.g. we may recognize excellences of character or of conduct as a separate set of valuable things, marked off not by having a different kind of value but just by being excellences *of character or of conduct*—though at the same time it may be held that to different groups determined by non-axiological characteristics determinate places in the scale of value belong, e.g. that excellences of character or of conduct rank above all other valuable things. This view is further characterized by the fact that ethics is held to be identical with the study of value in general. Prof. Moore is taken as representative of this view, and Prof. Urban as representative of the inclusive view *with* metaphysical implications.

The restrictive view is defined as the view "that moral value is restricted to values of a specific class because of a principle of intensional division within value itself" (p. 64), Prof. Hartmann being cited as representative of this view, with his distinction of situational values as different in kind from moral values, though necessary for the very existence of moral values. Finally, the exclusive view is defined as that which limits "the field of ethical enquiry to moral, values strictly interpreted as having to do with personal character and conduct on the 'inner' side alone" (p. 75); of this view Kant is cited as representative.

The classification is, I think, an original one; and it is worth following up.

The next chapter is, in effect, a criticism of recent views which reduce the meaning of ethical terms like "good" to stating the existence of certain subjective attitudes either on the part of the individual who judges something to be good, or on the part of the society to which he belongs. Mr. Jury makes many

shrewd comments on this type of view, of which one or two may be quoted as typical. "If what is meant by an ethical proposition is an assertion of personal feeling toward some object or event there need be comparatively little doubt as to what that attitude is; at least psychological analysis would be the means of dealing with doubts of this kind. Scepticism regarding man's ability to form true ethical judgments is not scepticism regarding his ability to have attitudes toward objects or his ability to recognize the psychological nature of those attitudes. It rests upon the assumption that, lying outside these, there is some objective fact in which the ethical character which is to be known inheres" (p. 87). "The tendency to subjectivism in ethical theory thus rests upon a general natural fallacy; that of making the psychological conditions of an object's being experienced at all parts of the definition of the object as it is given in experience"(p. 90). "This, it may be suspected, is the weakness of naturalistic ethics where natural concomitants of ethical characteristics have been taken as defining those ethical characteristics, because there has been failure to recognize the fact that they would never have been known to be concomitants of ethical characteristics if ethical terms had not an import apart from their naturalistic definition" (p. 103). On pp. 97–9 an interesting classification of views with respect to the objectivity or subjectivity of ethical judgments is offered.

The next chapter, on the uniqueness of ethical import, is chiefly occupied with defending the view, which seems obviously right, that it is by the nature of their predicates and not of their subjects that ethical propositions are to be recognized. Incidentally I note on p. 113 the interesting suggestion that Mill in his famous argument for hedonism was not supposing that "desirable" *means* the same thing as "desired," but was tacitly assuming the synthetic proposition that what is universally desired must be desirable. The chapter contains on p. 133 an interesting classification of the various kinds of proposition in which ethical terms occur.

I have left myself no space to write about the later chapters, on "the meaning of ethical terms," "the formal a priori and the a priori of content," and "the ideal and the characterization of the actual"; but I hope I have said enough to show that Mr. Jury's book is worthy of the serious attention of all those who are interested in the foundations of ethics.

W. D. Ross.

Reality and Value. By A. Campbell Garnett. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 320. Price 12s. 6d. net)

The main theme of this work, developed in a closely reasoned argument, difficult to abridge, is value; but it will conduce to an easier understanding if the leading term is seen to be *value experience*. Because of this the epistemological discussion which occupies the preliminary chapters is something more than merely incidental, for it is concerned with an analysis of experience in its most general character and thus provides results which have an important bearing on the main theme. This analysis is followed by a chapter on "The Self and the World" of high metaphysical constructiveness, showing how the diverse elements revealed by analysis are concretely related, manifesting the influence of Professor Whitehead and modern scientific ideas, and assigning to Time what some may suspect to be a somewhat mythological function and—an historical curiosity this—the rôle of *principium individuationis* formerly attributed by philosophers to space. There ensues a discussion of the main issues that have to be faced in connection with the notion of value—objectivity, obligation, standards, scales of value, and so on. The work ends with an

examination of the three traditionally accepted intrinsic values—truth, beauty, and moral value, regarding the status of which there might have been more criticism.

In the preliminary general analysis of experience the author's aim is to elucidate the ultimate data and to clarify the concepts necessary to make the world intelligible to thought in order to establish the reality of value experience and to show that the means are provided for interpreting such experience. Not merely are the ultimate data found to be sensa, space, and value, space being cognized independently of but along with and not merely through sensa, but also the knot tied so firmly by Hume is undone by the simple expedient of insisting that more is given than Hume admitted, namely an intuition of motion or of the spatial dynamic character of the physical world, and a direct awareness of the self as essentially conation, activity, or a form of will, and thereby an intuitional basis is found for the important categories which provide the logical framework for an inferential knowledge, on the one hand, of physical structure, and, on the other, of mental structure. The result relevant to the main theme is that value experience is found to be just as real as other kinds of experience, *real* signifying "to be what it appears to be" and to be capable of maintaining its appearance upon closer and clearer inspection and fuller knowledge; and value itself is objective primarily in the sense that it is the object of an act of awareness, object and act being the two poles of any experience, and, as such an object, it is an inherent quality of perspectives. This idea of value as a quality and this idea of perspectives provide the material for further interpretation; value as a quality affects the will in such a way as to become a *validity*, an obligation; the idea of value as a quality of perspectives—an idea expressive of an analogy, much emphasized by the author, between sensa and value-data—serves to explain the variability and seeming subjectivity of values and raises a question concerning the general conditions affecting the values of perspectives and the specific conditions affecting the perspectives concerned. The thesis formulated and elaborated in reference to this question is that "value experience arises as the mutual effect of the operation of a primary and a subsidiary will." This is a solution in terms closely akin to idealism, and will seem to some at least a very inadequate and logically unnecessitated conclusion to the recognition of the position that the values of perspectives are conditioned and that values are not maintained or attained unless their conditions are fulfilled.

The difficulties and complications peculiarly associated with the term value require the author to make use of his own terminology: he distinguishes between value and value-potentiality, between "are values" and "have value," between "are intrinsic values" and "have intrinsic value," between value as quality and value as validity. But these distinctions do not remove the difficulties and obscurities from his theory. The contention that value has a status as an independently real feature of the objective world, unaffected by the fact that we do not perceive it or feel it, there being such a thing as psychic blindness to value as to other data is not easy—to express the matter cautiously because the connection may be very elusive—to reconcile with the rejection of Professor G. E. Moore's view that value exists independently of anyone's awareness of it or with the declaration that there is no value unless a person is conscious of it. The proposition that value is concretely realized only in actual experience or that consciousness alone has value as content, all other things having value only as a potentiality, as a capacity for affecting value experience, is capable of diverse interpretations; and if such a proposition is considered along with the notion of "obligation to the realization of values" and the notion of value

as "what ought to be," one interpretation to which they all point is that what is valuable is *experiencing* or *being conscious.*

Nevertheless, in spite of these difficulties and, it may be noted, a few awkward grammatical constructions, such as "there could be no positive value experience arise from making the pursuit, etc." (p. 216) and "there is another value makes its appearance" (p. 306), the book is worthily written on an important subject; and, on the other hand, a philosophical argument that is largely realist, especially in its epistemology, that explicitly rejects a central tenet of idealism and yet ends with an ontology akin to idealism and with an ethical proposition that coincides with one enunciated by Bradley, whatever strange offspring of the brain it may seem to those who cling to rigid lines of demarcation between philosophies, cannot fail to be interesting to-day because of the growing tendency it reveals in contemporary philosophy and to be stimulating because of the high effort at synthesis which it manifests. Those who, noting that specific propositions can claim to be established by different, even opposing, philosophical arguments, find questions rising in their minds about the relevance of such arguments at all to the propositions reached may obtain some answer to their doubts in the concluding words of the author in which he stresses the important bearing of a philosophical argument upon the significance, concreteness, and definiteness of a proposition

B. M. Laing.

The Political Aspect of Religious Development. By the Rev. E. E. Thomas, M.A., D.Litt. (London: John Heritage, The Unicorn Press, Ltd. 1937. Pp. xxv + 274. Price 10s. 6d.)

This is in some ways an able and interesting book, in others a disappointing and even irritating one; and it would be difficult to determine whether its merits outweigh its defects, or *vice versa*. The title would lead one to expect an impartial historical account of the influence of politics on religion; but it is rather a polemic argument for a religion which will draw its contents from, and give value to, life as the man of to-day experiences and appreciates it. The term *politics* seems to be used in the wider sense of *social structure,* and the word *religion* is for the most part confined to the Christian, as the writer has only vague allusions to others. As he is described as the Rector of Marchwiel, one would expect that his treatment would be from the Christian standpoint: but, while he indulges in very severe condemnation of the Christian Church, he does not make clear how far he does accept the common creed of Christendom; and he writes as if in religion there were only human discovery and not divine disclosure. The word revelation does not occur in the index. He denies the autonomous character of religion, and makes it dependent on secular changes: "It was the political changes that came first; religious changes came afterwards" (p. 17). The impression which the Introduction gave me was that religion should be the product of the *élan vital.* The last paragraph confirms this impression. "We have now come to the end of our task. What we have tried to show is that religion is life, and life is religion. There is no gulf fixed between heaven and earth, between God and man, between the spiritual and the material. Each is formative of the other. Furthermore, the formative processes through which reality shapes itself under the hands of God and man are historical through and through. When, therefore, we look back upon the history of man and trace his endeavours to arrive at fulness of life through political and social striving, we are at the same time tracing his religious development. In and through his political ideals man's religious ideals take form, become clear, and move towards their

realization. As we look at the present and forward into the future we see how the vast changes taking place to-day, and the intense striving to create political and social principles which shall be adequate to control the greater fulness of life to which the present is giving birth, are having a profound influence upon religion. Religion and the world are being brought into intimate relationship with each other, and religion is being called upon to renew itself at the fire of life and to arise like the phoenix from its ashes" (pp. 266–7). It is no injustice to the author to say that historical Christianity, as the Christian Church conceives it, cannot be fitted into this framework without loss of what is distinctive of it, Revelation, Incarnation, Redemption; and that his doctrine of God tends towards, if it is not identical with, the divine *nisus* of Alexander's philosophy, or pantheism. The conceptions of transcendence, supernatural, miracle are foreign to his thought. In thinking of God as Creator "man is seeking to give to all that happens within the universe an inward bond of unity the same in kind, though infinitely greater in extent, as that which enables him to bind together all the events taking place within his own life and for which he himself is responsible" (p. 157).

I am not in these pages writing as a Christian apologist, and am neither praising nor blaming the author for offering an alternative, however vague he leaves it, for historical Christianity. I could have read with interest and appreciation an unprejudiced and persuasive argument; but what has tried my patience is that the author indulges in generalities which have just enough truth in them to be misleading, and in quite obvious misstatements. A political source is assigned to Christianity. "In the matter of His moral teaching, and in the matter of His religious claims, and in the matter of His miracles, Christ did not stand out high above the finer minds of His times. Where He did stand out infinitely above any thinkers either Jewish or heathen or Roman or Greek was in His political thought" (p. 15). What then was His political thought? "Not only did Christ express His hatred of the rich; He detested and expressed His detestation of the whole political and social scheme whereby riches and poverty came into existence. . . . He also waged a bitter warfare against the money kings of those days" (p. 21). Any competent New Testament scholar, however modern, would simply be amused at so inadequate a statement. On pages 56 and 57 Christ's divinity, resurrection, and exaltation seem to be unequivocably stated; but the phrase in the Index, "His assumption of Divinity," opens the door to doubt whether the author is stating facts which he himself believes, or is expounding the beliefs of the Early Church. If the former, the account of Christ's superiority must appear still more inadequate; if the latter, he would be more consistent with the account of religion than the Introduction would lead one to expect, and the last paragraph of the book indicates. This is the crucial test.

The account of Luther gives undue prominence to his political thought, and ignores what was destructive of him. He is excused for denouncing the Peasants' War. The statement that "princes ought to rule in the temporal sphere and ecclesiastics in the spiritual" is grotesque in view of his reliance on "godly princes" to set the churches in order (pp. 70, 71). Calvin's dependence on Zwingle and Luther is ignored. The charge that Calvin "was not slow to take advantage of . . . a unique opportunity for a man of strength to make himself dictator" is in flagrant contradiction to his reluctance to take the position of leadership, for which Farvel recognized his fitness. The statement about his "religious creed" as living on only "in remote parts of Scotland and Wales" but not in Switzerland will be read with interest in all these countries, which are witnessing a revival of Calvinism (pp. 74–5). As a Nonconformist who may claim to be at the very centre of its progressive

interests and activities, I read with surprise this estimate. "Nonconformity stands bewildered and helpless and despairing in a world it cannot understand in the least" (p. 123). The recent conferences of the Christian Churches are a refutation of the libels on all the Christian Churches in which the author indulges.

The second part is on the whole very much better than the first, and contains some valuable discussions of science, history, and religion, although the last three chapters fall below the level of the preceding six. The author's epistemology seems to be a combination of sensationalism and pragmatism; and it shows a lack of discrimination to include Kant with Hegel and Fichte in one condemnation. In seeking to verify my references I have discovered how defective the Index is. I have not directed my criticisms against the author's own positive conclusions; but against the serious defects of his method of argument, of which I have given only a few instances. The author has certainly not observed the golden rule of doing unto others as he would be done unto. I accept his contention that religious development is and must be affected by the environment; but he exaggerates the primary importance of what he calls "the political aspect."

A. E. Garvie.

Thought and Reality: Hegelianism and Advaita. By P. T. Raju, M.A., Ph.D. (Calcutta), Sastri (Government Sanskrit College, Benares), Lecturer in Philosophy, Andhra University. Foreword by J. H. Muirhead, LL.D., F.B.A. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 285. Price 10s. 6d.)

In one of his class-lectures Hegel expressed his opinion of Indian idealism in the following not very complimentary way: "Individuality, indeed, is not elevated to personality, but the power unfolds wildly enough as inconsistency of the passing over to the opposite; *we are in a realm of unbridled madness* (wir befinden uns auf einem Boden zügelloser Verrücktheit) where the commonest presence is directly raised to (the status of) something divine and the substance is imagined as existing in finite form, and no less immediately what has form is sublimated into the formless."[1]

The sources on which this judgement is based must be the same translations and essays on Indian philosophy which were then available in Europe and at the same time or little later evoked the enthusiasm of Hegel's contemporary and antagonist Schelling, as of W. von Humboldt. They were few but included already both the Bhagavadgītā (London, 1785; Bonn, 1823) and the Upanishads (Strassburg, 1801–2, Latin translation from a Persian translation). This shows how utterly unable Hegel was to find in Indian thought anything congenial to him. But then, next to nothing can have been known to him of the systematic Indian philosophy, and it is hardly possible to believe that he would have upheld his sweeping condemnation, had he become acquainted, e.g. with the Sānkhya-kārikā (1837) or with Śankara's famous commentary on the Brahmasūtras (1851 first incomplete, 1887 first complete translation).

For Hegel philosophy is the science of the Absolute, and it is the very same thing, viz. *brahma-vidyā*, for Śankara. And Hegel is, or at least was until recently, paramount in English philosophy. Sufficient inducement, then, for Indians to try a comparison of the two. This is, of course, possible only within narrow limits, and the task is no easy one. It has, however, been carried through in a really scientific manner by the author of the book before us. He has the double qualification required for it: a sound knowledge of both Indian and Western

[1] *Gesammelte Werke*, 1932, vol. xii, p. 440. Translation ours, also italics.

methods, and, though acquainted with Hegel from translations only and works on his system, may be said to have made himself thoroughly familiar with him. An interesting feature of the book has thus become the combined use made therein, against Hegel and the Hegelians, of the critical apparatus of Western philosophy and the instruments, as supplied by Śriharsha and others, of Indian dialectics.

The book is inscribed "To my teacher Professor Sir S. Radhakrishnan," and the author's aim in writing it has been "the clarification of Śankara's philosophy in the light of Western systems, so that it may be made the basis of logic" (p. 253), i.e. "of the logic of supra-rational Absolutism" (p. 11). It has five parts (with up to twelve chapters each) entitled respectively. "The Absolute as a Coherent System," "The Problem of Negation," "The Problem of Truth," "The Self and the Mind," and "The Philosophical Method," and in each of these we are being led *from Hegel through Bradley to Śankara*. Bradley has been chosen not so much as the greatest British Hegelian but because "of all the great Hegelians or Neo-Kantians Bradley comes nearest to Śankara" (p. 254), viz. through his "fundamental view that thought is inadequate to reality" (p. 254).

The following very incomplete survey must suffice for giving an idea of the comprehensiveness of this important work: *Part I* (eight chapters) is engaged in explaining that the Absolute cannot be the Infinite as understood by Hegel; can be no organism nor a system of individual selves; cannot be conceptual or logical; can have no manifestation of something new; and cannot be dynamic. *Part II* (five chapters) discusses Hegel's application, to the Absolute, of his principle of negation, further the meaning of negation and of difference, etc., and denies (with the Advaita) that negation has any ontological validity. *Part III* (twelve chapters): Identity of the nature of truth and reality. Criterium of thing to be based on its nature. Defectiveness of the coherence and the correspondence view. Status of the object of illusion; error wrongly believed by Hegelians to be absorbed by reality. Necessity to admit the principle of inexplicability (*māyā, avidyā*) advocated by Śankara. Non-contradiction wrongly identified with coherence. Truth as its own criterium. Universals not ontologically real. No distinction to be drawn between existence and reality. The objects of our knowledge are not ultimately real, but they are not mere ideas (Śankara's realistic idealism). *Part IV* (five chapters): Hegel's conceptual thinking explained and criticized; thought lifted to real Absolute Knowledge must disappear. Mind is not the Self, and intellect not the only form of experience; at the bottom of thought there is intuition through which alone the supra-rational and supra-relational Absolute can be experienced (in Self-consciousness): not, of course, as identity, but as non-difference; for "intuition is that consciousness in which distinctions are not found." "Intellect cannot exist without intuition" and may serve as a corrective of intuition, but "existence is known only through intuition." *Part V* (three chapters): the moving principle of the transcendental (=philosophical) method is the principle of non-contradiction, not that of coherence. Limits of syllogistic reasoning. Defence, against G. W. Cunningham, of the argument *a contingentia mundi*. Defects of Hegel's method: his thesis and antithesis are not contradictories, not even contraries, but differents; the lower categories cannot be deduced from the higher; the Absolute, as also the individual, is not coherence but integrality.—After this there is still a "Conclusion" (pp. 245–274) which is really an Appendix consisting of supplementary notes (as on the defectiveness of the dialectic as a process of life, on Śankara and Plotinus, etc.) hurriedly arranged in nine chapters without title and not bearing throughout the stamp of mature consideration which distinguishes the body of the work.

Turning logic into metaphysics is not wholly unknown in Indian philosophy, yet not more than a tendency to it can be pointed out, as e.g. in the inconsistent pluralistic realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika system. On the other hand, the idea of the Absolute as a system or an organic whole, though absolutely rejected by Śankara, who allows no distinction whatever in it, not even that of substance and attribute, is familiar enough to Indian philosophy. Rāmānuja, e.g., holds that souls and matter[1] are the "body" of God stretched forth, as it were, out of him and withdrawn again to its "subtle" condition in an endless series of cosmic "days" and "nights." But God being perfect, here as in every Indian system that has room for him, manifestation is but the ever repeated *divina comedia* (*līlā* "play") without the production of anything really new,[2]—which shows the contrast to Hegel's Infinite always remaining in a process of accomplishment. A conscious Self is not, as might appear from our book, universally assumed in India. It is most emphatically denied already in a late Upanishad where (Māndūkya-Up. 7) the Absolute is defined as "neither inwardly conscious nor outwardly conscious nor bothwise conscious; not a mass of consciousness;[3] neither conscious nor unconscious (torpid)"; and in both the Nyāya and the Mīmāmsā systems consciousness is a mere accidental attribute of the soul which disappears completely in Liberation. Let us remember also that the most ardent admirer of Śankara in the West, viz. the late Professor Deussen of Kiel University, felt compelled to state with regret[4] that Śankara has been unable to resist the widely spread anthropocentric belief that the "innermost being of man and of the world, the Brahman, the Principle, the Deity could have some similarity or analogy or identity with what we find to abide 'behind man's silly forehead' as consciousness, as thought, as spirit." It is in this way, indeed, viz. as some higher kind of consciousness, that the Absolute is understood by the large majority of Indian thinkers, including Śankara (and even the commentators of the Upanishad quoted above), and also by Hegel. But while for the latter it is even rational, it is supra-rational for Śankara and for our author. For, says Dr. Raju, we have *intuition* which alone gives us the idea of existence opposing thought (p. 212), and the highest form of intuition is Self-consciousness=experience of the Absolute (p. 218). Now, this is certainly a correct interpretation of Śankara's standpoint, and we agree with Dr. Raju that our idea of persistent, identical things is not a mere fiction of the intellect for the purposes of life, as held by Bergson (and the German Vitalists), but rests on an intuition that precedes reason and points to a reality which is just the opposite of Time. But we do not see the force of the argument (p. 200) that this reality cannot be unconscious and therefore must be supra-rational—for, is not supra-consciousness one more possibility? —and, on the other hand, find it difficult to believe that those who pretend to have had direct experience of it (as, e.g. Plotinus) have actually succeeded in descending to the deepest depth of our being. We do not mean to say that the idea of such experience is absurd. It is not so, because, even admitting duality in intuition, the Absolute, being necessarily present in both the subject and the object of our ordinary experience (as there can be nothing outside the Absolute), may as well at any time *also*, and occasionally *only*, be in an analogous way conscious of itself *without* the accompanying empirical consciousness. We cannot know what is possible or impossible for a supra-rational

[1] Not the former alone, as stated (by an oversight, no doubt) on p. 56 of our book.

[2] The exit of the liberated soul from the cycle of births being merely the realization of its own true nature.

[3] "Mass (or Lump) of consciousness" (prajñāna-ghana) is, in the older Upanishads, a description of the Absolute understood as pure consciousness in which subject and object are "unified."

[4] *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. i, part 2, p. 121; *cf. System des Vedanta*, pp. 145–146.

entity and should rather say that for the Absolute as the Perfect nothing should be impossible. But the experience of "cosmic consciousness,"[1] or rather several kinds of it, is familiar even to atheistic Buddhism, and we must be allowed to ask whether such experience, so far as it is not purely subjective (as is, admittedly, that, e.g. of "Infinite Space" as distinguished from the "real" experiences mentioned below) is not merely the experience of some higher yet intramundane, consciousness which is at the back of our own, or of the highest personal god (Brahmā, not the neutral Brahmă) of Śankara's cosmology, the ruler of our "Brahman-Egg" (which is, in developed Vedānta, only one of an infinite number of galactic systems).[2] Buddhism teaches eight dhyānas (meditations) leading to ever higher cosmic realms, e.g. the third grade of the first to the realm of Brahmā, the sixth to the realm of "Infinite Consciousness," etc., but none that leads to a supra-rational Absolute or any Absolute at all. The Buddha, while teaching an escape from the world of phenomena, is, on principle, silent on the noumenon, because "where all ideas are expunged, all paths of speech are also expunged" (Suttanipāta 1076). Śankara, on the contrary, emphasizes our conviction of the permanent self (ātmapratyaya) as the only thing we are sure of and is not even afraid of speaking on the relation of the world and the Absolute. Having established "non-distinction" in the Absolute and herewith the phenomenal nature of the individual as of any plurality, he can, without getting involved into Hegel's contradiction (of the one in the many with the latter as an *essential* part of the former) bridge over the gulf by means of his theory of *māyā* (illusion) = *avidyā*, *ajñāna* (ignorance) or, as our author calls it, the *principle of inexplicability*. This is perhaps most conveniently introduced to the West from the Greek habit of conceiving the world, when contrasted with Being or Ideas, as compounded, as it were, of Being and Non-Being. As there can be nothing outside the Absolute, the world, must be also the Absolute, but with a sort of veil over it which both hides it and makes it appear as many and changing. This double function of *māyā* is, in later Vedānta, styled its "hiding power" and "projecting (or: dispersing) power," *āvarana*-and *vikshepa-śakti*. Śankara combats subjective idealism: things and ideas are equally real for him; but both of these are, in regard to the Absolute, *māyā* "illusion," which, however, does not mean that they are "ideas" of and in the Absolute (as with Hegel)—for the Absolute is without distinctions or divisions—but that they are unimaginable both as existing in as outside the Absolute. *Māyā* is, therefore, declared by Śankara to be "undefinable both as truth and what is different from it." It is, says Dr. Raju, "an inexplicable entity" by which we, i.e. "as intellect," "are permeated" (p. 155). But Intellect *is māyā*, and the Absolute is *also* inexplicable; we should therefore prefer to reverse the statement and say, somewhat in the way of Karl Jaspers: existence is the ground that carries consciousness by shining through the latter with a glimmer of it ; it is not entirely outside consciousness but is obstructed in it by the inexplicable entity called *māyā*. Bergson and the Bergsonians are, of course, right in saying that our ego projects its own identity into the stream of becoming, but they are wrong both in calling this identity a mere fiction of the intellect and in condemning the projecting as illegitimate. For, our conviction of identity is based on something more elemental than reasoning, viz. intuition; and the object must be metaphysically of the same nature as the subject, i.e. it must be an

[1] On the Brahmanic view of which there is an excellent little book inspired by James's *Varieties of Religious Experience*, viz. *Cosmic Consciousness, or the Vedantic Idea of Realisation or Mukti (in the light of Modern Psychology)* by M. C. Nanjunda Row (a physician), Madras, 1909.

[2] *Cf.* the "encaptic" view of Professor Karl Groos of Tübingen, in his work *Die Unsterblichkeitsfrage*, Berlin, 1936; also Goethe's monadism.

integrality the breaking up of which into the form of subject and predicate ("the rose is red") can be only due to the process of *māyā* (p. 70). This process by which the Absolute assumes the forms has been styled *vivarta*, which term, meaning also "illusion," is used in contradistinction to *parināma* "transmutation," viz. of God into the world in the pantheistic systems, as to any system trying to explain by causation the relation of the Absolute to the world. It therefore does not mean any imaginable process at all, but points to the Absolute as that which transcends rest and movement as any relation we can think of. All of the many objections raised to the theory by Indian philosophers and constantly renewed until to-day are therefore futile. They "carry the contradictions of the lower level to the higher" (p. 85) by ignoring the absurdity of an explainable Absolute. There exists, as seems to me, something akin to *vivarta* in Western thought, viz. the "creation from nothing" of Christian theology and its philosophical echo in Scotus Erigena and the German mystics.

Our author concludes his work with two small paragraphs on the idea of freedom in the Advaita. He might have been more explicit here as to the problem of *free-will* which he merely hints at with the words "Because of this freedom," viz. of the Absolute, "there is inexplicability in the world." Śankara seems to have nowhere dealt with it (except from his "lower"=theological point of view, viz. in his comment on Brahmasūtra II, 3, 41–42), but would probably agree with the following: We are, as the transrelational Absolute, free from willing, and, as will, subject to causality, but by projecting our feeling of absoluteness (*ātma-pratyaya*) to the will (which as part of the *antaḥkaraṇa* or psychical apparatus is *māyā*, not Self, *ātman*) produce the impossible thing called *liberum arbitrium*.

The book is practically free from misprints, but the transliteration of the Sanskrit in the foot-notes leaves much to be desired and must in a future edition be made to accord with the practice followed by orientalists. On p. 156 (bottom) *twlāvidyā* should be *sthūlāvidyā*, and "snake" (*ibid.*) is a lapsus for "rope"; and on p. 274 the "play of God" is erroneously attributed to the Upanishads.

F. Otto Schrader.

The Focus of Belief. By A. R. Whately, M.A., D.D. (Cambridge: at the University Press. 1937. Pp. x+191. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

This is an interesting and valuable contribution to Christian theology, but it is often difficult to read as the author does not allow himself room for an adequate exposition of his original ideas, and the reader often remains uncertain whether these ideas are true as well as new. It is evident that he has been very strongly influenced by the theology of Karl Barth. He does not attempt to prove Christian theism, but assumes its truth, and then seeks to show how, when accepted in faith, it authenticates itself. After an Introduction stating the subject and method, five chapters are devoted to *Faith* as the organ for receiving and responding to the reality of God as revealed in Christ; it is related to Will, Reason, and Intuition (a direct apprehension of truth), and to Science and Philosophy, Ethics and Theology. All human thought remains inconclusive till Faith completes it. Reason may *comprehend* what Faith as Intuition *apprehends*. Christian theism needs to have a *focus*, and that focus is the redemptive action of God in Christ. Nine chapters are devoted to the exposition of this subject.

I find unsatisfactory the author's attempt to galvanize into apparent life the doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin as quite unnecessary for a doctrine

of Redemption, which can be more adequately stated in modern terms. His view of the Incarnation as an assumption of a human body only seems to me virtually, despite his exposition, to deny the manhood of Jesus. A few sentences from his last chapter *Retrospect and Conclusion* afford a clear summary of his argument. "The aim of this book has been to understand the Christian faith as a focused unity: to commend this presentment, not by coercive demonstration, but by releasing an intellectual intuition that, in its turn, once truly realized, must take control of the natural processes that assisted its emergence. It is our conviction that the whole context of the Christian meaning of Redemption is one inclusive and indiscerptible whole—that Redemption and Revelation may, from the side of either, be brought under one formula—however little we may have succeeded in bringing this home even to sympathetic readers. Further, we are sure (though this could not be worked out in a small space) that this conception gives unity to our general philosophy of life, reality, and knowledge by breaking up illicit or provisional unities that Philosophy has formed within itself, and opening out *from the other side* its convergent blind alleys" (p. 178). Reason is thus subordinated to Revelation, reason to intuition, philosophy to theology, Redemption is not only the focus of belief, but the clue to all reality. The argument is worth considering.

A. E. GARVIE.

Towards the Twentieth Century: Essays in the Spiritual History of the Nineteenth. By H. V. ROUTH, M.A., D.Lit. (Cambridge: at the University Press. 1937. Pp. x+392. Price 21s.).

The False State. By HILDA D. OAKELEY, M.A., D.Lit. (London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 1937. Pp. xii+211. Price 6s.)

These two books are both concerned with individual personality in relation to social structure; and though the subject of one is historical and of the other political, a similar predominantly moral outlook is common to both.

Dr. Routh deals with the failure of the great Victorians to satisfy the moral needs of their age: he discusses the reasons for their failure, and suggests how the legacy of spiritual aimlessness they left to us may be and is being overcome. The earlier part of his book is more successful than the later. On the early Victorian prophets he writes with elaborate mastery. It is an old story perhaps, but retold freshly and with imaginative insight. His general conclusion is that they failed because they "were still living on the inspiration of the romantic movement," and because "they tried to adjust ethics to metaphysics" (p.134). This seems to me true and important; and the whole argument of these middle chapters has a strong philosophical interest. But I found the later ones less satisfactory. There are some strange omissions. Thus while the "philosophy" of George Moore is discussed at some length, such writers as William Morris, Bernard Shaw, and H. G. Wells are barely mentioned. Moreover there is to me an obvious unfairness, and artificiality, in judging writers like Hardy and Conrad in terms simply of their "message"; and the contrast between Hardy's tragic sense and the "anti-pessimism" of the Greeks is a good deal less than adequate. Nor can I agree with Dr. Routh's conclusion that "after a century's controversy and research Physics has displaced Metaphysics in the quest for ultimate reality" (p. 377), nor in his selection of J. S. Haldane, Jules Romains, and Thomas Mann as leading prophets of the new dispensation.

Dr. Oakeley's much shorter book is a philosophical attack on the conception of the totalitarian state, and particularly the ideals of it as set forth in the work of Mr. and Mrs. Webb on *Soviet Communism*. Few, I hope, will disagree

with her in her dissection of this "gigantic fallacy" which "has reduced the life of men and women to unreality in the present era." It is well to insist that the tendency to regard the events of history as "objective spirit" leads naturally to a conception of the state as a super-personal "power," and that this hypostatization of an abstraction supplies the ideological excuse for the exercise of arbitrary authority by an individual despot. Her attack on the concept of the "mass-man" is no less salutary; and she well points out the logical contradictions involved in Mr. and Mrs. Webb's use of the word "freedom." But it is a pity that Dr. Oakeley cannot express herself in clearer English; for the clumsiness of her style continually blunts the edge of her argument. And there is surely some deeper confusion in her argument that the state is not "a necessary historical development."

The special philosophical interest of these two books is that they both voice, in rather different terms, the strong present-day reaction from the romanticism and absoluteness of Hegelian metaphysics. In Victorian days Hegelianism stood for a necessary corrective of a rampant individualism. But the remedy has proved worse than the disease. We need to-day another sort of philosophy, less grandiose and wordy, and more respective of individual personality. There is the citadel of freedom, and there the source of all our values.

ADRIAN COATES.

The Philosophy of Love (*Dialoghi d'Amore*). By LEONE EBREO. Translated by F. Friedeberg-Seeley & Jean H. Barnes. With an introduction by Cecil Roth. (London: The Soncino Press. 1937. Pp. xv+468. Price 15s.)

Although the work here translated from the Italian has passed, in one language or another, through some twenty editions since its first appearance in Rome in 1535, it is probably unknown to most students of the history of philosophy and of literature. Strange though it is—a medley, though a very charming one, of astrology, biology, and ethical and religious idealism—it deserves to be more widely known. No idea runs through literature, at any rate poetic literature, so prominently as that of love, and anyone who would trace its ways and guises from the intricate *rime* of the troubadours to the passionate lyrics of the Romantics will find the *Dialoghi d'Amore* an outstanding landmark and a finger-post to much that came after it. Its distinction of love and desire, and its substitution of metaphysical form as the essence of beauty in place of the contemporary Italian insistence on proportion, bring the book within the purview of the historian of aesthetics, as Croce has recognized. In the history of philosophy Leone is an interesting transitional figure. By taking love metaphysically, as the ground of creation and the principle of cosmic unity, he places himself with the neo-Platonizing Florentines; but, without losing his theism, he secularized the principle much more than Ficino and Pico della Mirandola ever did, and thus prepared the way for the naturalistic study of Nature which soon ensued and which itself gave birth to natural science. This subtle link between Leone and, for instance, Vesalius, may be of less interest to some possible readers than the link with Spinoza. Both were Jews, both mystics, both set a *nisus* at the heart of Nature, and both used and emphasized the same phrase, "the intellectual love of God": and a copy of the *Dialoghi*, in Spanish, was found among Spinoza's books after his death. It is striking that love was given a fundamental place by two unfortunates, the one exiled for being a Jew, the other for not being an orthodox one.

The publishers are, therefore, to be warmly praised for making this very characteristic product of the Renaissance at last available in English, and, it may be added, for giving it a beautiful external form (the printing is by the Curwen Press). The translators have not had an easy task, yet the version is smooth and idiomatic in a really distinguished prose which it is a joy to read. As for its accuracy, so far as I have tested it, it inspires confidence. I only regret that the text from which the translation has been made has not been indicated: it would be a help to know whether it is, for example, Santino Caramella's recent recension (1929, Bari) or Gebhardt's handsome facsimile of the first edition in the *Bibliotheca Spinozana* (Tom. iii, 1929).

The introduction is regrettably brief, being restricted to an outline of Leone's life. Some sketch of the various interest of the book, even if only as bare as the one given above, should have been added, seeing that there is no account in English (so far as I know) to which readers could be referred. The readers who are thus left to search for themselves for any further information about Leo the Jew might at least have been told, for guidance through catalogues and indexes, that his family name is variously spelt—Abarbanel, Abrabanel, and Abravanel.

T. E. Jessop.

The Self and the Ideal. An Essay in Metaphysical Construction on the basis of Moral Consciousness. By Rashvihari Das, M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Metaphysics and Indian Philosophy in the Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner. Reprinted from the Journal of the Department of Letters, vol. xxvii (Calcutta University Press, 1935. Pp. 251.)

Four more words should have been added to the sub-title of this work, viz. "and of Sānkhya metaphysics." For, though this comes out only in the last but one chapter, it is undoubtedly the most interesting feature of the book. We have here a renewal of a philosophical system, the oldest probably of all in India, which became extinct long ago but has left its traces in almost the whole realm of Indian thought. The classical (atheistic) Sānkhya, as will be remembered, teaches a metaphysical "dualism" of (1) Nature (*prakṛti*=matter with mind) as a single principle comprising three forces (guṇas) which pass alternately through huge periods of equilibrium=rest and disturbedness= psychophysical evolution; and (2) an infinite number of souls or spirits (*puruṣas*, lit. "men") which, being in themselves pure (objectless) consciousness, omnipresent, and "inactive," enable Nature to evolve by shedding their "light" on her, and are liberated through getting free from the illusion of their identity with mind. Now, this dualism is by our author upheld but transformed. He (1) removes the inconsistency of a plurality of pure subjects differing from one another in nothing whatever by declaring pure consciousness or the pure subject (undefinable, because comprehensible in itself only) to be one and the same in all "selves"; and (2) makes Nature the unconscious (though not lifeless) other half, as it were, of the Absolute: its *māyā* as he also calls it with the Vedāntic term, though not with its meaning "illusion." Not only, therefore, are the selves the Absolute in disguise (as in Advaita), but their double nature also reflects (as against it) a *real* dualism in the Absolute. The self, then, is a unity in variety, i.e. a real unity of a permanent subject with changing elements, in contradistinction to both the Sānkhya and the Vedānta who deny any real connection of pure consciousness with anything else. Prakṛti remains also when the world is not there, viz. in its "unmanifest" condition called *mūla-prakṛti* "Root-Nature" in the Sānkhya. "That means that it remains identified with the Puruṣa or the ideal" (p. 229). This is, we may add here, in accordance

with the most ancient Vishnuitic system, the Pāñcarātra, which teaches that the withdrawal of the world is, or rather results in, the "over-embrace" of Viṣṇu and Lakṣmi, the highest male and the highest female principle. And *love* is, indeed, insinuated by our author as the whole purport of the world-process looked at as the "play" (*līlā*) of God. For "the play has to be there because the principle of love, which may be supposed to hold together Purusha and Prakriti, sometimes in absolute union and sometimes in partial separation, can express itself only through this play" (p. 231). "Ultimate reality" is what never needs to change itself, i.e. the pure subject only, the unchanging principle of knowledge. This remains the same also during the world-process which requires it as its permanent background. The ground does not contain the world, not even in a germinal state, but "the form and character of the world are determined by it" (p. 226). To account for the origin of the universe we have to assume that the identity or perfect union of the ground with its other is somehow *disturbed*. This corresponds to what in the Sānkhya is termed *kṣobha* (shaking, concussion) and there means only the disturbance of the equilibrium in primitive matter (Root-Nature) implying not alienation from spirit, but, on the contrary, a new entanglement of the (unliberated) spirits in Nature.

This whole view appears in the book before us only as the final result of a long (and rather too lengthy) search after the ideal satisfying the demands of moral consciousness, the latter being taken as an indisputable fact. Moral consciousness means the duty felt to become "good" and act accordingly. What is the highest practicable standard of goodness? Not the idea of the good in the Platonic sense (ch. v) nor the transcendent or transcendent+immanent God of theism (ch. vi) nor an incomprehensible and really unknown Absolute (chs. vii–viii), but an ultimate reality which must be, as in the Vedānta, *saccidānanda*, i.e. "ultimate satisfaction (ānanda) with perfect knowledge (cit) guaranteeing absolute existence (sat)" (ch. xii). Moral consciousness demands a world which is both real and appearance (=changing), and a highest reality which, without containing the world, is its very self and the ideal to be increasingly realized in its history (p. 216). To understand moral obligation we have to suppose a "fall from the ideal," a self-differentiation of the ideal opposing itself to itself, and thus look at the world as "the self-alienated ideal," with the ideal, however, remaining "the ground and support of the world and thus the very self of its alienated part" (pp. 224–227).

The introductory chapters of the book (i–iv) deal with "Metaphysics and Ethics," "The Validity of Moral Judgments," "The Objectivity of Value," and "The Ideal"; the Conclusion (ch. xv) with freedom, evil, immortality, and the personal highest God of religion, the "world-spirit (Brahmā, masc.) "whose visible form is the universe" and whom "metaphysics does not deny," though taking care "to point to what lies beyond him."

The book shows remarkable independence, lucidity of thought, and great literary power, but also rather too much of the verbosity of the class-lecturer.

F. Otto Schrader.

Yoga Vasishtha, translated from the Sanskrit by Hari Prasad Shastri. (London : Favil Press, Ltd., 1937. Pp. 170. Price 3s.)

Yoga Vasishtha comes as a valuable addition to the already extensive Yoga literature of the West, and we welcome this publication especially since it is not an ordinary work which is made accessible to the English reader in this shape, but a philosophy which in the opinion of experts is "one of the greatest productions of the Indian mind," to use the words of Professor

B. L. Ātreya (Yogavāsiṣṭha and its Philosophy, lectures, 1st series 1932, 2nd series 1934).

There is hardly anything in the whole range of Vedāntic literature which can rival the depth of mystic feeling, strength of argument, and beauty of expression with which the universal essence of the individual soul as God-consciousness and master of the worlds is described as in the Yogavasishtha stanzas. They set forth the fundamental truths of all philosophy and any student at any time or place who in the deepest depths of his aspirations is confronted with the "Magnalia Naturae" will find perfect consolation in Yogavasishtha, since here the problems of reality and illusion are indeed solved, or—speaking a little less boldly and a little more Westernly—at least represented in such a way as to convince him that he *can* find the solution within himself. It is this universality of the Vedāntist and its up-to-date significance which tempts one to look for corroboration among leading European philosophers—a task which Professor Ātreya has successfully undertaken, and it is from this aspect that we would ascribe to Professor Shastri's translation more than a passing interest. His English rendering is clear and adequate and rises to poetical heights. We would perhaps not agree with the author's opinion on the chronology and literary criticism of the work translated : but we forgive him for that as he is a man who is convinced that the force of the spirit is more important than that of the letter.

The extracts from the teachings of Yogavasishtha (called by Professor Shastri "Holy Vasishtha") are preceded by the beautiful story of Queen Chudala who figures as a model of Yoga attainment. She is indeed a perfect embodiment of that serenity and happiness which is the fruit of true mystic contemplation.

W. Stede.

Man as Psychology Sees Him. By Edward S. Robinson. (New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1932. Pp. vii + 376. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

This is a book with a wide general appeal, popularly written but by no means superficial. The ground traversed is familiar, and there is nothing very new in the argument except in so far as the author succeeds in bringing the facts together in a rather striking way. The book is well worth reading even by the professional psychologist.

In Part I of the book, which is entitled "Man," the author discusses heredity and environment, motives, learning, and reason. Most of the wider problems of modern psychology, more particularly those with a definite social or educational bearing, are touched upon in an illuminating way, and without ignoring the views of any of the leading schools of psychology. In the last chapter of Part I we are given an interesting discussion of the mind-body problem.

Part II is entitled "Psychology" and begins with a consideration of the nature of the science, from which the author passes to a discussion of its development from philosophy, and then to an examination of the reasons for its position in the public mind to-day. The various cults characteristic of modern psychology are then dealt with in a suggestive and rather epigrammatical way. "The professor of psychology," says Robinson, "loves a cult."

The book can be heartily recommended. J. Drever.

Books received also:

L. Roth. *Descartes' Discourse on Method.* Oxford at the Clarendon Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1937. Pp. viii + 142. 6s.

E. S. Brightman. *The Future of Christianity.* New York: The Abingdon Press. 1937. Pp. 158. $1.50.

H. J. Bridges. (Foreword by Lord Snell.) *The Emerging Faith: Answers to Questions on Ethical Religion.* London: Watts & Co. 1937. Pp. x + 149. 2s. 6d.

W. R. Thompson. *Science and Common Sense: An Aristotelian Excursion.* London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1937. Pp. vii + 234. 7s. 6d.

S. K. Langer. *An Introduction to Symbolic Logic.* London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 363. 12s. 6d.

M. F. Cleugh (Foreword by L. S. Stebbing). *Time and Its Importance in Modern Thought.* London: Methuen & Co. 1937. Pp. x + 308. 12s. 6d.

D. L. Evans and W. S. Gamertsfelder. *Logic: Theoretical and Applied.* New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co. 1937. Pp. xiii + 482. $2.50.

M. J. Adler (Introduction by F. Alexander). *What Man Has Made of Man: A Study of the Consequences of Platonism and Positivism in Psychology.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co. 1937. Pp. xix + 246. $3.50.

T. E. Jessop (Ed.). *The Principles of Human Knowledge,* by G. Berkeley (Bishop of Cloyne). London: A. Brown & Sons, Ltd. 1937. Pp. xix + 148. 2s. 6d.

I. Hedenius. *Studies in Hume's Aesthetics.* (Reprinted from *Adolf Phalen in Memoriam,* Uppsala 1937.) Uppsala and Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksels Boktryckeri-A-B. 1937. Pp. 485. 4 sh.

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A. C. Benjamin. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science.* New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1937. Pp. xvi + 469. 16s.

R. W. Holmes. *The Idealism of Giovanni Gentile.* New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1937. Pp. xvii + 264. 12s. 6d.

C. J. Bond. *The Nature and Meaning of Suffering as Seen from the Evolutionary Standpoint.* London: H. K. Lewis & Co. 1937. Pp. 29. 1s.

M. C. Carré (Translator). *De Veritate: by Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury.* Bristol: J. W. Arrowsmith, Ltd., for the University of Bristol. 1937. Pp. 334. 12s. 6d.

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B. Heimann. *Indian and Western Philosophy. A Study in Contrasts.* London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 156. 5s.

B. Russell. *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz.* New Impression with New Preface. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. xxiii + 311. 12s. 6d.

B. Russell. *The Principles of Mathematics.* New Impression with New Introduction. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. xxxix + 534. 18s.

C. Spearman. *Psychology Down the Ages.* London: Macmillan & Co. 1937. Vol. I. Pp. xi + 454. Vol. II. Pp. vi + 355. 30s. the two vols.

S. M. Imam (Preface by C. F. Andrews). *The Poetry of the Invisible. An Interpretation of the Major English Poets from Keats to Bridges.* London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 231. 8s. 6d.

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B. Romeyer S. J. *La philosophie chrétienne jusqu'à Descartes. III. Les systématisations scolastiques de la philosophie chrétienne.* Paris: Blóud & Gay. 1937. Pp. 186. Fr. 12.

M. Lecat. *L'Intelligence des Animaux: Insectes Sociaux: Chevaux mathématiciens et causeurs.* Bruxelles: Librairie Castaigne. 1937. Pp. 22. Fr. 3.

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G. Castelnuovo. *La Probabilité dan les Différentes Branches de la Science.* Pp. 61. Fr. 12.

J. Mariani. *Les Limites des Notions d'Object et d'Objectivité.* Pp. 85. Fr. 20.

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G. Richard. *La Loi Morale. Les Lois Naturelles et les Lois Sociales.* Pp. 61. Fr. 15.

C. W. Morris. *Logical Positivism, Pragmatism and Scientific Empiricism.* Pp. 72. Fr. 15.

Paris: Hermann & Cie. 1937.

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K. Boldt. *Die Erkenntnisbeziehung.* Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr (P. Siebeck). 1937. Pp. 47. M. 1.80.

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CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL DES SCIENCES ANTHROPOLOGIQUES ET ETHNOLOGIQUES

Copenhague. 1er au 6 Août 1938

La deuxième réunion du Congrès International des Sciences Anthropologiques et Ethnologiques sera placé sous le Haut Patronage de S.M. le Roi de Danemark et d'Islande. Au Congrès seront présentées toutes les recherches qui se rapportent aux races, aux peuples et à leurs genres de vie, c'est à dire ce qui concerne l'étude scientifique de l'homme.

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Kaj Birket-Smith, *Alan H. Brodrick,* *John L. Myres.*
Secrétaires Généraux du Congrès.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

Sir,

The main points of Professor Ushenko's letter in the October issue of *Philosophy* are sufficiently impersonal to call for reply. I think that if he had realized that my review of his book, *The Philosophy of Relativity*, was addressed dispassionately to the readers of *Philosophy* and not mockingly to himself, he would not have written the more extravagant passages, and I will therefore not comment on them beyond defending myself against a charge which, if it were just, would disqualify me for what I have always felt to be the serious and responsible work of book-reviewing. Professor Ushenko states that my review "contends that this book, although 'undoubtedly worth reading' for philosophers, is not a 'valuable contribution' to science. The reviewer might, of course, have made it clearer that I had no intention of contributing anything at all to science." What I said was not that the book was not a valuable contribution to science, but that "we cannot regard his book as a valuable contribution to its professed subject." Its professed subject I had already stated in these words, for which there is almost verbatim justification in the Preface: "This book, which is intended primarily for philosophers, may be described as an attempt to review the nature of physical reality in the light of the theory of relativity. To the physicist it is recommended as a possibly new interpretation of his equations." When, therefore, Professor Ushenko goes on to say that, according to me, "to say that philosophical speculation about the concepts of relativity does not contribute anything to the science of physics, is the same as saying that it is irrelevant to an understanding of the nature of physical reality," he ascribes to me notions which arise entirely from his own imagination.

But the main point is Professor Ushenko's claim that my statement (really mine this time) that "The relation of any scientific theory to philosophy is simply the relation of science in general to philosophy, and that is not at all affected by the advent of relativity" is "simply not true to facts," because "In the history of philosophy before 'the advent of relativity,' the philosophies of events in spatio-temporal relations as contrasted with the philosophies of substances in mutual transactions were not, and could not be, heard of." True: and before the advent of the electromagnetic theory of light the philosophies of electromagnetic ethers as contrasted with those of mechanical ones were not heard of; nor were the philosophies of atomic as contrasted with those of continuous energy heard of before the advent of the quantum theory. These facts do not affect my statement, which is simply that the concern of philosophy is with the procedure of science and not with the particular products which happen to be in vogue at the moment.

Professor Ushenko, for some reason which I do not understand, regards my last-quoted statement as inconsistent with my admitting "the relevancy of science to philosophy." He then proceeds to argue that relativity and solipsism are incompatible, in opposition to my statement that they were conformable with one another. This point is really important, and I venture to discuss it very briefly, since Professor Ushenko's understanding of relativity seems less complete than I was formerly willing to assume. In the language of relativity, the metric

$$ds^2 = g_{\mu\nu}\, dx^\mu\, dx^\nu, \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (1)$$

where the values of the g's are unspecified, represents *any possible* mechanical system whatever, described in terms of *any* system of coordinates. Now give the g's a particular set of values. Then the resulting equation represents *one particular* mechanical system, described in terms of *one particular* system of coordinates. Next, make any mathematical transformation of coordinates (I am ignoring irrelevant

mathematical minutiae, and writing in rough, but for this purpose accurate, terms), thus obtaining an equation with different values for the g's. Then this equation represents the *same* mechanical system as before, described *either* (i) by the same observer using a different system of coordinates, *or* (ii) by a different observer using the "same" system of coordinates. The remaining forms of equation (1), in which the g's have values *not* obtainable from the chosen ones by mathematical transformation of coordinates, represent *other* mechanical systems.

Now relativity makes no distinction whatever between (i) and (ii). If you are a solipsist you choose (i); if you abhor solipsism you may choose (ii); but the choice, if any, is made on grounds entirely outside physics. That is why I say that relativity is conformable with solipsism, and hold Professor Ushenko to be in error in saying they are incompatible. His remarks on "space-like and zero-intervals which cannot be observed by a solipsist for the simple reason that they transcend observation" are meaningless. The "zero-interval" between an event on the Sun and my perception of it is about $8\frac{1}{3}$ minutes and 93 million miles in the usual coordinates. It has been observed, and therefore cannot transcend observation, and in any case it has nothing whatever to do with solipsism.

Professor Ushenko's final argument shows the falseness of his position still more clearly. He says, "I can change from time to time my coordinate systems, but if I do I am not the same percipient event after such a change . . . tantamount to a rejection of the thesis of solipsism." Does Professor Ushenko really believe that if I decide to measure lengths in metres instead of in centimetres, I become another person? That is what in effect he says, because it is an essential feature of relativity that this simple change of coordinates is identical in principle with the most complex change, corresponding to the most complex motion, conceivable. Moreover, if I can change my identity in this way, who on earth am I? Professor Ushenko must surely know that according to relativity there is no one coordinate system peculiar to any one observer, but that all possible ones are (apart from convenience, which varies with the problem considered) equally legitimate. But it is unnecessary to follow the implications of this argument because it is clear enough that, true or false, this thesis concerning percipient events has nothing to do with relativity. It is held, if at all, on quite independent grounds and then applied to relativity. That is the characteristic of most of Professor Ushenko's book, and that is why I said that it was not a valuable contribution to its professed subject. It is not a philosophy of relativity; it is relativity uncomprehendingly considered in the light of an independent philosophy.

Yours faithfully,
HERBERT DINGLE.

IMPERIAL COLLEGE,
LONDON, S.W.7.

(This correspondence is now closed.—ED.)

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*.

DEAR SIR,

In his notice of Professor F. M. Cornford's important *Plato's Cosmology* in your last issue (p. 482), Professor G. C. Field accepts Mr. Cornford's exegesis of the difficult Platonic words (*Timaeus* 37c6) in which the οὐρανός is called τῶν ἀιδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα as final. He agrees that the meaning is that the heavens are a *shrine* inhabited by "everlasting gods," who are the stars and planets. In the hope of possibly having an answer either from Professor Field or from Professor Cornford, may I state briefly the difficulties which make me still hesitate to accept the interpretation? (1) At the point which Timaeus has reached in his narrative, nothing has been said as yet of the existence of either stars or planets? How then can a reader be expected to guess (or how were the imaginary auditors of Timaeus to guess) that the "everlasting gods" means neither of the only beings who have so far been called "god" in the dialogue (the "Demiurge" and the Universe) he makes, something hitherto

unnamed? (2) If the text of vour MSS. is correct, there is clearly an intentional antithesis between *ἀιδίων* and *γεγονός*. It is meant then that the "gods" in question have a better right to be called everlasting than the "shrine," which is by contrast with them called a *γεγονός*. But how can the stars be opposed in this way to the "cosmos"? (3) While it is, of course, true that those commentators who have assumed the *ἄγαλμα* can mean nothing but an *image* are wrong, is there sufficient warrant for giving it, in any passage of classical Greek, the sense Mr. Cornford puts on it, *shrine?* Where *ἄγαλμα* in classical authors does not mean image, it seems to bear the sense of (*a*) *ornamentatum* or (*b*) *deliciae*. That it could mean *shrine* is just what needs to be shown. I should be very willing to accept the interpretation if these difficulties can be met. If they cannot, I fear I shall still impenitently think the words of the passage probably corrupt (in which case the mention of "gods" is pretty certainly part of the corruption). A. E. Taylor.

Edinburgh,
October 1937.

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

Sir,

Although not a logical positivist, I, as a physicist, have come to take up a somewhat similar view,[1] and it was, therefore, with the greatest interest that I read Professor Muirhead's criticism and Dr. Lamont's article in the October number of *Philosophy*. The more I read, however, the more I am convinced that philosophers will one day have to wear the hair shirt of science, i.e. they must define their terms. I admire Professor Muirhead's youthful attitude in refusing to give up the search for "the best," but I fail utterly to see how, without defining the word "best" we can ever get anywhere.

It has always seemed to me that "good" and "bad" applied to actions are learned when we are children and mean, roughly, "pleasing or displeasing to Papa or Mama or Nanny" and that, when we grow up, we drop Mama and Nanny and change Papa into God. But God, being a hypothetical entity, can be made to like what we please, and has, in the past, for instance, liked human slavery. At the present time it is not quite certain whether this hypothesis likes birth-control. . . . Therefore, even for those who believe in theism the question of what is a good act degenerates into the question of what is pleasing to a hypothesis, and to those who do not require this hypothesis it is meaningless.

To avoid difficulties of this sort I have found it useful to add the word "for" and use only "good for" and "bad for." Thus "Is cycling good?" (meaningless) becomes "Is cycling good for . . . ?" and then educated higher apes (such as philosophers and physicists) cannot resist the habit of completing the sentence and we get, say, "Is cycling good for the digestion?" or "Is cycling good for the bank-balances of those who have shares in cycle companies?" both of which have a meaning, since there is a large measure of general agreement as to the difference between good and bad digestions and shares.

I am entirely in agreement with Dr. Lamont that the moral philosopher is not concerned with what ought to be done ("ought" is another word with a meaning only in the nursery), but to show "how your use of this standard, or your thinking this particular type of action good, is related to other facts about your life and social and material environment" (p. 441).

This object clearly requires the establishment of true facts and relations and thus ethics becomes a part of science, and the inducto-deductive method of Francis Bacon becomes the most fundamental activity of our branch of the higher (= more complex) apes, of which a humble member subscribes himself.

Your servant,
G. Burniston Brown

Hampstead,
November 1937.

[1] Cf. The Limits of Science, *Science Progress*, 116, p. 729. April 1935.

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"OUTLINES OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY," a class by the Director of Studies, on Wednesdays, at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1. The class will be resumed in the Lent Term on Wednesday, January 19th. Fee for the course, 12s. 6d. Members free.

The EVENING MEETINGS for the Lent Term of the Session will be held at University College, Gower Street, W.C.1, at 8.15 p.m., on the following dates:—

Tuesday, January 18th: "The Rational and Empirical Elements in Physics." Herbert Dingle, D.Sc., A.R.C.S. (Assistant Professor of Astrophysics, Imperial College of Science).

Tuesday, February 15th: "Philosophy and the Common Reader." Professor L. S. Stebbing.

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